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Preface
Through her camera, Martha Cooper captured much of the energy of the
emerging hip-hop scene during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Cooper, a
white photographer for the New York Post, gained entrance into graf‹ti cul-
ture and was provided an opportunity to document the birth of hip-hop.1
Her photographs render the burgeoning aesthetic of early hip-hop culture,
its socioeconomic context, and the youthful exuberance of the participants.
Because photography is a visual medium, these pictures tend to privilege
graf‹ti and break-dancing over deejays and emcees. Cooper’s Hip Hop Files
shows graf‹ti artists sketching ideas on notepads, kids painting in dimly lit
train yards, and trains covered with designs that require multiple cars.2 She
also took photographs of the Rock Steady Crew, one of the earliest and most
important break-dancing groups.3 Her work depicts them training, practic-
ing, and ultimately performing. These shots also provide evidence of how
New York City was suffering from neglect and decay even as these early hip-
hop pioneers were laying the foundation for a new cultural aesthetic.
Cooper documents, among other things, how property, cultural owner-
ship, and materialism, in various forms, have shaped hip-hop culture.
Cooper’s photography portrays graf‹ti artists acquiring paint and canvases
by whatever means possible and documents the disintegration of the Bronx
and other boroughs. It also depicts how young people sought to reclaim a
form of ownership over their crumbling communities. In retrospect, these
photographs highlight battles over public space, private property, and in-
tellectual property. Although the City of New York criminalized the par-
ticipants, graf‹ti art, break-dancing, and deejays, at their best, sought to
beautify a decaying urban landscape and create public spaces for post–Civil
Rights era youth to enjoy the freedoms for which the Civil Rights Move-
ment fought so gallantly.
These early elements of hip-hop culture quickly entered both main-
stream and elite cultures. Break-dancing, due to MTV’s emergence and the
immense popularity of Michael Jackson, found adherents across the country
and in many suburban communities. Graf‹ti art also soon merged into the
New York art scene as graf‹ti writers, including Lee Quinones and Fab Five
Freddy, became the subject of gallery shows during the early 1980s. Jean-
Michel Basquiat, who gained as much or more celebrity in the art world than
in the world of hip-hop, transformed graf‹ti into an “elite art” and soon be-
came associated with Andy Warhol and other New York artists. Pre‹guring
intellectual property law’s con›ict with hip-hop, his work from the early
1980s frequently included ironic usages of copyright and trademark symbols.
Richard Marshall argues that “the © is Basquiat’s stamp of approval, author-
ity, ownership, and originality.” He further observes that “by symbolically
copyrighting his SAMO sayings, Basquiat was not just identifying them as
his own, but sarcastically commenting on the obsession with legitimacy,
ownership, and authorship, even of his often cryptic, subversive, and anti-
ownership phrases.”4 Long before sampling became the subject of copyright
disputes, hip-hop aesthetes, like Basquiat, examined who “owned” American
culture and how the distribution of property and putatively color-blind
property law doctrines operated to produce racial inequalities.
Hip-hop would soon expand beyond New York and the United States.
Although it has relatively quickly become a key element of youth culture
worldwide and a form of mass or corporate culture, its initial concerns with
ownership, property, and materialism remain integral elements of hip-hop.
Hip-hop culture continues to provide a running dialogue, albeit sometimes
confusing, contradictory, and highly metaphorical, about the material con-
ditions of African American life and the relationship of Black America to
American society and culture. The term hip-hop aesthetics denotes how
these issues shape the content and form of contemporary African American
cultural texts. My examination of hip-hop aesthetics seeks to explain the
relationships among post–Civil Rights era art, literature, and music and
view them as interrelated phenomena. By privileging artistic and literary
texts in my account, I hope to transcend the debates about hip-hop lyrics,
especially their violence and sexism, and focus on the underlying aesthetic
strategies that shape their production.
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Another purpose of this book is to try to make some sense of the con-
fused debate about property, property rights, and materialism in the
post–Civil Rights era. Law, economics, cultural studies, and the arts all lay
claim to these words, and no one book could synthesize all these usages.
Scholars have most frequently viewed this con›ict as pitting hip-hop mu-
sic, especially with its reliance on sampling, against copyright law’s under-
standing of fair use. In part because this is well-worn territory, and because
I thought this narrow focus has unintentionally omitted some key elements
of the story, I have broadened the con›ict to examine a wider range of vi-
sual and textual production and to provide an occasion to speculate in a
more philosophical tone (as opposed to a doctrinal one) about the purposes
and effects of intellectual property law. As I hope this book makes clear
throughout, intellectual property law is not the sole or primary in›uence
shaping contemporary African American cultural production. Rather, it
has become one of the key contemporary battlegrounds for a wide range of
social, cultural, economic, and political questions.
In its effort to synthesize the vibrant conversations around intellectual
property5 and hip-hop aesthetics,6 this book, engaging in a thought exper-
iment of sorts, asks what insights could be gleaned if we viewed hip-hop
aesthetics and African American cultural history, more generally, through
the lens of intellectual property law (with occasional slippages into prop-
erty law) and if we imagined what intellectual property law might look like
if it tried to use copyright and trademark regulations to create a more just
circulation of racialized texts. Obviously, these questions are arti‹cial ones,
because neither legal nor cultural texts can be so neatly isolated. The “real
world” is in‹nitely more complex. That being fully admitted, this thought
experiment helps sheds light on how the mind-sets or worldviews pro-
moted by hip-hop and intellectual property law con›ict at a conceptual or
theoretical level and further the contemporary racial divide.
To examine this interface between hip-hop aesthetics and intellectual
property law, I rely heavily on critical race theory and Latino/a critical the-
ory.7 These models have helped me imagine how a color-blind area of law,
intellectual property law, might be transformed into a discursive space
where race-conscious remedies might be developed and a more just popu-
lar culture nurtured. In a nutshell, the overall structure of this book follows
what I would term a critical race theory methodology, which seeks to ex-
amine the historical, popular, and cultural origins of today’s debate about
intellectual property and then proceeds to offer a number of case studies in
which legal doctrine is applied to speci‹c texts. The conclusion then tries
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to suggest how each discipline or ‹eld might be affected by this con›ict be-
tween hip-hop aesthetics and intellectual property law. Because this proj-
ect attempts to synthesize the work of so many scholars from numerous
‹elds, I regret that it has been impossible to recognize every scholarly con-
tribution to this book without destroying the ›ow of the text and the cen-
tral argument developed herein.
The book begins in chapter 1 by examining the historical debate within
the African American community about the role of property and material-
ism in shaping a social justice agenda. The second chapter shifts to an ex-
amination of African American popular culture and its relation to the de-
velopment of critical race theory. I consider how Henry Louis Gates’s
in›uential description of vernacular and artistic practices within the
African American community relies on assumptions that run directly
counter to intellectual property law’s assumptions about creativity. The
third chapter draws on Anna Deavere Smith’s Twilight—Los Angeles, 1992
to map out the characteristics of hip-hop aesthetics and provide an
overview of contemporary aesthetic strategies, highlighting how those
strategies have resulted in legal con›ict or led to the threat of legal con›ict.
Chapter 4 applies the hip-hop aesthetic to Toni Morrison’s Beloved and
Adrian Piper’s Vanilla Nightmare series. Neither Morrison nor Piper is part
of the hip-hop generation, but this chapter tries to show how the structure
and themes of their work, especially their focus on the meaning of owner-
ship, constitute a bridge between Civil Rights generation strategies for so-
cial justice and hip-hop era approaches. Chapter 5 examines copyright and
trademark law’s approach to fair use by engaging in a close reading of Col-
son Whitehead’s John Henry Days and Michael Ray Charles’s Forever Free
series. The penultimate chapter considers the possibility of social transfor-
mation and what intellectual property law terms “transformative use” by
exploring Alice Randall’s The Wind Done Gone and the artwork of Fred
Wilson. The book concludes by suggesting possible directions for future
scholarship in African American literature, African American art history,
intellectual property law, critical race theory, and hip-hop studies.
By examining hip-hop as an aesthetic structure that underlies a range of
genres, this book can provide a fuller critique of contemporary social and
cultural relations. Parodies of Ownership ultimately concludes that intellec-
tual property law doctrine has contained and neutralized the critical im-
pulse of hip-hop aesthetics even if contemporary African American writing
and art have ›ourished. Despite attempting to transform how intellectual
property law distributes ownership rights for ideas, expressions, and texts,
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courts have been unwilling to modify copyright law even when practition-
ers of hip-hop aesthetics, such as Alice Randall, win their cases. The wide-
spread popularity of hip-hop aesthetics has challenged but not transformed
intellectual property law.
Because this book regularly shifts among four academic disciplines (litera-
ture, art, law, and music) that do not always share premises or methods, I
must acknowledge a few of my working assumptions in writing this book:
1. While this study describes how hip-hop has in›uenced contempo-
rary African American literary and artistic production, it is clear that hip-
hop is not solely an African American phenomenon. At its origins, hip-hop
blended multiple ethnic traditions in its aesthetic and continues to do so
today, especially as its popularity in Europe, Africa, and Asia attests. How-
ever, I have limited my study to hip-hop’s effect on African American art
and literature in order to keep the project a manageable one and to main-
tain a fairly uni‹ed focus throughout.
2. While much contemporary African American cultural production ‹ts
within the hip-hop paradigm, it would be a mistake to apply the model to
all people with a certain skin tone. Rather, this books identi‹es the central
elements of hip-hop, translates them to a number of aesthetic realms, and
demonstrates how a range of creative endeavors within African American
culture share a common methodology or approach.8 Not all books by
African American writers will ‹t within this paradigm, nor will every piece
of art by African American artists. For example, this book does not exam-
ine “street lit,” despite its recent popularity and its focus on hip-hop-re-
lated content, because these books tend not to display the aesthetic strate-
gies discussed herein.
3. Hip-hop’s journey through the legal system has been well-docu-
mented and analyzed, especially as it relates to the “fair-use” doctrine, by
numerous hip-hop and intellectual property law scholars. While this book
examines the fair-use doctrine and applies it to contemporary African
American cultural production, it spends most of its critical energy examin-
ing the abstract or philosophical meaning of intellectual property, rather
than engaging in doctrinal analysis. The doctrinal analysis of fair use’s ap-
plication to hip-hop has largely been accomplished, and the most pressing
issues in intellectual property law scholarship, from a lawyer’s point of
view, have moved onto new terrain. Rather, this book is concerned with a
different set of questions. Who “owns” the American cultural imagination
and possesses the ability to rework and reconstruct it? What kinds of own-
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ership rights can be asserted through art, music, literature, and law, espe-
cially by historically marginalized people? Do textual producers draw on
particular aesthetic or cultural traditions when they assert their ownership
claims, no matter whether they are making copyright, trademark, or even
patent claims? Although this book frequently relies on dominant legal
analysis as a point of comparison, I am even more interested in explaining
the cultural and philosophical signi‹cance of the gap between intellectual
property law and hip-hop aesthetics. I have chosen “intellectual property
law” as the key theoretical focus, despite the book’s emphasis on copyright,
because it is a more general term and offers a more appropriate analog for
understanding what Rayvon Fouché terms “black vernacular technological
creativity,” forming the basis for the hip-hop aesthetic during the post–
Civil Rights era.9
4. I rely on the term property to denote a range of meanings: self-own-
ership; a claim of ownership; a tangible good; the laws regulating the own-
ership of tangible goods, land, or texts; and property rhetoric/talk. Within
the context of African American historical experience and cultural criti-
cism, one de‹nition frequently blurs into the others, and literary, musical,
and visual references to any one aspect of property frequently constitute
metaphors for the other de‹nitions of property. This slippage, I would ar-
gue, is intentional within African American cultural criticism because it is
designed to destabilize or challenge legal discourse. It also serves to ques-
tion the existing distribution of property and property rights. To respect
this tradition, I have adopted this metaphorical usage of property.
5. As a heuristic device, I argue that contemporary African American
criticism re›ects a shift from civil rights to property rights. For many
lawyers, this is a distinction without a difference because property rights
are civil rights too. I nonetheless use this language because property rights,
by and large, rely on the logic of alienability, where one’s interest can be
bartered or traded away. Civil rights approaches, by contrast, tend to as-
sume that one’s rights to due process and equal protection cannot be alien-
ated or given up as a part of negotiation or contract. (Again, I realize that
lawyers more familiar with the nuances of property and civil rights law
might disagree with this broad characterization.) Because of hip-hop’s ma-
terialism and its emphasis on commodi‹ed forms of identity, I believe that
examining the shift from a rhetoric of inalienability (civil rights) to one of
alienability (property rights) and its legal rami‹cations is absolutely essen-
tial for any understanding of contemporary African American cultural pro-
duction and its critique of dominant legal discourse.
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6. Although I do see differences between the Civil Rights and the hip-
hop generations, I also see many linkages.10 If their parents generally saw
the Civil Rights Movement as a romantic struggle to overcome racial in-
justice, then hip-hop children tend to view the earlier generation’s accom-
plishments and their effects more ambiguously and ironically. My assump-
tion, as a cultural historian, is not that these attitudes are incommensurate
and unrelated. Rather, the purpose of this book is to trace out how and why
the hip-hop generation has turned from romantic optimism to a more
ironic attitude. The recent election of Barack Obama suggests that these
two generations do share values and goals and that the cynicism and irony
of the post–Civil Rights era may be transforming into a new cultural nar-
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From Chattel to Intellectual Property:
Legal Foundations of African American
Cultural Critique
Copyright and intellectual property are the real estate of the
future.
—Dexter Scott King, Growing Up King
Many critics charge that the King family has neglected King’s
social and moral legacy in favor of exploiting for themselves
his commercial appeal.
—Michael Eric Dyson, I May Not Get There with You
The U.S. Postal Service has issued over 150 stamps of African Americans.
From Frederick Douglass and Harriet Tubman to Malcolm X and Charlie
Parker, the images of African American leaders, musicians, athletes, scien-
tists, and business leaders have been captured on stamps of all sizes and de-
nominations. The watershed year for this representational emphasis is
1980. Between 1940 and 1980, about twenty African Americans appeared
on postage stamps. In the last quarter-century, nearly seven times that
number of African Americans have appeared on postage stamps and post-
cards. Despite the continued existence of racial hierarchy and white su-
premacist thought in American life, what does this sudden explosion of im-
ages from African American history mean? How does this shift in
American popular visual culture demand a rereading of the very tradition
of African American cultural criticism these stamps seek to represent?
How does the “materialization” of this tradition of dissent alter the very
meaning of the original messages for contemporary readers? Does this
commodi‹cation of such ‹gures reveal absences, gaps, or new ways of
reading and understanding these canonized ‹gures?
The hip-hop and Post-Soul generations (who came of age after the
March on Washington, but before the rise of commercialized hip-hop) en-
countered the great leaders of African American history not only within
their homes and churches but within American popular culture as well.
Unlike earlier generations, who learned about the accomplishments of
Douglass, Jacobs, Cooper, Washington, and Du Bois primarily within the
con‹nes of the African American community, more recent generations
have encountered the canonized versions of King and Malcolm X, along-
side the African American community’s memories. If their parents and
grandparents knew their words, the hip-hop generation is just as likely to
recognize the images of Martin and Malcolm as their ideas. On the one
hand, this increased visibility demonstrates a shift in American culture be-
cause most people consider it “normal” to recognize African American he-
roes. On the other hand, more images within American visual culture do
not necessarily translate into a broader-based commitment to end racism
or white supremacy. Ironically, the civic recognition of King and others has
persuaded many whites that racism is a thing of the past. The increased vis-
ibility of African American leaders may also cause the hip-hop generation
to grow cynical about Civil Rights Movement heroes because the apparent
widespread acceptance of their efforts has not helped to realize their vi-
sions of freedom and equality for African Americans.
From the hip-hop generation’s viewpoint, the translation of the Civil
Rights Movement into stamps or other commodities creates an ambiguity
about the movement itself. Coupled with the general ironic attitude to-
ward politicians, athletes, and Hollywood stars, this has led to widespread
cynicism about social activists and activism. For example, the main charac-
ter of Barbershop (Eddie, played by Cedric the Entertainer) calls Martin
Luther King a “ho” because of his adulterous behavior and states that
“Rosa Parks ain’t do nothin’ but sit her black ass down.” These comments
(and the ones critical of Jesse Jackson as well) re›ect disenchantment with
the Civil Rights Movement, its tactics, and its vision because the move-
ment and its main ‹gures have become unquestionable, especially as white
leaders from across the political spectrum genu›ect at the past while in-
2 / parodies of ownership
creasingly ignoring the continued legacy of racial hierarchy in American
culture.1
This chapter provides an intentionally revisionist account of African
American cultural criticism. My goal here is to trace the origins of the hip-
hop generation’s approach to property law and why materialism and prop-
ertizing one’s identity, at least on the surface, appear to be more appealing
than social activism for many young African Americans. Building on the
work of many hip-hop commentators who have examined, criticized, and
defended hip-hop’s materialism, I seek to place hip-hop’s attitude toward
property in a historical context. My purpose is not to rehearse the argu-
ments made so ably by Derrick Alridge, Regina Austin, Yvonne Bynoe, Jeff
Chang, Nelson George, Robin Kelley, James Peterson, Ted Swedenburg,
S. Craig Watkins, and Kristine Wright on this topic. Rather, I hope to ‹nd
a broader historical explanation for this “return” to property rights and
contextualize it as part of the ebb and ›ow of African American cultural
criticism. Todd Boyd has begun this project by articulating the dawning
self-consciousness among the hip-hop generation.2 Regina Blackburn has
also initiated the project of revising African American cultural history
through the lens offered by hip-hop.3 This chapter, in essence, is equal
parts archaeology, genealogy, and hermeneutics. Using the material prac-
tices and frequent materialism of hip-hop as a primary analytic, I reread
the classic texts of African American studies to help them speak to the chal-
lenges of the post–Civil Rights era.
Stephen Best has recently argued that slave law in the nineteenth cen-
tury laid the foundation for the contemporary propertization of life via in-
tellectual property law.4 In this chapter, I seek to extend his account and
show how African American culture has increasingly placed property law at
the center of cultural criticism. Rather than providing a de‹nitive reading
of any one text or period, I am trying to stitch together remnants of his-
torical memory and develop a narrative to explain recent shifts in African
American cultural production. This new/old narrative breaks up African
American intellectual history into three periods based on the main ques-
tion the period posed for property law. The ‹rst period (1780–1880) asked
who could own property. While there was a range of writings, sermons, and
speeches during this period, I am speci‹cally interested in how some of the
most famous slave narratives addressed this question about the subject in
property law.5 The second period (1880–1964) begins with the enactment
of Jim Crow laws and caused African Americans to struggle with the ques-
tion of where could African Americans own property and the spatial logic of
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property law. These questions about the geography of race can be found in
the debates between Du Bois and Washington and between Malcolm X
and Martin Luther King. The last period (1964 to the present) represents
the beginnings of a new era in which the question becomes who owns the
imaginary domain out of which African Americans form cultural identity. In this
section, I explore the lawsuit between Rosa Parks and Outkast. The
post–Civil Rights era has been marked by multiculturalism and identity
politics. The legal battle over Parks’s name suggests how the ownership
over the symbols and metaphors of American and African American life
has become a central issue in African American cultural criticism.6 My
rereading of African American history through the lens of property implies
both continuity and change between generations or historical periods.7
While admittedly painting with a broad historical brush, my goal here is to
provide a historical context for hip-hop aesthetics and its attitude about
property.
Slave Narratives
Slave narratives depict the monstrous cruelty of slavery, enabling formerly
enslaved African Americans to write themselves into American culture and
providing a forum for demonstrating how slavery tainted the entire coun-
try with immorality. According to Robert Stepto, “The strident, moral
voice of the former slave recounting, exposing, appealing, apostrophizing,
and above all remembering is the single most impressive feature of a slave
narrative.”8 These highly crafted narratives allowed certain talented writ-
ers, like Frederick Douglass, to assume a high level of authorial control in
spite of the many generic restrictions and engage in social, cultural, and
political criticism.9 Hazel Carby notes that “in the slave narratives written
by black women the authors placed in the foreground their active roles as
historical agents.”10 Carby’s study also demonstrates that African American
women used the slave narrative both to assert control over racial and gen-
der stereotypes and to create, via writing, a more authentic self. Henry
Louis Gates argues that because slave narratives frequently were honed
and perfected on the speaking podium prior to being written down, the
texts incorporate both authorial intent and audience response.11 Gates
contends that from the beginning, slave narratives constituted revisionist
accounts of African American history. Hip-hop’s rereading of slave narra-
tives thus merely serves as the latest iteration of revisionist criticism.
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Hip-hop’s rereading of slavery and slave life is perhaps no more shock-
ing than Booker T. Washington, who downplayed the hardships of slavery
to promote the value of labor, but it nonetheless clashes with more estab-
lished views and fosters tensions between generations of African Ameri-
cans.12 Near the conclusion of Jake Lamar’s The Last Integrationist (1996),
Emma Person, one of the main characters, states quite bluntly that “what
the slave wants is not freedom, but a slave of his own.”13 Through Emma
Person, Lamar argues that freedom is not the main goal of the slave—
property ownership is. If Lamar alone had articulated such a position about
slavery, it might be idiosyncratic to highlight it here. However, Edward P.
Jones won the 2004 Pulitzer Prize for ‹ction for his novel The Known World
(2003), where he presents a complex portrait of antebellum life that in-
cludes a former slave becoming a slave owner himself. In Jones’s ‹ctional
account, Henry Townsend, a freed slave and plantation owner, quickly
adapts and adopts the attitudes toward property held by whites of the pe-
riod. In the visual arts, the MacArthur Foundation presented Kara Walker
with a prestigious “genius” grant for her black cut-paper silhouettes that
resurrect forgotten images of African Americans from the South. Walker
has been criticized for producing work that so closely resembles forms and
images designed originally to demean and oppress African Americans. Be-
cause Walker’s silhouettes tell complex stories, Thelma Golden once com-
mented to Walker, “I imagine that there must be 500 pages of some sort of
parody of a slave narrative lurking in your studio.”14
Do these fairly well-received instances of contemporary artists and writ-
ers rewriting slave life suggest how hip-hop is revising our understanding of
slavery? Annette Dixon writes: “Adopting the antiquated medium of the sil-
houette, Walker turns it into a power tool with which she evokes the system
of slavery, exploring themes of exploitation, accommodation, and complic-
ity in the institution of slavery on the part of both the powerful and the op-
pressed.”15 Novels about slavery written in the transition period between
the Civil Rights era and the full-blown emergence of hip-hop aesthetics in
the late 1980s, such as Ernest J. Gaines’s The Autobiography of Miss Jane
Pittman (1971), Gayl Jones’s Corregidora (1975), and Sherley Ann Williams’s
Dessa Rose (1986), retain a much more reverent attitude toward those who
were enslaved and clearly criticize every aspect of racism from that era.
More recent images and novels present a much more ambiguous image of
slave life and the goals and hopes of enslaved African Americans. By analyz-
ing a few select passages from three of the more important slave narratives,
I will bring attention to several moments in these texts that critics have
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tended to overlook but that are likely to gain in importance as a result of the
hip-hop challenge to African American cultural criticism.
Most scholars identify Olaudah Equiano’s text as one of the earliest
slave narratives. A hip-hop rereading of the text might, for instance, focus
on the narrative’s conclusion, after Equiano is free and is attempting to ‹nd
success in a postliberation (at least for him) setting. The narrative’s ulti-
mate anecdote relates his efforts to serve the English government and aid
a group of Africans the British wished to return to Africa. Initially, Equiano
refused to join the mission but was ultimately convinced to participate.
The misappropriation of funds by government of‹cials, however, caused
the ship to lack the basic requirements needed to complete the journey. A
number of the Africans perished as a consequence of this misuse of public
property. As a result of the improprieties, the government relieved
Equiano of his position. Equiano then uses his narrative to protect his in-
tegrity and incorporates in his text a number of letters that demonstrate
that his virtue was ultimately vindicated by later investigations.
A hip-hop reader is likely to focus on this passage because it confronts
the dilemma of hip-hop culture: how does one maintain one’s integrity
(i.e., keep it real) in a material world? This concluding story from his nar-
rative allows Equiano to remind his readers one last time that slavery con-
stitutes barbarity and a form of theft. Equiano demands that English law
take seriously its own property laws. Slavery circumvents property law
properly understood and undermines the budding capitalist ethic.
Equiano’s argument is structurally similar to hip-hop’s critique of contem-
porary property law because both reiterate the value of protecting property
interests but question what can and cannot be owned. Even though the
narrative as a whole is much more concerned with developing a critique of
slavery and stating the case for abolition, its attention to property relations
allows the book to speak in a different register to contemporary audiences,
especially as it makes clear that the evil of slavery is that it is not a small step
from the misappropriation of black bodies to the misappropriation of gov-
ernment property.16
Similarly, Harriet Jacobs’s Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl concludes
by reinforcing the importance of reconstructed property law for African
Americans. Although one might assume that a woman, such as Jacobs, who
had been an object of property would demand a complete abolition of the
propertization of life, Jacobs endorses ownership as long as the subject of
property law (i.e., who can own things) is expanded to include African
Americans. Under antebellum law, slave owners stole a slave’s labor. To
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this, Jacobs responds, “When a man has his wages stolen from him, year af-
ter year, and the laws sanction and enforce the theft, how can he be ex-
pected to have more regard to honesty than the man who robs him?”17 She
argues that property law will be just only if the right to own property (i.e.,
the power to exclude others from enjoying or reaping the bene‹ts of an ob-
ject) is guaranteed to those at the bottom of society as it is those at the top.
A society that limits the rights of ownership to a speci‹c class of men will
necessarily be an unstable one because it will be, in effect, condoning theft.
Jacobs’s slave narrative concludes with the claim that “the dream of my life
is not yet realized. I do not sit with my children in a home of my own. I still
long for a hearthstone of my own, however humble. I wish it for my chil-
dren’s sake far more than for my own.”18 The last scene suggests that free-
dom and property ownership are intertwined and that the realization of
property ownership will help her achieve her ultimate dream. Jacobs’s last
wish, however, links property ownership with virtue because it is primarily
for the sake of her children that she wishes to become a property owner.
Within this context, freedom from slavery is not freedom enough. The
‹nal liberation occurs, at least textually, when the freed slave becomes an
owner herself and can transmit her wealth to her children.
If Jacobs and Equiano attack slavery while explicitly arguing for the im-
portance of property ownership, Frederick Douglass appears to assume the
necessity of property rights for achieving freedom and equality.19 In his
speech “What to the Slave Is the Fourth of July?” Douglass announces his
support for John Locke’s approach to property in his Second Treatise and its
inclusion within the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.20
In My Life and Bondage, Douglass discusses the controversy that arose when
abolitionists purchased his freedom while he was visiting England. In de-
fending the abolitionists, he argues that this action should be viewed “in
light of a ransom, or as money extorted by a robber,” and that such an ac-
tion did not violate “the laws of morality.” In addition to absolving his lib-
erators from any moral guilt, Douglass reminds abolitionists that the prob-
lem with slavery is not the possession of a right of property, but of “a right
of property in man.”21 Because James Wright immediately manumitted
Douglass, the laws of morality were satis‹ed by his actions, and property
law was rehabilitated.
While these three moments cannot represent the entirety of the slave
narrative tradition, they do point to a contemporary reading of African
American history that emphasizes ethical forms of ownership. This read-
ing of the tradition diverges signi‹cantly from Marxist or radical analyses
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in which the elimination of property rights should theoretically lead to a
greater equality among all Americans. In the post–Civil Rights era, critical
race theorists (and hip-hop artists as well) have pretty much accepted cap-
italism as a necessary ground for any social change. For example, Cheryl
Harris argues in her 1993 article, “Whiteness as Property,” that whiteness
has functioned as a property interest for most white Americans and that
af‹rmative action has been and continues to be necessary to remedy the ef-
fects of this ongoing racial legacy. She concludes that “in protecting the
property interest in whiteness, property is assumed to be no more than the
right to prohibit infringement on settled expectations, ignoring counter-
vailing equitable claims that are predicated on the right to inclusion. It is
long past time to put the property interest in whiteness to rest.”22 It is cru-
cial to note that Harris seeks to rede‹ne property by eliminating racialized
properties, which her revisionist legal history traces back to the antebellum
period, not to dismantle the property concept altogether.23 While the slave
narratives can be (and have been) read in a number of ways, recent debates
about multiculturalism, property rights, and reparations help de‹ne the
meaning of the slave narratives for the hip-hop generation. Perhaps the
hardship most shared by the slaves and today’s hip-hop generation is a gen-
eral exclusion from the market economy. Hip-hop aesthetics reenacts the
slave narratives’ desire to become the subjects of property law.
The Great Debate: Washington and Du Bois
My attempt to offer a new periodization for African American cultural crit-
icism jumps from the great slave narratives (from the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury) to the turn-of-the-twentieth-century debate between Booker T.
Washington and W. E. B. Du Bois. The transition from the slave narratives
of Equiano, Jacobs, and Douglass to Washington and Du Bois’s non‹ction
clari‹es the categorical differences between the two periods’ approaches to
property law. Once the crisis of de‹ning objects and subjects of property
law (or who can own what within property law) gets resolved, at least tem-
porarily, through the Civil War, the battle within legal discourse turns in-
creasingly to the geography of race and the spatial dimensions of property
law. Although few historians have described it as such, the debate between
Washington and Du Bois concerns geographic distinctions within prop-
erty law, as Jim Crow segregation primarily attempted to create spatial dis-
tinctions to replace the status distinctions that had been outlawed with the
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Emancipation Proclamation. The question shifted from who could own to
where do the boundaries of property law extend.
Booker T. Washington’s Atlanta Exposition speech in 1895 sets the
grounds for this new debate about property law. The speech’s ‹rst image is
that of two ships meeting. One of the ships is suffering from lack of water.
When the distressed ship asks for water, the response is, “Cast down your
bucket where you are.”24 Washington, unlike many others of this period,
urges African Americans to remain in the South and “put brains and skill
into the common occupations of life.”25 He advocates using whatever ma-
terials people can ‹nd and whatever skills they have toward earning money
and building wealth.26 Washington speci‹cally refuses to dismantle Jim
Crow laws ‹rst. Rather, he argues that material prosperity will lead the way
to other forms of equality.
“In all things that are purely social,” Washington says, “we can be as
separate as the ‹ngers, yet one as the hand in all things essential to mutual
progress.”27 His famous symbol of the hand provides a ready metaphor to
describe the ‹ght for equality and prioritizes the struggles that African
Americans will need to overcome. The ‹rst hurdle is economic for Wash-
ington. For African Americans to succeed economically, Washington advo-
cates an initial acceptance of Jim Crow and the geography of race in the
South. African American material prosperity will “bring our beloved South
a new heaven and new earth.”28 Much like the writers of the slave narra-
tives, Washington reinforces the importance of property rights. He de-
mands neither the immediate abolition of property rights nor the disman-
tling of Jim Crow. Rather, his autobiography condemns theft early and
often in order to demonstrate how the logic of self-improvement hinges on
property rights.29 Washington is careful to align the goals of the African
American community with those of the white community. What Washing-
ton, in effect, requests is that the South respect the very racial lines it has
drawn and allow African Americans to acquire property within those
boundaries. Washington thus answers the question of where can or should
African Americans own property by saying, wherever whites allow African
Americans to do so, as long they consistently respect those boundaries. At
least one hip-hop studies scholar has argued that the rhetorical construct of
the “hip-hop mogul,” and its performance by Russell Simmons, Sean
Combs, and others, embraces Washington’s approach to racial uplift.30
For Du Bois, Washington’s answer is unacceptable. Du Bois argues that
the Atlanta Exposition speech “represents in Negro thought the old atti-
tude of adjustment and submission” and that the “program practically ac-
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cepts the alleged inferiority of the Negro races.”31 While criticizing the
economic tenor of Washington’s thought, Du Bois appears to exit the lan-
guage of property and adopt politics, civil rights, and education as key words
in his analysis of Jim Crow. It is my contention, though, that Du Bois does
not fully abandon economics or property law in his critique of American
culture. Rather, his analysis of the relationship between geography and
property relies on psychological metaphors to emphasize that ownership is
not how a person relates to an object, but how communities determine the
relations between objects and subjects. What Washington attempts to sta-
bilize in his Atlanta Exposition speech (the boundary lines where African
American property claims will be respected), Du Bois remaps entirely. Du
Bois argues that any strategy for African American liberation must ‹rst
create the conditions where social and self-respect can be won and then re-
work the rules about property ownership based on this new psychological
geography.
In the opening chapter of The Souls of Black Folks, Du Bois articulates his
famous notion of double consciousness. In an oft-quoted passage, Du Bois
writes:
It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of al-
ways looking at one’s self through the eyes of the other, of measur-
ing one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused con-
tempt and pity. One ever feels his twoness,—an American, a Negro;
two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring
ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from
being torn asunder.32
Many argue that this passage constitutes an attempt to represent the strug-
gles faced by African Americans. Earnest Allen has recently challenged this
view. Allen notes that despite the popularity of this concept, especially in
the post–Civil Rights era, he doubts Du Bois found it a successful descrip-
tion of the psychic condition of African Americans because he quickly
abandoned the phrase after introducing it.33 Allen presents a compelling
case for rethinking the now standard interpretation that focuses on self-es-
teem or self-realization. Certainly, the recently rediscovered and rere-
leased collection of photos Du Bois prepared for the 1900 Paris World Fair
displays no signs of “unreconciled strivings” or “warring ideals.” The im-
ages re›ect digni‹ed middle-class African Americans striving to improve
themselves and the race.34
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Viewing this famous quotation through hip-hop aesthetics’ engage-
ment with intellectual property law suggests Du Bois deployed psycholog-
ical terminology to describe the spatial problem at the heart of property
law and thus to respond to Washington’s embrace of economics. Du Bois
has taken the racialized or segregated geography that Washington accepts
and tries to move it within the body in order to show its danger. He devel-
ops three arguments against Washington. First, Du Bois, relying on psy-
chology, argues that segregated spaces ultimately lead to segregated minds
and that segregated minds cause madness, not empowerment. Du Bois
concludes that Washington’s bargain with the South is a failure because it
would allow African Americans to own only a part of themselves. Limiting
African American ownership claims to restricted areas within the black
community, for Du Bois, is not really ownership at all: “He [Washington]
is striving nobly to make Negro artisans business men and property-own-
ers; but it is utterly impossible, under modern competitive methods, for
workingmen and property-owners to defend their rights and exist without
the right of suffrage.”35 In this passage, Du Bois makes clear that his dis-
agreement with Washington is over not the importance of property rights,
but how African Americans can best attain them.
The geography of difference and ownership is inscribed in a second
way in Du Bois’s account of double consciousness. Du Bois posits a scene
where identity is constructed through a series of views.36 Although many
rely on this account to explain how identity is constructed and how the vi-
sual shapes cultural formation, reading Du Bois’s description of double
consciousness through property law theory suggests a different meaning.
An object (in this case, a person) does not have identity a priori. Rather,
identity is a product of human effort that gets mixed with a seemingly nat-
ural object (in this case, the body). In other words, Du Bois relies on a the-
ory of racial consciousness where the properties of identity always already
require a network or constellation of views or perceptions.
By insisting that the social matters for acts of self-ownership, Du Bois
undermines Washington’s reliance on an uncritical rhetoric of self-im-
provement. Washington implicitly endorses the capitalist ethic. Central to
this ethic is John Locke’s theory of property. Locke writes:
Every man has a property in his own person: this no body has any right
to but himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we
may say are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the
state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his
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labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby
make it his property.37
In his account of how property is created, John Locke argues that a human
being owns himself, without regard to social rule or custom, and owns
whatever his labor touches. Washington, however, quickly retreats from an
orthodox Lockean position because he cannot talk of natural property
rights without running afoul of segregation laws because within a segre-
gated society, a person is prohibited from owning whatever his labor mixes
with unless it falls within the limited geography permitted by Jim Crow
laws. Through his speech, Washington implicitly accepts the Southern at-
tempts to de‹ne African Americans regardless of how individuals de‹ne
themselves. Du Bois’s description of double consciousness allows him to
unmask the failed foundation of “segregated ownership” as a philosophy.
Ownership claims within the limited spaces left to African Americans con-
stitute incomplete acts of ownership because a racialized legal discourse
could just as easily ignore or repudiate them. According to Du Bois, the
central problem of African American history has not been the failure to de-
mand self-ownership, but the failure of whites and legal discourse to rec-
ognize those demands.
Du Bois’s third and ‹nal critique of Washington’s approach to property
also involves the where question, but holds that the most important prop-
erties are cultural—not material. As is well-known, Du Bois and Washing-
ton differed greatly on the kind of education that African Americans
needed. Du Bois advocated for higher education, and Washington favored
vocational training. A way of understanding this debate is to consider it an
effect of how they answered the question about where African Americans
should own property. Du Bois believed that cultural properties would lift
up the race, while Washington preferred a focus on the accumulation of
material objects.
Following Du Bois’s lead, many African Americans sought to create so-
cial and cultural institutions that challenged segregation. For example, the
early twentieth century saw a boom in African American fraternal lodges.
Frequently, African Americans tried to model their organizations after suc-
cessful white organizations, such as the Elks or the Masons. Borrowing re-
galia and symbols, they frequently gave their organizations names like the
Black Elks and the Black Masons in an effort to show solidarity with white
lodges. Despite the appearance of segregation, participants viewed them-
selves as integrating into American culture by joining these civically
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minded organizations. Anticipating more contemporary debates and con-
troversies, the white lodges frequently resorted to law, sometimes even in-
tellectual property law, to prohibit their black counterparts.38 Interestingly,
the courts relied on theories of “territorial jurisdiction,” with its connec-
tion to Jim Crow segregation, to determine when and where black organi-
zations could appropriate the regalia and symbols of white lodges.39 Some
scholars have argued that these lawsuits helped develop the legal tactics
that would be deployed later, during the Civil Rights Movement.40 These
disputes illustrate how African Americans sought to claim ownership over
segregated spaces and objects in American culture.
In addition to its effects on political and social life, segregation created
tremendous barriers for African American musicians. Ironically, the mod-
ern music industry developed concurrently with Jim Crow segregation
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and Jim Crow
thus contributed to its overall structure. K. J. Greene argues that three fac-
tors made it dif‹cult for jazz and blues musician, especially African Amer-
icans, to succeed: “(1) inequalities of bargaining power, (2) the clash be-
tween the structural elements of copyright law and the oral predicate of
Black culture, and (3) broad and pervasive social discrimination which
both devalued Black contributions to the arts and created greater vulnera-
bility to exploitation and appropriation of creative works.”41 In many ways,
intellectual property rights issues, which are the subject of this book, had
not ripened because artists had to overcome other barriers ‹rst. Russell
Sanjek and David Sanjek note that segregated unions also affected the
ability of many African American musicians to earn a living, play music
live, and participate in recording sessions.42 Even industry practices re-
garding recording contracts differed based on the musician’s race. Frank
Kofsky describes how Billie Holiday and Charlie Parker worked under
particularly ungenerous contracts.43 The ‹rst major copyright clearing-
house (ASCAP) had rules that made it dif‹cult for many blues and folk
musicians to join. Without the creation of BMI in the 1940s, artists such
as Huddie Ledbetter, Arthur “Big Boy” Crudup, and Fats Domino may
not have been able to receive royalties from their work.44 Because the
question of segregation dominated this historical moment, African Amer-
ican criticism about the de‹nition and distribution of ownership rights
over cultural texts has only recently become a central concern. Even
though intellectual property law has become a focal point in the ongoing
quest of racial justice, hip-hop artists still face numerous political, eco-
nomic, social, and contractual hurdles.45
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The rise of Jim Crow and the entrenchment of segregation presented
the problem of where African Americans should own property. Washington
went along with the racialized geography in order to help African Ameri-
cans build material wealth and an economic base. Du Bois looked to psy-
chology, sociology, and culture as more fertile and ultimately more
signi‹cant areas for making claims of ownership. While the debate be-
tween these two giants of African American thought has long been foun-
dational to African American studies, a hip-hop rereading of their dis-
agreement helps us understand how property concerns shaped the debate’s
terrain. As will become apparent in later chapters, hip-hop culture has not
embraced either Washington or Du Bois, but both of them. Of course, this
produces tension and can appear paradoxical or contradictory, but it also
re›ects the hybrid nature of hip-hop, where samples of seemingly contra-
dictory beats, rhythms, or melodies can be brought into a certain harmony
through hip-hop artistry.
Martin Luther King and Malcolm X
Despite the nearly ‹fty years between the Washington–Du Bois and the
King-X debates, the question about where African Americans should own
property remained an open one even after Brown v. Board of Education ruled
that “separate but equal” was unconstitutional. Lorraine Hansberry’s A
Raisin in the Sun (1959) portrays the debate within a ‹ctional black family,
the Youngers. Through the play’s dialogue, Hansberry considers which
kinds of property claims will best serve the family after they receive an in-
surance check following the father/husband’s death. On a basic level, the
play asks whether it is better to own a liquor store in segregated Chicago
or purchase a home in an integrated neighborhood. The Youngers ulti-
mately opt to demand integration.46 While Hansberry’s play explores other
issues and con›icts besides property law, it nonetheless provides a ready
bridge to connect debates between Washington and Du Bois with those
between King and Malcolm X. Although not typically considered primar-
ily critics of property law, Martin Luther King and Malcolm X returned to
the Washington–Du Bois debate about property (although some would say
it never completely left African American culture). In more conventional
histories of the period, King comes to represent integration, and Malcolm
X becomes a spokesperson of Black Nationalism. For King, integration
means the ability to own property alongside or next to white people and
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would allow African Americans to buy homes where they wanted, open
businesses, and participate fully in society. Black Nationalism, on the other
hand, argues that African Americans must develop their own businesses,
social structures, and cultural institutions in order to gain true equality. In
contrast to integration, true liberation will occur when African Americans
develop their own resources without relying on or mixing with white
people and their institutions. For Malcolm X, integration would prove a
failure because it would force African Americans to give up or sell their
birthright (Black culture) as the price of social recognition.
James Hal Cone, quite astutely, points out that any mapping of Martin
Luther King and Malcolm X into an ideological binary is simple and in-
complete: “We should never pit them against each other. Anyone, there-
fore, who claims to be for one and not the other does not understand their
signi‹cance to the black community, for America, or for the world. We
need both of them and we need them together. Malcolm keeps Martin from
being turned into a harmless American hero. Martin keeps Malcolm from
being an ostracized black hero.”47 Cone argues that over the course of their
lives, their respective philosophies moved closer together. For my purposes
here of exploring a hip-hop rereading of King and X, however, it is inter-
esting to examine how their words invoke a series of property claims. Both
sought to answer the question of where should African Americans own
property.
In two of his most important texts, King relies on property talk to lay a
foundation for his appeal for equality. Neither moment has become part of
the national myth, like King’s dream that his children “will not be judged
by the color of their skin, but the content of their character” or his claim
that he is “an extremist for love.” However, his appeals to property law sug-
gest that it forms an emotional and theoretical basis for his call for integra-
tion. Hip-hop generation readers of King’s “Letter from Birmingham Jail”
‹nd King’s lament about how “you suddenly ‹nd your tongue twisted and
your speech stammering as you seek to explain to your six-year-old daugh-
ter why she can’t go to the public amusement park” particularly powerful.48
This image helps white readers “feel” the emotional pain caused by segre-
gated property rules. A hip-hop revision emphasizes the consumerist or
materialist mentality that underlies this powerful historical moment. Even
though King eventually questioned capitalism as an engine for equality, in
this justly famous letter he updates Du Bois’s argument about segregated
spaces to include how a segregated marketplace leads to fundamental un-
fairness and inequality. Probably because of the class divisions within the
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African American community, King initially emphasized the “ordinary”
middle-class longings of African Americans in order to build a bridge with
whites and demonstrate the plausibility and inevitability of integration in a
market economy. The vocabulary of property and loss marked within this
anecdote suggests that property- or materially based critiques were not
completely foreign to the Civil Rights generation. In fact, even King, the
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), and the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) relied on such metaphors to
mobilize middle-class African Americans and to persuade whites that all
people wanted the same (material) things.
In his “I Have a Dream” speech, King lays the theoretical groundwork
for his dream by noting that the ideals of the Declaration of Independence
and the Constitution have not been realized. The metaphor that he
chooses to represent this failure is that of a returned “promissory note”
that “has come back marked ‘insuf‹cient funds.’”49 According to legal dis-
course, a promissory note is a property interest. Akin to cash or stock, a
promissory note allows its owner to protect his interests and confers rights
and remedies on the owner if a problem arises. Within the speech, King re-
lies on social contract theory to explain the origins of American democracy
and to appeal to conventional notions about how society works. King reit-
erates the founding contract, which brought the United States into being,
in order to write African Americans back into that contract. He also sug-
gests that the basic rules of exchange and contract require white America
to respond in good faith and live up to their promises. According to King,
“we’ve come to cash this check, a check that will give us upon demand the
riches of freedom and the security of justice.”50 This promissory note, this
property interest, becomes the driving force in “purchasing” liberty and
justice. Within the logic of the speech, King’s dream must be purchased
through the transfer of property. The unspoken, but all too dearly paid
consideration for this transaction, was the labor of slaves and the burdens
imposed by segregation.
Obviously, Malcolm X would not have relied on such a metaphor be-
cause he argued that whites could not be persuaded into giving African
Americans rights and that this framework perpetuates the central lie of
American culture (i.e., that the American Revolution, the Declaration of
Independence, and the Constitution offered freedom to all). Nor would
Malcolm X have quite endorsed efforts to gain the right to eat with or play
with white people because integration was not his solution to race in Amer-
ica. Malcolm X answered the question of where African Americans should
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own property quite differently and thus deployed property rights to other
ends. Malcolm X argued that revolutions are “based on land” and that “a
revolutionary wants land so he can set up his own nation, an independent
nation. These Negroes [Martin Luther King and other more moderate or
integrationist approaches] aren’t asking for any nation—they’re trying to
crawl back on the plantation.”51 Malcolm X argued that where African
Americans should own property was the crucial question. For him, this
question was not simply one of physical geography, but of how culture and
social institutions de‹ne and transform a space into a place. In “Message to
the Grass Roots,” Malcolm argues that integration cannot be a suf‹cient
response to the where question because that will only address the effects,
not the causes of white supremacy in America. Later in the same speech,
Malcolm states that “this modern house Negro loves his master. He wants
to live near him. He’ll pay three times as much as the house is worth just to
live near his master.”52 Malcolm X belittles integration because it fails to
rede‹ne ownership. In many ways, he blends Booker T. Washington’s eco-
nomics and Du Bois’s sociology to transcend existing property rules and
create a more just social structure.
Malcolm X does not just criticize King and other reformers without of-
fering his reformulated de‹nition of property and true ownership:
The economic philosophy of Black Nationalism is pure and simple.
It only means that we should control the economy of our commu-
nity. Why should white people be running all the stores in our com-
munity? Why should white people be running the banks of our
community? Why should the economy of our community be in the
hands of the white man? Why? If a black man can’t move his store
into a white community, you tell me why a white man should move
his store into a black community.53
For Malcolm X, a revised property law must go beyond looking at who
owns individual tracts of land. Rather, Malcolm X looks at patterns of own-
ership and seeks to build networks of property relations. Black National-
ism, according to Malcolm X, transcends Booker T. Washington’s ap-
proach to property law because it refuses to ignore overall economic
structures and the tremendous inequalities they produce. Self-reliance or
self-help without concerted effort and a desire to take control of the com-
munity cannot empower the entire community. It only enriches certain
chosen individuals. Unlike Martin Luther King, Malcolm X does not be-
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lieve that increased property exchanges, which lead to more integrated
neighborhoods, will improve the situation of the African American com-
munity. Integration only further isolates African Americans from one an-
other. The goal of Black Nationalism is to draw new cultural boundaries,
not accept existing ones, as integration does. Because African Americans
would establish these new spatial divisions, they would be empowered.
Black Nationalism thus stresses the geography of ownership, perhaps even
more so than other theoretical orientations, because it subordinates indi-
vidual property rights in favor of communal needs. In this instance, the an-
swer to the question of where African Americans should own property is
not so much a particular physical space, but a metaphysical or cultural one.
The only meeting between Martin Luther King and Malcolm X oc-
curred during the congressional hearings about the Civil Rights Act of
1964. This act transformed American culture by granting formal equality
to African Americans in public facilities and marked the beginning of the
end of this debate. Within the context of my argument that African Amer-
ican cultural criticism has frequently focused on property law, it is impor-
tant to review with some care this watershed moment for the Civil Rights
Movement and the hip-hop generation. The legislation states, “All persons
shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, fa-
cilities, and privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of
public accommodation.” The bill continues by identifying the physical
spaces covered by these rights:
(1) any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment . . . ;
(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda foun-
tain, or other facility principally engaged in selling food for con-
sumption on the premises, including, but not limited to, any
such facility located on the premises of any retail establishment;
or any gasoline station;
(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, sta-
dium or other place of exhibition or entertainment.54
While Congress would wait until the Civil Rights Act of 1965 to address
inequalities in voting, and the Civil Rights Act of 1968 to speci‹cally ad-
dress home ownership and apartment rentals, this ‹rst major legislative
victory focused squarely on opening up public spaces, especially sites of in-
teraction and entertainment, to integration. The underlying logic of this
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and other Civil Rights acts implicitly endorses a property-centered analy-
sis of African American cultural criticism. This legislation transforms
equality into a consumer transaction.
This victory (clearly more integrationist than Black Nationalist) set the
wheels in motion for a new property paradigm to take hold in African
American cultural criticism. Physical integration, for better or worse,
would become the new national paradigm for improving race relations and
the quality of life for African Americans. Although advocates for “color-
blind” jurisprudence would see this as the logical end for civil rights ac-
tivism and African American cultural critique, raced cultural criticism con-
tinues.55 Instead of focusing on delineating the physical boundaries that
limit black life, the question, mirroring a much wider debate in American
culture, centers on who owns the imaginary domain out of which African Amer-
icans form cultural identity. This battle not only pits African Americans
against whites but has also created a rift between the Civil Rights and the
hip-hop generations.
Rosa Parks and Outkast
Despite the wonderful idealism of Civil Rights leaders, their legacy has be-
come the subject of property disputes. After the deaths of King and Mal-
colm X, heated battles ensued over who owns the rights to their work and
who should have the right to purchase and display their intellectual prop-
erty. The King estate has sought to control his legacy by threatening and
initiating lawsuits against Boston University, the television program 60
Minutes, and even the federal government for planning to use King’s like-
ness in a memorial without paying for the rights.56 The King family has as-
serted its intellectual property rights in his papers and his image in order to
protect his legacy. While we might question from whom or what they are
protecting him, it is quite clear that copyright law allows King’s heirs to
control access to and authorize who may copy his papers. These rights
have allowed the King family to claim ownership over a central ‹gure of
African American culture and American history. The life and thoughts of
Martin Luther King have become propertized and transformed into a re-
source to be developed, managed, marketed and sold. Obviously, this situ-
ation is troubling, or at least an impediment, to students of American cul-
ture and anyone who wishes to claim and extend King’s legacy.
But King is not alone in becoming the subject of intellectual property
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disputes after his death. Lost to history, the papers of Malcolm X suddenly
appeared in an eBay auction in February 2002. A few weeks later, eBay
pulled the auction because the auctioneers, who had presented the materi-
als, could not adequately determine the legitimate title for the materials.
Academics argued that these items needed to remain together within an
archive or library that could appropriately manage them.57 The Shabazz
family and scholars feared that intellectual property law would allow im-
portant historical, cultural, and literary data about Malcolm X to slip be-
hind a “veil” of private ownership and possibly be lost to scholarly in-
quiry.58 One scholar even suggested that these documents constitute the
inalienable inheritance of all African Americans.59 Ultimately, the Schom-
burg Center for Research in Black Culture purchased the documents and
is preparing them for further study and public display.
The controversies surrounding the cultural legacies of Martin Luther
King and Malcolm X reveal the increasing importance of intellectual prop-
erty law for regulating how contemporary African Americans remember
these icons, pay homage to them, and build upon their ideas. The aca-
demics who commented on the Malcolm X papers saw a need to protect
some private ownership rights for the Shabazz family and to allow some
form of cultural ownership rights for all African Americans. These cases
suggest the dif‹culties inherent in drawing a line between the public do-
main, what is “our” common heritage from which we may borrow, and the
needs of individuals to hold their own documents, ideas, and stories in pri-
vate ownership.
The lawsuit between Rosa Parks and Outkast demonstrates just how
much the debate about property within African American culture has
changed and become much more complicated because it involves tensions
not only between blacks and whites but between generations of African
Americans as well.60 Mark Anthony Neal argues that the Outkast “song can
be seen as a tribute to her [Parks] and the movement that her actions
helped incubate. I see the use of Rosa Parks in this context as one of the
components of Post-Soul strategies that willingly ‘bastardize’ black history
and culture to create alternative meanings, a process that was largely intro-
duced to the Post-Soul generation via the blaxploitation ‹lms of the
1970s.”61 Todd Boyd argues that Parks’s actions reveal how the Civil Rights
generation misunderstands hip-hop.62 Building on the astute analyses of
Neal and Boyd, I would add that both Outkast and Parks willingly proper-
tize, or transform their ideas and values into potential property interests.
Who won the dispute is of less interest to me than how their economic mo-
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tives for commencing the lawsuit undermine their ability to articulate any
kind of claim that does not appear motivated by materialism or greed. The
Civil Rights ethic of working together to create a more just world has ap-
peared to slip away. Besides Rosa Parks, Bobby Seale claimed that a ‹lm
company falsely represented him in its movie about the Black Panthers,
and Faith Ringgold ‹led suit against Black Entertainment Television
(BET) for using a reproduction of her art as part of the scenery in an
episode of Roc.63 Neither won their case, but both activists, who had previ-
ously made claims about the collective cultural experiences of African
Americans, articulated their claims under the rubric of private property.
In 1998, Outkast released the album Aquemini, which features the song
“Rosa Parks.” The song does not really reference Rosa Parks or her famous
refusal to stand in 1955, which led to the Memphis bus boycott, but it does
contain the line: “Ah ha, hush that fuss / Everybody move to the back of
the bus.” Parks sued Outkast because she claimed that the use of her name
(1) constitutes false advertising, suggesting that Parks either approved of
the music or endorsed the compact disc; and (2) intrudes on her right of
publicity. Based on documents submitted in the lawsuit, it is clear that
Parks did not want her name associated with a hip-hop album because she
had recently licensed an album of gospel recordings, Verity Records Presents:
A Tribute to Mrs. Rosa Parks. This lawsuit suggests that Parks and, by im-
plication, the Civil Rights generation have shifted focus from civil rights to
property rights. Parks displays some of the same motivations and values for
which the Civil Rights generation criticizes the hip-hop generation. The
lawsuits ‹led by Civil Rights era leaders and their heirs, from Martin
Luther King to Malcolm X to Bobby Seale to Faith Ringgold to Rosa
Parks, seem to re›ect more continuity with the hip-hop generation’s con-
cerns than most would like to admit. Nelson George identi‹es a key mo-
ment in this transition to a new approach to property: “Public Enemy
made politics seem cool. In the process, they also made politics a com-
modity.”64 The reparations movement offers another example of the
in›uence of property rhetoric on African American cultural criticism. Pro-
ponents of reparations hope to use the money from any settlement to rem-
edy poverty, unemployment, and illiteracy and/or create museums, li-
braries, and educational curricula.
In district court, Outkast successfully defended itself as the court ruled
that the bus reference establishes a strong connection between the song
and its title and that the group’s First Amendment rights allow them to use
Parks as a symbol within their song. That court dismissed the lawsuit after
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Outkast submitted a motion for summary judgment.65 Parks appealed this
decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which over-
turned the lower court’s decision. The Court of Appeals questioned the
connection between the title and the song and determined (through its
own reading of the lyrics) that little binds the song to the title and that
therefore it was possible for a jury to conclude that the song merely uses
Parks’s name to get free publicity. Therefore, it denied Outkast’s motion
for summary judgment and returned the case to the district court for a
trial.
Both juridical attempts to determine “whether there is any artistic rela-
tionship between the title and the underlying work” deserve close scrutiny
because they reveal the new tensions within African American culture as it
confronts contemporary intellectual property doctrine.66 Before exploring
these analyses, it should be noted that Rosa Parks and Outkast brought dif-
ferent interpretative lenses to the text. Parks argued that her name had
nothing to do with the song’s meaning and that Outkast simply wanted to
get free publicity. She took a fairly literal reading of the song and deter-
mined that because there was no mention of the Civil Rights Movement,
Montgomery, or the 1955 bus boycott, the song had no connection to her.
Parks relied on Civil Rights era understandings of racial narratives in
which racial uplift serves as the primary storyline in her interpretation of
the song. Because there is no clear view expressed in the song about poli-
tics or culture, the lens Parks brings to “Rosa Parks” cannot make any con-
nection between the song and its title.
In the court documents, Outkast did not really explain how Parks’s
name is connected to the song or why they had chosen to use it. The dis-
trict court judge argued that the lyrics about moving to the back of the bus
connect Outkast’s boasting about their excellence to Rosa Parks’s famous
refusal to give up her seat. Within the aesthetic of hip-hop, referencing
people, places, and trademarked objects constitutes a primary method of
establishing location and identity. Unlike other forms of poetry or writing,
hip-hop does not always aim to build a coherent narrative, but to construct
a ›ow or rhythm out of “used” phrases or images. (Hip-hop can be de-
scribed as an aural analog to the scrap quilts of Gee’s Bend, Romare Bear-
den’s collages, or David Hammons’s sculptures made out of discarded ob-
jects.)67 In other words, the aesthetic of hip-hop requires the use of names,
locations, and objects to establish one’s context, one’s identity, and one’s
hip-hop virtuosity. Robin Kelley writes that “what counts more than the
story is the ‘storytelling’—an emcee’s verbal facility on the mic, creative
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and often hilarious use of puns, metaphors, and similes.”68 For Outkast,
Rosa Parks was simply another possible referent to add to their repertoire
of imagery and wordplay.
The Sixth Circuit, however, needed to resolve which interpretation
would de‹ne the meaning of “Rosa Parks” for its decision. Speaking for the
three-judge panel, Judge John Holschuh attempted to discern the “plain
meaning” of the song. Based on a blend of judicial common sense and YZ’s
Unof‹cial Rap Dictionary, the court concluded that “there is a genuine issue
of material fact whether the use of Rosa Parks’ name . . . is artistically re-
lated to the content of the song.”69 The court, however, did not believe
that this question could be easily answered, and it remanded the case to the
district court for a hearing on this issue. By returning the case to the dis-
trict court, the Sixth Circuit Court allowed the opportunity for both sides
to call witnesses and experts to explain whether or not Parks’s name has any
connection to the song. Ultimately the case settled and legal discourse was
not forced to choose which interpretative lens, that of the Civil Rights gen-
eration or the hip-hop generation, would be adopted in this case. For at
least awhile longer, the question of who owns the imaginary domain out of
which African Americans form cultural identity remains unanswered.
The dispute between Parks and Outkast shows the continued impor-
tance of property law to African American culture because the shift from
slavery to segregation to intellectual property both (1) demonstrates prop-
erty’s continued central role in African American thought and (2) sets the
stage for the emergence of critical race theory as a major force in shaping
how African American culture criticizes law and legal discourse. By focus-
ing on hip-hop aesthetics throughout the remainder of this book, I will de-
ploy hip-hop culture as a practical example of critical race theory’s attempt
to “race” legal discourse through a philosophical rewriting of law’s founda-
tion. The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Parks v. Laface Records demonstrates
that law, especially intellectual property law, must increasingly make inter-
pretative judgments about cultural matters to apply legal doctrine. With-
out attending to the origins of cultural practices, it is impossible to apply
intellectual property doctrines fully or fairly.
From Chattel to Intellectual Property / 23
......chapter 2......
Critical Race Theory, Signifyin’,
and Cultural Ownership
By the 1980s, Civil Rights–era strategies and reasoning no longer could re-
spond effectively to evolving forms of racism. The impediments to equal-
ity and freedom had been altered from the physical violence of Bull Con-
nor to the representational violence of the Reagan era. The post–Civil
Rights era transformed the grammar and syntax of racism, racialization,
and white supremacy. The success of the 1963 March on Washington and
the “I Have a Dream” speech altered how Americans argued for a status
quo where many African Americans (though not all) lived with de facto
second-class citizenship. If political leaders previously relied on con-
sciously racist language to keep African Americans “in their place,” the
1970s and 1980s saw a resurgence of property rights and state’s rights
rhetoric that evaded overt references to race while tapping into racialized
fears.
In legal discourse, Arlington Heights (1977) exempli‹es the limits of
Civil Rights strategies that rely on legal decision makers to remedy racial
inequality. A housing developer wanted to change the zoning classi‹cation
of a parcel of land so he could build apartment buildings for low-income
families in a mostly white suburb of Chicago. At the zoning board hear-
ings, some people objected to the possibility of poor African Americans
moving from the city to the suburbs, but most focused on the potential
change to “settled” zoning laws and the town’s strategy to create buffer
zones between commercial and residential districts. The town refused to
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change the zoning rules, and the developer ‹led suit. Because the record
did not establish a clear and overt racial bias, the court found no discrimi-
natory purpose in denying the zoning change. The town fought the con-
struction of a low-income development probably due to racialized fears.
Because it relied on the “color-blind” rhetoric of property rights, the court
could not “see” the presence of race.1
Radical legal scholars became concerned about the increasingly limited
ef‹cacy of legal discourse in remedying social problems. Weaving together
strands of Marxist and postmodern thought, a movement of like-minded
scholars created critical legal studies (CLS) to identify the contradictions
of liberal legal thought that had created an impasse in the effort for mean-
ingful social reform. Mark Kelman identi‹ed three main contradictions
that CLS found in liberal legal ideology: (1) the contradiction between a
commitment to “mechanical rules” and law’s claim to review all cases on
their own merits; (2) the contradiction between liberal thought’s valuation
of individual desires as the basis for social life and its appeal to universal
reason and objective knowledge when it engages in legal reasoning; and (3)
the implicit tension between trying to validate and respect personal choice
and acknowledging how social forces shape individual lives.2 Roberto
Unger, one of the earliest proponents of what became CLS, concluded that
“without a guiding vision, legal reasoning seems condemned to a game of
easy analogies.”3 As a result, CLS focused on the crisis of legitimation in
which legal discourse, because it contains a range of attitudes and perspec-
tives, can be used to legitimate contradictory conclusions about a legal
problem. As a postmodern legal movement, CLS focused on the language’s
rhetorical slippage and the failure of reason to explain human behavior and
legal decisions.4
From legitimation, CLS turned to its attention to power, especially as
described by Michel Foucault in Discipline & Punish (1995) and The History
of Sexuality, Volume 1 (1990). Illustrative of these concerns, Peter Goodrich
argued that law is concerned with “the transmission of power from person
to person and from place to place by invisible means.” Goodrich argues
further that “power is unseen, it can be imagined through the surfaces
upon which it is inscribed.”5 To locate this unseen ›ow of power, scholars
increasingly looked toward popular culture for the traces of law’s power. In
the language of Foucault, these endeavors sought to map out the micro-
physics of power. Rather than being means to develop strategies to end dis-
crimination and oppression, textual indeterminacy and the sketching of
cultural power soon became ends in and of themselves. CLS came to rep-
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resent nihilism because it became identi‹ed with “trashing” law and liber-
alism due to its efforts to uncover the cultural biases of legal discourse but
appeared to offer little hope about law’s utility for promoting cultural or
social change.6
Initially, legal scholars of color supported the CLS movement, but they
slowly grew disenchanted with the direction in which it was headed.7 Kim-
berlé Crenshaw invited a number of scholars of color, including Richard
Delgado, Neil Gotanda, Mari Matsuda, Stephanie Phillips, and Kendall
Thomas, to attend the ‹rst “Critical Race Theory” (or CRT) workshop in
1989. Crenshaw convened the meeting to discuss how lawyers could con-
tinue the work of dismantling racial hierarchy in the context of CLS’s
growth in the legal academy.8 At the meeting, the participants organized
their discussions around two common interests. First, they shared an un-
derstanding that white supremacy inhered in dominant and formally equal
institutions as an endemic feature rather than as a deviation. They argued
that lofty legal ideals, while in theory neutral and fair, have relied on un-
stated and unconscious racial assumptions. Thus, they expressed a certain
amount of shared skepticism of legal principles such as the rule of law, ob-
jectivity, and equal protection as necessarily neutral. Second, they shared a
commitment to altering racial hierarchy in the United States.9 While not
all attendees shared a common perspective on how to accomplish their
goals, all desired to use law to transform American culture. Other factors
also shaped the birth of CRT. Its adherents were also concerned about the
increase in urban violence, the “War on Drugs” and the incarceration of
black men, chronic unemployment and underemployment, and white
›ight to the suburbs. The same factors that produced a shift in legal dis-
course also laid the foundation for the birth of hip-hop culture.10
Frustrated with postmodern legal theory, Derrick Bell, then a professor
of law at Harvard, began writing short stories to illustrate the limits of tra-
ditional formal legal analysis, how it failed to connect with the lived experi-
ences of African Americans. Bell’s stories, which were collected in his And
We Are Not Saved (1987), demonstrated that law produced and regulated
racial identity and that racialized discourses constituted a necessary founda-
tion for the ef‹cient operation of legal reasoning.11 Unlike their postmod-
ern counterparts, Bell and other critical race theorists insisted that human
beings have created the category of race to realize particular social and eco-
nomic ends and that the social construction of race affects individual lives.12
Patricia Williams, another founding member of CRT, wrote a book that
blended legal critique, autobiography, and cultural commentary in order to
demonstrate how cultural narratives in›uence the content of rights dis-
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course.13 The work of Williams, Bell, and Richard Delgado, author of The
Rodrigo Chronicles (1995), challenged not only the boundaries of law but also
the proper writing style for legal scholarship. By penning short stories
(Bell), neo-Platonic dialogues (Delgado), and legal autobiographies
(Williams), these authors sampled various literary styles, layered different
voices from within the African American community in their writing, em-
phasized the orality of African American culture and the practices of every-
day life, and included moments of humor and irony in their writing. Much
as hip-hop has been criticized as a dangerous nihilistic enterprise, CRT has
been accused of attacking reason and engaging in a wholesale cultural war.14
Some CRT proponents, such as Richard Delgado, argue that the new
grammar of race requires a shift in tactics away from formal civil rights or
constitutional law to other areas such as tort law. Delgado urges courts to
articulate “an independent tort for racial slurs” that “would protect the in-
terests of personality and equal citizenship that are part of our highest po-
litical traditions and moral values, thereby af‹rming the right of all citizens
to lead their lives free from attacks on their dignity and psychological in-
tegrity.”15 In his seminal article “Words That Wound,” Delgado an-
nounces both a return to a fundamental premise of the Civil Rights Move-
ment (that the movement was an effort to demand that dominant culture
recognize the humanity and subjectivity of marginalized people) and a shift
in orientation. He goes beyond focusing on where African Americans could
or should own property to explore how the next stage in the civil rights
struggle requires a remapping of knowledge that can acknowledge realms
or dimensions “unseen” by the majority. For Delgado and other critical
race theorists, post–Civil Rights era discrimination is not labeled publicly
or obviously, like the signage of the segregated South. Thus, it appears to
be invisible for legal discourse. By recognizing a tort for racial epithets,
Delgado, in effect, argues that cultural discrimination may not leave visible
scars, but it nonetheless affects the psyche. In the vocabulary of Carl
Gutièrrez-Jones, we need to develop a new rhetoric of injury that is capa-
cious enough to capture those aspects of racism, such as hate speech, that
the Civil Rights Movement could not address and that thus remain invisi-
ble to dominant culture.16
Henry Louis Gates and Signifyin’
Mark Anthony Neal observes that Henry Louis Gates “has positioned
himself as one of the most prominent gatekeepers of black intellectual
Critical Race Theory, Signifyin’, and Cultural Ownership / 27
property” in large part because his book The Signifying Monkey set the
terms of the debate about African American literature during the culture
wars of the 1980s and 1990s. Even more astutely, Neal observes that Gates,
in his role as one of the “deans” of African American letters, has come to
understand that “black intellectual thought and criticism are wed with the
demands of the mainstream marketplace.”17 The Signifying Monkey sought
to uncover or make visible the connections between black vernacular
speech and the African American literary tradition.18 Gates is most clearly
responding to the theoretical turn in literary studies during the 1970s
and1980s that emphasized importing French theories, especially Derrida,
to counter the New Critics’ formalistic analysis of American literature,
which attempted to stabilize the meaning and value of literary texts. The
Signifying Monkey thus attempts to provide African and African American
origins for debates about textual indeterminacy and the coherence of cul-
tural traditions. Gates seeks to show how trickster ‹gures from African and
African Caribbean culture are transformed on the journey to America, not
to establish rules or laws of historical development but to demonstrate the
connection between African and African American cultural forms in the
present day.
For Gates, the central theoretical principle that uni‹es and explains the
African American literary tradition is signifyin’. Adopted and adapted from
scholarly literature in anthropology and linguistics, signifyin’, Gates con-
cludes, “is a metaphor for textual revision.”19 It can appear in everyday par-
lance as “talking shit, woo‹ng, spouting, muckty muck, boogerbang, beating your
gums, talking smart, putting down, putting on, playing, sounding, telling lies,
shag-lag, marking, shucking, jiving, jitterbugging, bugging, mounting, charg-
ing, cracking, harping, rapping, bookooing, low-rating, hoorawing, sweet-talk-
ing, smart-talking, and no doubt a few others that I [Gates] have omitted.”20
In each of these versions, signifyin’ “depends on the success of the signi‹er
at invoking absent meaning ambiguously ‘present’ in a carefully wrought
statement” that playfully mines the indeterminacy of language to say one
thing but mean another.21 Frequently, signifyin’ relies heavily on citing and
rewriting well-known symbols, metaphors, or objects.
Because some have limited signifyin’ to the dozens, it has been wrongly
reduced to a game of verbal aggression. However, Gates makes clear that
signifyin’ cannot be reduced to the dozens because the practice, rightly un-
derstood, is simultaneously humorous and deadly serious, conveying
meaning as much with style as with substance.22 It signals a “triumph of wit
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and reason” based on verbal acuity.23 According to Robin Kelley, signifyin’
is “an effort to master the absurd metaphor, an art form intended to enter-
tain rather than to damage.”24 Claudia Mitchell-Kernan clearly differenti-
ates the insulting or verbally aggressive components of the dozens from its
signifyin’ aspects. She argues that signifyin’ “incorporates essentially a folk
notion that dictionary entries for words are not always suf‹cient for inter-
preting meanings or messages, or that meaning goes beyond such inter-
pretations.”25 While insults or verbal aggression can accompany signifyin’,
they are not necessarily linked. To place signifyin’ at the center of African
American literature is not to emphasize hostility or linguistic violence.
Rather, such a focus emphasizes wordplay, textual revision, and metaphor.
Although he rarely directly states this, Gates seeks to infuse literary
studies with an African American subjectivity. Signifyin’ stands in for a his-
torically and culturally speci‹c way of creating and understanding textual
production, which Gates traces back to the late eighteenth century with
the trope of the talking book. If postmodern literary theorists (the literary
analog of CLS) sought to reframe literary analysis from the self-suf‹cient
text assumed by the New Critics, Gates seeks to demonstrate that racial
subjectivities shape how scholars read texts. Similar to critical race theo-
rists, Gates wants to decenter the dominant cultural attitudes and narra-
tives that have structured literary interpretation and limited the horizons
of literary discourse. Following nearly identical paths, CRT and Gates
both write over postmodern concerns about textual indeterminacy and the
ubiquity of contradiction within acts of judgment to emphasize how the
very discourses of law and literature themselves have been raced or racial-
ized. Neither Gates nor CRT sees the gains of Civil Rights activists as be-
ing suf‹cient to transform social relations. Another step, one that recog-
nizes how race unconsciously infects perception and judgments based on
those perceptions, is needed.
A central element of Gates’s theory is that African American originality
departs signi‹cantly from dominant notions of creativity. Gates succinctly
notes that “the originality of so much of the black tradition emphasizes
re‹guration, or repetition and difference, or troping, underscoring the
foregrounding of the chain of signi‹ers, rather than the mimetic represen-
tation of a novel content.”26 In essence, Gates argues that the creativity of
black vernacular speech emphasizes language use over language meaning.
It matters not whether a speaker/writer ‹rst coined a phrase, idea, or ex-
pression; what matters is the art by which it is used to convey a new mean-
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ing and make a new connection. Thus, the pleasure of a signifyin’ text is
how well it opens up the meaning of a seemingly well-de‹ned and settled
word or image.
A recent but excellent example of signifyin’ occurs in Aaron Mc-
Gruder’s comic strip, The Boondocks. In one strip, Huey Freeman, a young
radical African American boy, overhears several loud sounds outside his
window as he reads the newspaper. When he goes outside, he sees Cindy, a
white girl, with a football and Riley, Huey’s “thuggish” brother, lying on
the ground asking, “But how was I supposed to know she . . .” Throwing
the newspaper at him, Huey interrupts and replies, “Read Dummy!”27 In
the strip, McGruder has re‹gured Charles Schultz’s classic Peanuts situa-
tion where Lucy pulls the football away when Charlie Brown is attempting
to kick it. At its most basic level, the strip signi‹es on Riley for not reading
the newspaper, as “Read Dummy” is the slogan of Huey’s radical news-
paper, which Riley has never had time to read. If Riley did read Huey’s or
any other newspaper, he would know that in Peanuts cartoons, the girl al-
ways pulls the ball away from the boy. By framing this as an interracial en-
counter, McGruder reminds his readers that when African Americans trust
whites, they tend to get fooled and wind up on their rear ends. It also sug-
gests that black men should be careful in their encounters with white
women, thus racializing the frequent instances of sexual tension that ap-
pear in comic strips. Lastly, it reinforces the unconscious norm of white-
ness that underlies Peanuts, despite the occasional appearance of Franklin,
and comic strips more generally.28 Gates identi‹es this kind of textual revi-
sion, which emphasizes textual indeterminacy, as distinctive to African
American art and culture.
To illustrate how vernacular in›uences literary culture in The Signifying
Monkey, Gates occasionally turns to the jazz music of Count Basie, Louis
Armstrong, Duke Ellington, Jelly Roll Morton, and Charlie Parker, or the
musical criticism of Ralph Ellison, Langston Hughes, and Zora Neale
Hurston. Gates identi‹es John Coltrane’s version of “My Favorite Things”
as an exemplary instance of formal parody: it begins with the melody of the
classic Julie Andrews version before veering off into a completely different
direction.29 Jazz has long constituted the soundtrack for African American
culture, and Gates follows the standard scholarly approach of placing mu-
sic at the center of African American cultural productions, with other arts,
such as writing and painting, occupying a derivative or secondary status.
Although Gates is ‹rst and foremost a literary scholar, he nonetheless re-
capitulates this historical ordering of African American culture.
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Signifyin’ and Hip-Hop
A hip-hop rereading of signifyin’ may appear to follow this pattern. For ex-
ample, Aaron McGruder’s Boondocks updates John Coltrane’s rewriting of
“My Favorite Things” by providing hip-hop-based lyrics for the song.30 If
Coltrane signi‹ed on Julie Andrews and suggested that jazz was the new
“Sound of Music,” then The Boondocks writes over Coltrane’s revision and
announces that hip-hop is the new “Sound of Music.” McGruder thus
signi‹es on critics who use jazz as the quintessential African American art
form, especially during the age of hip-hop. This parody also shows the lim-
its of Gates’s jazz-in›uenced construction of signifyin’, which includes
both pastiche and parody as central features of African American cultural
production. Pastiche, which Gates describes as unmotivated revision, fo-
cuses on the form of a text and how literary history names itself. Parody, or
motivated revision, infuses words—taken from another text—and provides
them with a new context and subverts their apparent meaning.31 Because
Gates relies on jazz as his musical basis and on literature written before
1982, his attempt to map out the contours of African American cultural
production does not quite seem to align with the hip-hop aesthetic that was
emerging as he wrote his groundbreaking work. Greg Tate goes so far as to
argue that Gates’s approach to signifyin’ has cut Gates off from contempo-
rary African American cultural styles and themes, including hip-hop.32
This book’s examination of recent art and literature suggests that hip-hop
aesthetics has emphasized parody over pastiche in its use of signifyin’ pri-
marily because the increased circulation of racialized texts and new tech-
nology has made sampling or cutting and pasting popular images, sounds,
or texts easier than ever before. The “calling out of one’s name” also ap-
pears to have more commercial appeal than the “naming” of a tradition,
and it certainly provides grist for the advertising and publicity mills that
rule mass culture.33
During the culture wars, scholars and activists sought to revise the
norms, values, and direction of American culture in accord with multicul-
tural paradigms. Conscious or motivated efforts to revise canons, institu-
tions, and culture exploded. Hip-hop music and the hip-hop aesthetics it
spawned emphasized parodic forms because they echoed and reinforced
ongoing dialogues about diversifying public life. Pastiche or unmotivated
revisions that borrowed material without substantial modi‹cation ap-
peared “old school,” accommodationist, or simply not radical enough to
face the challenges of the post–Civil Rights era. I want to emphasize that
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pastiche as form of signifyin’ did not disappear after the 1980s, as the end-
less samples from George Clinton and James Brown attest, but it becomes
a residual or minority form within African American culture. Hip-hop aes-
thetics prefers parody or irony because it mocks dominant culture and ex-
presses the disappointment and despair attendant to the breaking apart of
the Civil Rights coalition.34 It also enables African American cultural
workers to foreground the irony of African American life in a formally
color-blind society, but one in which race still shapes so much for so many.
Parody, not pastiche, as motivated revision provides a form that matches
the cultural ethos.35
To explore the differences between hip-hop and earlier iterations of sig-
nifyin’, I will brie›y contrast Frederick Douglass’s parody of the nine-
teenth-century hymn “Heavenly Union” with A Tribe Called Quest’s “Can
I Kick it?” Scholars frequently overlook that Douglass’s ‹rst Narrative con-
cludes with a note of parody. Douglass, whom Gates identi‹es as “a master
Signi‹er,” culminates his attempt to write himself into freedom by crafting
new lyrics to a common church hymn.36 In the “original,” a nameless nar-
rator describes how his/her soul is saved and he/she attains a “heavenly
union” with Jesus. In Douglass’s much longer version, he “borrows” lines
and the rhythmic pattern from the hymn but transforms its meaning and
criticizes the hypocrisy of American churches, which supported slavery. In
the standard version, the opening stanza proclaims that God “gave” the
singer a heavenly union, whereas Douglass’s parody states that churches
merely “sing” of it. The bloody “‹re and brimstone” imagery of the origi-
nal, describing hell and sin, is reworked to depict the brutality of African
American slavery. If churchgoers sang of their aspirations to unite with Je-
sus, Douglass emphasizes how the nation, or the “union” of states, consti-
tutes a parody of real heavenly union because it has failed to realize its lofty
political and Christian ideals.37 Douglass clearly mocks Christian apolo-
gists for slavery and reworks one of their own texts to demonstrate their
hypocrisy. This is signifyin’ par excellence.
In many ways, A Tribe Called Quest follows the signifyin’ ways of Doug-
lass in its 1990 song “Can I Kick It?” which parodies and deconstructs Lou
Reed’s “Walk on the Wild Side.” The song samples from and criticizes
Reed’s ode to sexual adventurism. In his song, Reed has “bitten,” or stolen,
African American R&B rhythms from the 1970s and exoticized black ur-
ban spaces through his sexualized lyrics. A Tribe Called Quest’s parody,
however, operates primarily through its samples, rather than the lyrics
themselves. The samples rework Reed’s song, deconstructing its references
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to drug use, interracial sexuality, and societal rebellion. When he asks,
“Can I Kick It?” Q-Tip of A Tribe Called Quest calls out Lou Reed for
both identifying the location of his “walk on the wild side” as New York
City and including African American girls within that walk.38 Q-Tip ques-
tions Reed’s ability to walk his streets or “hang” with A Tribe Called Quest.
Although the lyrics do parody Lou Reed’s, the group signi‹es on Reed pri-
marily through the rhythm tracks and the melody. By reclaiming a stolen
or bitten rhythm line, A Tribe Called Quest is engaged in a turf war with
rock and roll. This battle is not about a physical space, but appropriated el-
ements of intellectual property. Later in the song, Q-Tip asks David Dink-
ins, “Would you please be my mayor?” This references the election of the
‹rst black mayor of New York City and extends the parody and the claim
of cultural ownership over New York City. A Tribe Called Quest calls out
not only Lou Reed and rock and roll but the white political establishment
that has attempted to dominate black urban spaces. “Can I Kick It?” si-
multaneously constitutes a parody of white popular culture and a demand
for political and cultural freedom. The form of the music, although it
shares some characteristics with Douglass’s parody, also suggests a new use
of signifyin’ in the post–Civil Rights era.
Signifyin’ functions like a trademark or copyright symbol. A successful
instance of signifyin’ constitutes an act of rhetorical ownership over an ob-
ject, a text, or even an individual. For example, Douglass’s parody demon-
strated his moral superiority over Christian apologists through his verbal
acuity, and A Tribe Called Quest asserts claims of cultural ownership over
rock and roll and New York City. In both cases, African American cultural
workers write over well-known texts. Signifyin’, especially in the case of
hip-hop, adds an “ironic spin” on the original, frequently “contradicting
the original meaning.”39 The practice of signifyin’ also refuses to acknowl-
edge the seemingly settled distribution of property rights, which legal dis-
course purports to confer, and writes over them.40 Although Gates does
not call attention to this explicitly, he describes how signifyin’ offers a
method and a form to claim cultural and personal ownership over an ob-
ject, sound, image, text, or trademarked logo. As a clandestine or alterna-
tive property-ownership system, signifyin’ allows participants within
African American culture to write over an unjust distribution of intellectual
and cultural resources. This competing legal structure “allocates” rights
over intangible objects within African American culture without following
the requirements identi‹ed in copyright or trademark law. For popular and
vernacular culture, law, as written in the statute books, is simply irrelevant.
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Keith Aoki asserts that, especially during the formative years of blues and
jazz, the lack of of‹cial copyright protection fostered creativity and inno-
vation among African American musicians.41
Signifyin’, as described by Gates, constitutes a second-level legal order.
This legal order does not possess the judicial authority to adjudicate claims,
levy ‹nes, or order parties to desist from certain conduct, but it does pos-
sess cultural authority in conferring status, power, and authority within
African American culture. Such recognition frequently can translate into
market success within the white community.42 Eduardo Penalver and Sonia
Katyal have argued, in the case of property law, that property outlaws or
dissidents have been the catalysts for legal change.43 Applying their analy-
sis to the expansion of intellectual property law, Katyal argues that we have
entered into a period of marked “semiotic disobedience,” in which “social
activism exposes the need for alternative political economies for informa-
tion.44 In many ways, I am arguing that Gates’s description and canoniza-
tion of signifyin’ constitutes a strategy of semiotic disobedience.45 This
strategy may ultimately transform the de‹nition and distribution of intel-
lectual property rights.
Signifyin’ and Copyright Infringement
Gates’s theory of signifyin’ does not explicitly purport to undermine the
foundations of American jurisprudence, but it does, however, uncover a
paradox or contradiction at the heart of liberal legal theory: the self-evi-
dent nature and meaning of cultural properties. Gates, along with a bevy of
hip-hop artists and critical race theorists, arrives at similar criticisms about
the role of subjectivity in shaping what an object or text means. Speakers,
writers, artists, and viewers bring a set of narrative assumptions about the
world when they interpret the meaning of a text. These narrative assump-
tions frequently are connected to their identity and their experiences.
Texts, in and of themselves, may be indeterminate and open to endless de-
construction—an argument made by Derrida, his followers, and legions of
postmodern thinkers. Hip-hop aesthetics, as articulated through Gates,
and the rise of hip-hop respond to Derrida’s call by demonstrating how
cultural speci‹city works to create interpretative networks or lenses that si-
multaneously specify a determinate meaning and keep texts open for rein-
terpretation.46 This paradoxical property of signifyin’ produces an im-
passe—or aporia, in Derrida’s vocabulary—for legal discourse. Intellectual
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property law has increasingly protected copyright holders from any tres-
pass, including those that might constitute fair use. Such borrowings, how-
ever, are fundamental to African American vernacular practices, especially
as prescribed by Gates’s theory of signifyin’.47 The very boundaries that in-
tellectual property law seeks to establish to protect intellectual properties
directly con›ict with how African American vernacular culture and hip-
hop aesthetics operate. Thus, hip-hop aesthetics, when read through
Gates’s theory of signifyin’, constitutes an outlaw practice because it values
long-standing cultural practices over the recent expansion of intellectual
property doctrines.48
The initial question that drove my scholarship (and resulted in this
book) is whether hip-hop’s use of sampling constitutes copyright infringe-
ment.49 In what follows, I hope to demonstrate that while hip-hop aesthet-
ics fails to conform to legal ‹ctions about cultural and property law bound-
aries, the result is not a pervasive, infringing cultural aesthetic. Rather,
intellectual property law has failed to untangle abstract legal ‹ctions about
creativity from how ordinary people within a shared cultural system con-
vey meaning through the reordering of signs, symbols, metaphors, and
icons.50 Copyright law reserves to bona ‹de intellectual property owners,
not necessarily the artist who produced a work, the right to reproduce a
work, create a derivative text of it, distribute it, perform it, or display it
publicly.51 Copyright infringement is engaging in any of the aforemen-
tioned acts without the appropriate permission or license. What if these
very acts of potential infringement follow established patterns of and atti-
tudes about creativity and constitute a conscious attack on the limited (and
racialized) assumptions of legal discourse? Should relatively recent changes
in intellectual property law require a shift in longstanding practices of
African American signifyin’? Do African American cultural workers need a
license to signify now, even though signifyin’ was “free” in the past?52 As
the domain of intellectual property increases, does culture become a source
of oppression, rather than a potentially liberatory force?53 Does the grow-
ing epistemological violence of copyright law constitute a contemporary
analog for establishing racial supremacy, as lynching and other racist prac-
tices did in an earlier era?
An examination of Robert Colescott’s Les Demoiselles d’Alabama vestidas
and Demoiselles d’Alabama desnudas illustrates all of the issues surrounding
the question of whether signifyin’ constitutes an act of copyright or trade-
mark infringement. Colescott’s work functions as a bridge between earlier
African American artists and contemporary ones, who more fully develop
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hip-hop aesthetics.54 In a pair of 1985 paintings, Colescott signi‹es upon
Picasso’s Les Demoiselles d’Avignon by re-visioning the scene and accentu-
ating the racialized nature of art history, which looks to Europe for mod-
els and paradigms. The contents of the paintings serve as mirror images.
In his Les Demoiselles, Picasso depicts ‹ve naked (all ostensibly white)
women, three with faces that stress their resemblance to their “real” faces
and two with African-inspired masks or facades. The forms, borrowing on
African-inspired aesthetics, incorporate Cubism and emphasize the
women’s angularity.
Colescott’s pair of Les Demoiselles paintings talk back to Picasso and art
historians by rewriting Picasso’s famous scene both to accentuate the un-
spoken racial gaze of art criticism and to focus on Picasso’s own borrowings
of African cultural practices and forms. The 1985 works invert the races of
the women depicted in the original and emphasize the fullness of the
women’s forms, rather than relying on a sparse angularity. Colescott trans-
lates Picasso’s image into black vernacular by transforming the three os-
tensibly white women into African Americans and changing the women
with African-inspired masks for faces into white women. This color or race
adjustment underscores how liberally Picasso borrowed from African
sources to create a “radical” vision of art and works to reclaim cultural
ownership of modernist techniques “stolen” from African culture. Cole-
scott also provides a more curvaceous depiction of the women to demon-
strate the differences between African American and dominant concep-
tions of beauty. For Picasso and by implication Western art, thin or angular
white women have become the very de‹nition of feminine beauty. Cole-
scott’s fuller women project an entirely different perspective on feminine
beauty, one that resonates with dominant attitudes within the African
American community.
While repainting Picasso’s Les Demoiselles d’Avignon in itself would con-
stitute signifyin’, Colescott multiplies the effect of his critique by replacing
a singular image with a pair of paintings. One revision would be
insuf‹cient to respond to Picasso’s image and his Cubist aesthetic. The dif-
ference in content between the two images focuses on the extent to which
the painting “reveals” the truth of the women. By portraying clothed and
nude women, Colescott parodies Picasso’s reliance on African-inspired
forms and images to reveal human nature. If anything, Colescott’s paired
critique emphasizes the play of absence and presence inaugurated by visual
culture. Thus, Picasso’s attempt to reveal the women of Avignon through
the lens of primitivism merely recapitulates the masking of reality that he
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attempts to uncover, even if the women appear to allow the artist view
them in a natural state. The primitive or natural scene Picasso sought to
capture constitutes nothing but a mask for Colescott, a mask whose exis-
tence he can highlight only by offering a pair of revisions. In addition to
unmasking the ‹ctitious foundations of art history that place Picasso
within the pantheon of revered painters, Colescott also undermines the
very ideal of romantic authorship, which has driven scholarship in both art
history and legal theory. If Modernist primitivism itself had no choice but
to rely on a “borrowed” cultural foundation to depict humankind’s natural
core, then Colescott interrogates the foundations of both property and art
because both discourses recognize Picasso as the owner and originator of
certain conventions from African art. Colescott’s revision of Picasso cer-
tainly invites the question of cultural ownership because he interrogates
how art history has identi‹ed Picasso as a genius, placed him at the center
of twentieth-century art, and granted him ownership rights over certain
African-in›uenced forms. What does Picasso or his estate own in regard to
Les Demoiselles? What parts of it, if any, are available for the long-standing
practice of signifyin’ within African American and African communities?
What principles will courts rely on to determine and distribute ownership
interests when a form of African American cultural dialogue depends on
extensive citation as critical practice?55
By emphasizing signifyin’ as the narrative center of his vernacular the-
ory of African American literature and culture, Henry Louis Gates has ap-
parently authorized and perhaps even encouraged others to continue en-
gaging in signifyin’ practices. Who wins when cultural practices, described
and endorsed by a major academic, potentially con›ict with developments
in legal theory? Do property or cultural rights triumph in this con›ict?
Many Civil Rights activists relied on rights discourse to argue for social
change and civic recognition.56 The Civil Rights generation’s progeny,
however, have seen the limitations of that strategy and have deployed black
vernacular practices to reframe freedom and equality in the language of
property rights. Signifyin’, as it appears in contemporary African American
art, music, and literature, constitutes a necessary complement to the polit-
ical and social claims made by integrationists and the Black Power move-
ment. The question is whether this challenge to property law will ulti-
mately be recognized by legal discourse; cause a recon‹guration of
intellectual property doctrine; and transform social, political, and eco-
nomic relations. Can Gates’s turn to vernacular culture recenter literary
discourse and redistribute property rights?
Critical Race Theory, Signifyin’, and Cultural Ownership / 37
Sampling, Signifyin’, and Copyright Law
By the late 1980s, hip-hop music’s use of sampling had become the subject
of numerous controversies. The ‹rst major case to consider hip-hop’s use
of samples was Grand Upright Music v. Warner Brothers (1991).57 It involved
Biz Markie’s use of three words from a Gilbert O’Sullivan recording. The
copyright owners of the song, Grand Upright Music, brought suit for
copyright infringement against Biz Markie and his record company,
Warner Brothers, for illegally copying the original recording in their song
“Alone Again.” The legal question the U.S. District Court for the South-
ern District of New York had to answer was whether the inclusion of a
sample constituted a copyright infringement. Warner Brothers and Biz
Markie argued that because sampling had become a common practice
within hip-hop culture, the court should not consider it an infringing ac-
tion. The court did not ‹nd Biz Markie’s defense satisfactory. Judge Duffy
began his opinion by quoting the Ten Commandments: “Thou shalt not
steal.” He continued: “The defendants . . . would have this court believe
stealing is rampant in the music business and, for that reason, their conduct
here should be excused.”58 In these opening comments, Judge Duffy re-
veals his assumption that property matters more than aesthetic or cultural
considerations within his legal approach and his hostility toward hip-hop’s
use of sampling.
The court pointed to letters sent by Biz Markie and Warner Brothers
attorneys to the copyright owners of the sampled material, requesting per-
mission to sample. Judge Duffy argued that these letters demonstrate
copyright infringement.59 In my reading of these letters, it is clear that
Warner Brothers sought to protect itself from how copyright law might be
applied to the “new” aesthetic offered by hip-hop. A similar argument
about legal uncertainty was made by the court on behalf of 2 Live Crew in
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose (1994). This uncertainty arises from the application
of intellectual property law not simply to new practices, but to a musical
form that was linked to raced and classed bodies.60 In the 1980s and 1990s,
CRT explored how legal discourse operated in a racialized manner without
ever mentioning race.61 In addition to his heavy-handed biblical opening,
Judge Duffy included a curious footnote in his opinion: “The argument
suggested by the defendants that they should be excused because others in
the ‘rap music’ business are also engaged in illegal activity is totally spe-
cious. The mere statement of the argument is its own refutation.”62 Duffy
refuses to explore the artistry of hip-hop, its connection to jazz- and blues-
38 / parodies of ownership
inspired creativity, or its legal and cultural criticisms. By stating without
reason or argument that hip-hop clearly constitutes an illegal activity,
Duffy relies on unspoken cultural narratives that both criminalize young
black men and locate artistic genius and historical memory within white
America. For Duffy, signifyin’ is nothing more than stealing. Even though
Gates and others had attempted to describe African American vernacular
culture since the late 1960s, Judge Duffy felt empowered to regulate
African American culture without any apparent knowledge of its operation.
Although hip-hop does not necessarily denote race or social class, it has er-
roneously become synonymous with African American culture and has be-
come a raced practice. As CRT has long noted, Judge Duffy or any other
judge cannot accuse a person of being “criminal” because of their race.
However, a color-blind liberal legal theory has permitted racialized music,
clothing, or linguistic usage patterns as proxies for criminality.63 Although
this judicial opinion is relatively brief, it makes clear that the music itself is
criminal because “we all know” that its performers are really just thieves.
Following Grand Upright Music, copyright owners asked courts to de-
termine how much and what kind of sampling constitutes copyright in-
fringement. In Jarvis v. A&M Music (1993), a court found that sampling
even short nonverbal sounds could constitute copyright infringement.64
Some courts have found that “fragmented literal similarity,” or distorting
the original, is not actionable,65 nor is borrowing a note.66 More recently,
the Sixth Circuit held that any copying, no matter how small, could con-
stitute a copyright infringement.67 This ruling, however, appears to
con›ict with an earlier Seventh Circuit decision that allows for comple-
mentary copying but not substitutional copying.68 In other words, this
court wanted to consider whether the “copied” item would directly affect
the sales of the original one. Although it is generally clear that producers
must clear samples, the kind of sampling that triggers this requirement is
ambiguous.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose (1994), explored
parody and how it ‹ts within copyright and fair-use jurisprudence. This
case involved 2 Live Crew’s use of lyrics and music from Roy Orbison’s
“Oh, Pretty Woman” in its song “Pretty Woman.” Tracing the origins of
parody to ancient Greece, the court found that this hip-hop parody consti-
tuted a fair use of a copyrighted text.69 Applying the four-part balancing
test for fair use, the court determined that hip-hop parodies were unlikely
to serve as “market substitutes” for the original.70 Even though 2 Live
Crew sold many copies of its song, the Supreme Court found it suf‹ciently
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critical of Orbison’s to warrant a “fair-use” defense against copyright in-
fringement.71 Although it took several cases, lawyers began to see that
characterizing hip-hop aesthetics as parody (not signifyin’) allowed them
to deploy fair use to defend some claims of copyright infringement.
What remains unspoken or unseen within the courts’ stated reasoning
is the role race plays in legal thinking. Except for a footnote de‹ning rap as
“black American pop music,” the decision omits all discussion of race.72
The races of Luther Campbell and Roy Orbison are also omitted. The case
report, as written, exempli‹es liberal legal theory’s commitment to color-
blind jurisprudence. The court only invoked the culture of ancient Greece
to demonstrate the “timelessness” and potentially “civilized” origins of
parody. Did race, however, shape how the court applied fair-use doctrine to
hip-hop? While no direct evidence exists to answer this question, the deci-
sion in Rogers v. Koons suggests that racial considerations do matter when
applying the rules of fair use.73 In that case, Art Rogers, a photographer,
sued Jeffrey Koons because he had transformed one of his photographs of
a couple holding several puppies into a parodic or satirical sculpture mock-
ing the original photograph’s sentimentality. The court had to determine
whether Koons’s self-described parody constituted fair use. Unlike in
Campbell, the court in Rogers found that Koons had, in fact, infringed on
Rogers’s copyright because he had borrowed too much from the photo-
graph, and the resulting sculpture was merely satirical of sentimentality in
general, rather than speci‹cally commenting on or criticizing Rogers’s pic-
ture. Koons had attempted to defend his actions under the rubric of ap-
propriation art, but the court found this to be merely an indication that
marketability, not artistry, had determined Koons’s choice of subject mat-
ter.
Comparing Campbell and Rogers, one notable difference between the
two cases is race. In Campbell, the court did not state, but clearly knew, that
Orbison was white and Campbell was African American. By contrast, in
Rogers, both were deemed white. Race matters when applying the “fair-
use” doctrine because Campbell could claim an implicit racial critique of
Orbison. Koons had no such claim against Rogers. Campbell could also
rely on the academic authority of Henry Louis Gates because Gates had
testi‹ed on 2 Live Crew’s behalf in its obscenity trial.74 As part of his de-
fense of 2 Live Crew, Gates argued that the group’s use of obscene lan-
guage followed patterns of African American vernacular culture, also
known as signifyin’. Although signifyin’, as an African American vernacu-
lar practice, failed to be mentioned in Campbell, its omission probably
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might have allowed 2 Live Crew to emerge victorious in its case. Signifyin’
necessarily involves borrowing, appropriation, and inversion, but those
critical practices, even if part of an artistic tradition, frequently appear as
copyright infringement within intellectual property law. The Supreme
Court’s omission of signifyin’ and thus of the speci‹city of African Ameri-
can cultural production simultaneously ignores race in “good” color-blind
fashion and allows race to retain its unspoken and unconscious force in lib-
eral legal theory.
Gates’s articulation of signifyin’ clearly differentiates African American
cultural texts. African American cultural workers’ reliance on mimicry and
appropriation as aesthetic principles produces a con›ict between cultural
theory and intellectual property law.75 Hip-hop’s expansion of signifyin’ in
an age of increasing copyright protections only deepens the crisis. Ironi-
cally, hip-hop’s popularity has caused African American writers and visual
artists to develop hip-hop aesthetics further and create a potentially un-
bridgeable rift between African American culture and intellectual property
law. The unspoken legal context of Gates’s theory of signifyin’ presents
both a potential legal liability for African American artists and an opportu-
nity to realize critical race theory’s mission to produce a color-conscious
jurisprudence.
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......chapter 3......
De‹ning Hip-Hop Aesthetics
Scholars have long relied on musical styles to describe, de‹ne, and sym-
bolize African American cultural production. Gospel, blues, jazz, soul, and
now hip-hop have come to represent how both dominant culture and aca-
demics view and analyze African American life. The primacy of music
within African American cultural criticism can be traced back at least to
Frederick Douglass’s discussion of sorrow songs, developed by W. E. B. Du
Bois in The Souls of Black Folk. In the late 1960s, Leroi Jones, now Amiri
Baraka, characterized African Americans as a “Blues People.”1 Novels such
as The Color Purple (1982) and Corregidora (1975) have relied on blues
singers as central characters.2 Richard Powell has viewed African American
art through a “Blues Aesthetic.”3 Sterling Brown and Langston Hughes
frequently created blues-in›uenced poems and short stories. Jazz improvi-
sation has frequently inspired literary style, and jazz innovators have been
frequent subjects of literature. Ralph Ellison, John Edger Wideman, Toni
Morrison, Michael Harper, and others have turned jazz into literature.
Scholars have applied jazz categories and metaphors to understand the art
of Archibald Motley, Aaron Douglas, Jacob Lawrence, Romare Bearden,
and many others.
While music certainly has proven fertile ground for cultural analysis
and criticism, rarely have the relationships among music, literature, and vi-
sual art been symmetrical ones. Musicians, composers, and music critics
have rarely turned to literature or visual art for inspiration or artistic para-
digms. The traditional explanation for this hierarchical or core-periphery
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structure within African American cultural criticism has been that music is
the most immediate repository of African American vernacular culture. In
other words, the orality of African American culture can be most easily
translated into music—not art or literature. The transcription of Black En-
glish, for example, has proven extremely problematic within literature,
even as Black English has been common within musical lyrics. Gates’s the-
ory of signifyin’ counters these trends, attempting to remove music in this
account of how African American orality gets translated into literature.
Even though Gates includes lyrical analysis in his book, he turns folk
songs, blues lyrics, and urban toasts into literary documents. The sound
and humor of black life get muted in order to place parody, satire, and
metaphor as the identifying or core features of African American vernacu-
lar culture. This ambitious structure, however, merely inverts the asymme-
try between cultural forms rather than explaining how art, music, and lit-
erature constitute complementary practices.
By downplaying the blues, the sorrow song, and jazz improvisation,
Gates’s theory of vernacular culture in effect depoliticizes African Ameri-
can literature and dampens the critical vision (both explicit and implicit)
contained within many texts. Although African American cultural criticism
has long focused on property, the structure of Gates’s argument accentu-
ates how the African American literary tradition is based upon writers
reading and writing over one another. African American literature needed
this organizing principle, according to Gates, to solidify its status in En-
glish departments during the culture wars of the 1980s. This highly tech-
nical argument, however, furthered the split between literary discourse and
social activism. Even though signifyin’ involves both rede‹ning and redis-
tributing ownership interests over cultural and imaginative texts, Gates
fails to make explicit connections to the burgeoning “property rights”
movement of the 1980s. In contrast, hip-hop boldly announces its materi-
alism to mock the moralizing impulse of idealistic Civil Rights leaders.
Hip-hop, not Gates, succeeded in an aesthetic form in which a critique of
property law could be articulated through African American vernacular
culture.
The purpose of this chapter is to establish the basic elements of hip-hop
aesthetics and show how this form shapes its cultural message.4 Hip-hop
aesthetics possesses four central characteristics: (1) sampling, (2) layering,
(3) rhythmic ›ow and asymmetry, and (4) parody or irony.5 In identifying
these characteristics, it is my intention to create a suf‹ciently broad de‹ni-
tion of hip-hop aesthetics to explore the interaction among contemporary
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visual artists, musicians, and writers. Hip-hop aesthetics frequently relies
on compositional and lyrical signifyin’, but not exclusively so. The goal of
deejays, b-boys, graf‹ti artists, and emcees is to entertain, amuse, and cre-
ate—not merely to signify. Any discussion of hip-hop aesthetics that omits
how much fun it is makes an error similar to a discussion that confuses
blues music with feeling “blue.”6 One key aspect of hip-hop is the vicarious
experience of making ownership and authenticity claims in a postmodern
world where self and communal ownership are constantly in ›ux. Hip-hop
‹nds pleasure in ownership rights at the very moment they may seem ei-
ther irrelevant or insuf‹cient for realizing America’s promises of freedom
and equality. Analogous to Albert Murray’s reading of the blues, hip-hop
aesthetics is not necessarily postmodern, but the tonic for the crises post-
modernism has brought: the rupture between an object and the word, im-
age, or sound that represents the object. Hip-hop initiated neither the de-
construction of black musical history nor the destruction of our nation’s
urban centers. Rather, hip-hop chases away the “blues” of postmodern
America and attempts to stitch together the ruptures of postindustrial
America so ordinary folks can once again claim ownership over their cul-
tural traditions, which the culture industries have commodi‹ed and trans-
formed into their own private property.
The work of Anna Deavere Smith, which blends sound, image, move-
ment, and wordplay, provides a wonderful illustration of how hip-hop aes-
thetics operates. I have chosen Smith’s work to illustrate hip-hop aesthet-
ics for a number of reasons. First, her work allows me to discuss hip-hop
aesthetics without potentially exposing her to legal liability. Smith appro-
priates or samples from comments elicited during her interviews with
people, and she probably obtained releases and/or permission to use their
words. Even if Smith did not do this, copyright protection requires that
words be ‹xed in a tangible medium before copyright attaches. Because her
interviewees spoke to her, they would not have any ownership rights over
their comments. As a result, Smith is well-protected from potential law-
suits even though her methodology bears a striking resemblance to that of
Biz Markie, Public Enemy, De La Soul, N.W.A., and the Beastie Boys, all
of whom have been subject to lawsuits because of the texts they chose to
sample. One of the challenges of researching and writing about hip-hop
aesthetics is that a poorly chosen topic could open up the subject of the re-
search to a lawsuit! Another factor in my choice of Smith as my exemplar
is that she is the ‹rst hip-hop aesthete to win major recognition for her
artistry. The MacArthur Foundation recognized her work in 1996 with a
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“genius” grant. Finally, her work includes all the foundational aspects of
hip-hop culture. To offer such an interdisciplinary model of hip-hop aes-
thetics will undoubtedly make the familiar strange for some readers be-
cause most studies of “hip-hop” focus almost exclusively on music and mu-
sicians. Hip-hop culture, however, demands a more thorough account of
its diverse effects, especially as it captures the ethos of the post–Civil
Rights era.
A signi‹cant challenge faces anyone who attempts to de‹ne hip-hop
aesthetics: it is continually in ›ux. Myriad forms and genres of hip-hop
have come and gone. Battles between boroughs, coasts, record companies,
and generations have marked hip-hop’s history. Technical innovations and
legal decisions have also contributed to the quick pace of change within
hip-hop. Music videos, trends in ‹lm, and demographic shifts have also im-
pacted the aesthetic. This book selects 1991 as the approximate average or
mean for identifying the characteristics of hip-hop aesthetics for three rea-
sons. First, Grand Upright Music changed the legal environment for sam-
ple-based hip-hop music production and caused a split in how art, music,
and literature apply the elements of hip-hop. Second, acts like Public En-
emy had by this point become crossover artists, merging with rock, shift-
ing the audience for commercialized hip-hop.7 Third, this year serves as an
approximate midpoint between the earliest days of hip-hop and today’s
very different scene.8 For my purposes, it constitutes the “average” or
“norm” of an ever-shifting cultural formation. The downside of this ap-
proach is that I am forced to generalize. The resulting generalizations as-
serted here cannot and will not explain every song, artwork, or writing by
Americans of African descent, nor could any other generalization. Rather,
the traits of hip-hop aesthetics help illuminate how hip-hop’s approach to
artistry (and pleasure) frequently incorporates a critique of legal and eco-
nomic institutions.
During the 1980s, Anna Deavere Smith began working on a series of
performances pieces entitled On the Road: A Search for American Character.
To create these “scripts,” Smith “interviews people and later performs
them using their own words.”9 Her most well-known pieces from this se-
ries focus on exploring racial tensions surrounding explosive issues in var-
ious locales. For Fires in the Mirror, Smith interviewed a range of residents
(African Americans, Jewish Americans, and Caribbean Americans) from
Crown Heights following the killings of Gavin Cato and Yankel Rosen-
baum and the violence that ensued. Twilight—Los Angeles, 1992 examines
local responses to the riot that followed the ‹rst Rodney King verdict.
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Throughout these performances, Smith shifts her tone, posture, syntax,
and appearance to signal changes in character. Smith’s work constitutes a
perfect instance where word, image, movement, and sound converge
within a shared aesthetic framework. To distinguish the literary, musical, or
visual from the rest would reduce the richness of her work. As one-person
shows, these performances highlight Smith’s virtuosity as an actress and
her ability to synthesize a “polyphony of perspectives” within a coherent
performance text.10 Critics such as Debby Thompson and Tania Modleski
have analyzed these texts through the lens of postmodernism and have
concluded that Smith’s approach to racial performance repeats or mimics
racial identities to recognize their lethal hold on our imaginations and the
possibilities for freeing our minds.11 By illustrating hip-hop aesthetics
through Smith’s work, this chapter seeks to connect her creative process to
developments throughout contemporary African American culture and
demonstrate how such artistic strategies cannot be con‹ned to distinct me-
dia, such as art, music, and literature, but form an aesthetic unity. This
chapter concludes by considering how Smith’s work, and thus hip-hop aes-
thetics more generally, deconstructs several central principles of intellec-
tual property law.
Sampling
The Negro, the world over, is famous as a mimic. But this in no
way damages his standing as an original. Mimicry is an art in it-
self.
—Zora Neale Hurston, 
“Characteristics of Negro Expression”
My description of hip-hop aesthetics begins with sampling—not lyrical
analysis or the beats. Much writing on hip-hop downplays its production to
focus on the violence, misogyny, or cultural nationalism of its lyrics or to
connect its polyrhythmic complexity to African origins. While these issues
or elements require careful consideration, overemphasizing them causes
critics and scholars to overlook the underlying aesthetic processes hip-hop
embodies and its critique of political economy. Sampling, as a creative
method or framework, bridges the acts of consumption and production. It
requires cultural workers to rearrange the symbols, phrases, rhythms, and
melodies circulating within American culture into something completely
new. Sampling is part active listening and part production. Hip-hop is re-
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lentlessly engaged with the world of sounds, images, texts, and commodi-
ties through which African Americans and others experience contempo-
rary life. Hip-hop did not originate with political or artistic manifestos, but
at dance parties and in public parks. Deejays played records on turntables
and then transformed these songs by emphasizing, looping, or repeating
the parts audiences enjoyed (i.e., the breaks) and disregarding the rest.
Sampling developed a re‹ned aesthetic based on transforming recogniz-
able elements into something new and fresh.12
Joseph Schloss describes hip-hop, in part, as a sonic collage.13 In many
ways, collage is an apt metaphor for hip-hop aesthetics because the newer
generation of writers and visual artists has foregone extended studies of in-
dividual characters or situations. In its place, we often ‹nd a collection of
loosely related characters, scenes, storylines, images, logos, and narratives.
This strategy not only challenges the pacing or rhythm of contemporary
African American texts but also constitutes a further elaboration of signi-
fyin’. Sampling or collage, unlike the blues, is not primarily concerned
with bending notes, wringing experiential angst out of a familiar song,14 or
writing over tradition,15 but locating a “cohesive organizing principle” that
fuses together the familiar elements in an aesthetically satisfying way.16 To
produce a text, the hip-hop aesthete must understand the sociohistorical
context of the sampled material and comment ironically on it through lay-
ering and rhythmic ›ow.
To please and surprise their audiences, deejays such as Afrika Bam-
baataa, Afrika Islam, and Kool Herc DJ, sought out beats from all kinds of
music, from soul to jazz to rock to calypso to reggae to Bugs Bunny sound-
tracks.17 Grandmaster Flash explains that “to every record, there’s a great
part. This is what we used to call ‘the get down part.’ . . . And this particu-
lar part of the record . . . unjusti‹ably, was maybe ‹ve seconds or less. This
kind of pissed me off. I was like, ‘Damn, why’d they do that?’ You know?
So, in my mind, in the early seventies, I was picturing. ‘Wow, it would re-
ally be nice if that passage of music could be extended to like ‹ve min-
utes.’”18 For Flash, the technology of the 45 and the structure of the single,
with its series of verses and repeating choruses, had caused both musicians
and record producers to bury the sounds to which people wanted to dance.
According to Schloss, the break—what Flash names the “get down
part”—does not exist until a deejay hears a rhythm or percussion track and
identi‹es it as a sample for use in a related but completely different com-
position. DJ Jazzy Jeff claims, in an interview with Schloss, that many ini-
tial musicians and producers didn’t understand the very music that they
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had recorded. It took hip-hop producers who created samples from their
work to show them the importance of the sounds and rhythms they had
created.19 Schloss even suggests that hip-hop producers can transform
compositions from other musical forms into hip-hop merely by listening to
them with an ear practiced in identifying samples. Domino claims that
merely by listening to a Beatles song, his ear can change its rock and roll
sensibility into hip-hop.20
While record companies, copyright holders, and legal discourse tend to
view sampling as theft, hip-hop producers understand the process as being
much more like research and development.21 Samples, within the logic of
hip-hop, have an af‹nity with heretofore unknown elements or with land
for which no one useful economic purpose has been found. According to
John Locke, the architect of modern theories of property, property is cre-
ated when a person does labor on an object and thus marks it as her own.22
Hip-hop sampling embodies that moment when an artist mixes her work
with a sound, text, logo, or image and rede‹nes that object due to her own
labor. Locke’s theory of property argues that humans will never exhaust na-
ture’s bounty because our creativity will constantly ‹nd new uses for dis-
carded or devalued items. Although few tend to connect hip-hop artistry
and John Locke, the practice of sampling echoes his optimistic view about
the creativity of the human mind. Locke, like the proponents of hip-hop
culture, argued that government’s central purpose was to protect property
rights. Within hip-hop, piracy or biting another’s style—not sampling—
constitutes theft because it does not add anything to the original.23 If a new
perspective, beat, or take on something old is created, then it is sampling.
Sampling thus constitutes a fairly unique and culturally speci‹c way of
de‹ning originality, even if it relies on words, images, or sounds produced
by another person.
Samples of conversation, clothing, and mannerisms form the basis of
Anna Deavere Smith’s performance pieces. Although Smith is rarely
viewed as part of the New Black Aesthetic (NBA), or the Post-Soul gener-
ation, her method of textual production exempli‹es precisely what is new
about hip-hop aesthetics. Smith is a relentless “sampler.” If deejays must
pay their hip-hop dues by “digging in the crates” to ‹nd the right sounds,24
then Smith has paid her dues by interviewing hundreds of people to ‹nd
the “samples” for Fires in the Mirror and Twilight—Los Angeles, 1992. She
makes no attempt at creating unique characters or plots de novo. Rather,
she employs the personas and words of actual people to craft her own nar-
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rative or performance out of borrowed poses, tones, mannerisms, hair-
styles, and statements. Much like Grandmaster Flash on the turntable,
Anna Deavere Smith uses the interviews to locate the poetry within her in-
terviewees.25 It is precisely these poetic moments that Smith isolates from
an hour-long interview and samples via a two-to-seven-minute mono-
logue. Smith explains how she chooses to include a sample within her per-
formance: “I try to ‹nd a section that I don’t have to interrupt [the voice of
the character with the questions she asked in the interviews]. The perfor-
mance is much more dif‹cult if I’ve created chaos in their frame of
thought.”26
Hip-hop producers, such as DJ Jazzy Jeff and Domino, argue that they
transform original sounds by the mere act of listening with an ear trained in
the hip-hop aesthetic. Without speci‹cally drawing on hip-hop deejaying to
illustrate her methodology, Smith outlines a very similar process for con-
structing her performance pieces. In her introduction to Fires in the Mirror,
Smith prefaces her discussion about her methods by referencing one of her
grandfather’s favorite phrases: “If you say a word often enough, it becomes
your own.”27 Although her father disputes the exact phrasing, Smith is
clearly concerned with the very problems that have haunted hip-hop musi-
cians: is sampling an original act, and who owns a text based on samples?
Again, Smith makes no explicit connection to hip-hop, but she tries to show
that through her presenting herself “as an empty vessel, a repeater,” the
words spoken during her interviews have demonstrated their power and al-
lowed her to learn about contemporary American culture.28 This approach
enables Smith to go beyond traditional acting methodologies that ask actors
to look inside themselves to develop a character. Rather, sampling has con-
vinced Smith “that the activity of reenactment [her term for sampling]
could tell us as much, if not more, about another individual than the process
of learning about the other by using the self as a frame of reference.”29 A bit
later, Smith claims, “To develop a voice one must develop an ear.”30 These
quotations taken together articulate the ethos behind sampling in
post–Civil Rights era African American cultural production. Smith uses
sampling to both focus an audience’s attention on the best parts of a person’s
view or critique of American culture and demythologize any and all racial
categories by demolishing stereotypes and monolithic conceptions of iden-
tity. Smith claims that her use of sampling allows her to get beyond the
worn stereotypes of mass culture and complicates simplistic portrayals of
raced individuals, presenting their stories with humor and pathos.
De‹ning Hip-Hop Aesthetics / 49
Layering
Whatever the Negro does of his own volition he embellishes.
—Zora Neale Hurston,
“Characteristics of Negro Expression”
In addition to relying on sampled sounds, hip-hop has also relied on ex-
tensive references to local landmarks, popular culture, celebrities, and
high-priced commodities. Although these references are not recorded and
reworked through the aid of technology, mixing, rapping, graf‹ti, and
breaking have consistently invoked popular culture and translated it into
their compositions. A typically humorous example of this is EPMD’s “The
Steve Martin,” where the lyrics describe a dance where the goal is to imi-
tate and mock Martin’s dance moves as the lead character in the 1979 ‹lm
The Jerk, about a white person raised by blacks who never quite ‹ts despite
his best efforts to act “black.” By layering this Steve Martin reference
(which is as much a visual reference as a musical one) over drum, horn, and
bass tracks, along with scratching sounds, as Erick Sermon and Parrish
Smith rap back and forth, the layering of sounds, images, and symbols
opens a space for giving these items a new meaning, thus creating a way for
hip-hop artists to make ownership claims over texts. Tricia Rose argues
that “hip hop has always been articulated via commodities [i.e., already
owned objects] and engaged in the revision of meanings attached to
them.”31 Layering is one way to “deterritorialize” dominant images,
sounds, and phrases and make fun of and out of them.
The power of Anna Deavere Smith’s performances hinges on her abil-
ity to weave together an underlying narrative out of the multiple characters
and issues she presents. Her plays are deceptively simple because they
move so quickly among characters, settings, and viewpoints that the viewer
rarely has time to re›ect upon the sutured nature of the narrative. In the
terminology of hip-hop aesthetics, Fires in the Mirror and Twilight—Los
Angeles, 1992 relentlessly layer sample upon sample to complicate any sim-
plistic attempt at realism or representation through the development of
one character, story, or theme. Rather, these works seek to examine the na-
ture of perception itself. Smith’s performances tie together a range of emo-
tional responses, idiosyncratic views, and disparate images. There is noth-
ing necessary about their connection to one another. What Smith produces
is a bricolage that comes to represent the perceptions these events elicited,
not the events themselves. By editing, shaping, and organizing these sam-
ples, she imposes a kaleidoscopic order upon the chaos of human experi-
ence. Within a kaleidoscope, objects produce random shapes that a mirror
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will form into complex patterns. Smith, in effect, orders the random views
offered by local residents and fashions them into a singular object.
Smith’s use of layering is not unprecedented within African American
cultural history. On the contrary, this tradition is long-standing, even if the
contemporary era has refocused the practice. In perhaps its earliest African
American form, the strip quilt illustrates the layering within African Amer-
ican cultural production: “In this type of quilt the scraps of cloth are ‹rst
sewn into strips, which are then assembled into various patterns.”32 While
people from many ethnic and racial groups have engaged in scrap quilting,
African American versions distinguish themselves through ‹ve characteris-
tics: “(1) the dominance of strips; (2) bright, highly contrasting colors; (3)
large design elements; (4) offset designs; and (5) multiple patterning.”33
Layering appears to have a long history within African American cultural
production, predating the invention of electronic samplers. African Ameri-
can women layered fabrics into elaborate designs that conformed to African
aesthetic standards, emphasizing asymmetric patterns. Quilting, as a para-
digm, emphasizes both working-class and female perspectives because it
moves away from the artist as solitary genius and places her or him within a
social context where creations serve both pragmatic and artistic purposes.
Any analysis of Smith’s performance pieces must attend to their layered
structure and their methodological connection to strip quilting, especially
as a gendered paradigm for cultural production. Fires in the Mirror and
Twilight—Los Angeles, 1992 do not provide linear or chronological ac-
counts of the events they explore. Rather, they form a quilt, with multiple
patterns but no clear narrative or geometric center. These strips of com-
mentary, however, all contain brilliant hues of experience and emotion.
Scrap quilting, although a traditional folk art, anticipates developments in
postmodern and postcolonial theory. According to Tania Modleski, “Smith
radically and viscerally contests ideals of authenticity, in effect ‘deterritori-
alizing’ her characters and getting them to act on new common ground—
the stage.”34 Modleski relies on postcolonial theory to argue that Smith’s
aesthetic breaks down traditional ideas about artistic genius and reality in
order to demonstrate the constructed nature of cultural truths and prod-
ucts. The postcolonial provocateur, according to Modleski, must decon-
struct as she creates because the hidden truth of cultural production,
African American or not, is that the quilting circle presents a better para-
digm for describing artistic processes and the social construction of reality
than other models do. Layering, the selection and placement of samples,
constitutes an essential element of African American cultural work, espe-
cially in the post–Civil Rights era.
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To give a speci‹c example of how layering works within Smith’s
method, I want to explore the section “Hair” from Fires in the Mirror. In
this relatively brief section, Smith performs three characters who articulate
the relationship between hair and identity and demonstrate what all human
beings share—concern with appearance—and how racial discourses articu-
late that concern in culturally speci‹c ways. The ‹rst portrait, of an anony-
mous teenage black girl, presents the claim or call to which the following
sampled characters will respond. She starts by explaining how she learned
she was black and then quickly adds the 1960s Black Power slogan, “Black
is beautiful.” Like fabric redeployed in a strip quilt, Smith takes this tired
and now empty phrase and tries to build a new pattern around it. The girl
then adds, “White is beautiful too,” indicating that she is taking this con-
versation in a different direction than the original phrase might have sug-
gested, especially within the context of a play about racial con›ict.35 The
girl then describes how her black friends “bite” the styles—everything
from hairstyles to gym shoes—of their Puerto Rican classmates.36 In this
monologue, the anonymous girl borrows the phrases of her parents, a pre-
vious generation, and her friends, presenting a layered text within a layered
text.
Smith next provides a portrait of Al Sharpton discussing how he pat-
terned his own hairstyle after James Brown’s hair. Sharpton promised to do
so because Brown took the fatherless Sharpton under his wing. Performing
as Sharpton, Smith says: “It’s a personal thing between me and James
Brown. And just like in other communities people do their cultural thing
with who they wanna look like, uh, there’s nothing wrong with me doing
that with James. It’s. It’s us. . . . So it’s certainlih not a reaction to Whites.
It’s me and James’s thing.”37 Smith interviewed Sharpton because he had
organized protests after the Crown Heights riots, but she selected his com-
ments about his hair to include within the play because they best ‹t the
theme about identity she sought to develop. Last in this section, Smith ex-
plores how Lubavitcher women approach the relationship between hair
and identity. Through Rivkah Siegal, Smith shows how Hasidic women
shave their heads and wear wigs. Rivkah describes how she wears ‹ve dif-
ferent wigs and how her coworkers believe that she has cut or dyed her
hair. This scene culminates with Rivkah stating: “I’ve gone through a lot
with wearing wigs and not wearing wigs. It’s been a big issue for me.”38
Although these three portraits ‹ll only ten pages within Fires in the Mir-
ror, they suggest how carefully Smith chooses and layers each sample or
“fabric strip.” As part of the opening movements of the performance, the
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section on “hair” incorporates analysis of gender, race, religion, and mari-
tal status through a borrowing of the visual appearance, words, and syntac-
tical patterns from two “ordinary” people and one famous person. While
ostensibly exploring the origins and consequences of the Crown Heights
riots, Smith stops to meditate on the cultural foundations of beauty within
African American and Jewish communities. Brilliantly, she both exposes
the historical connection between whiteness and beauty and suggests that
this relationship may be breaking down even as institutional racism per-
sists. When the anonymous girl introduces the hip-hop phrase “biting”
into the conversation about beauty and style, it suggests Smith’s awareness
of hip-hop’s reliance on sampling and her acknowledgment that the aes-
thetic standards of hip-hop rely on incorporating existing styles into one’s
own style, potentially transforming the borrowed style. Sharpton’s defense
of his trademark hairstyle homage to James Brown, itself reminiscent of
hip-hop’s sampling from Brown’s oeuvre, illustrates the danger of appro-
priation, as some members of the black community claim Sharpton’s hair-
style relies on white standards of beauty. Smith, however, tries to show that
Sharpton’s reuse of Brown’s style is a thing of a beauty because it symbol-
izes his emotional connection to a father ‹gure. Last, Rivkah Siegel’s con-
cern about her extensive reliance on wigs suggests that “borrowing” too
much can lead to as many problems as it solves. By layering these three
samples next to one another, Smith comments on her own aesthetic prac-
tices even as she humanizes both sides of the Crown Heights riots. This
methodology also transforms the meaning of the original words from
Smith’s interviews and helps connect the interviewees in ways they had not
originally conceived.39 Layering thus allows Smith to juxtapose a wide
range of concerns—many of which would remain socially invisible without
her intervention—within a relatively concise space.40
Flow and Asymmetry
The presence of rhythm and lack of symmetry are paradoxical,
but there they are. Both are present to a marked degree. There
is always rhythm, but it is the rhythm of segments.
—Zora Neale Hurston, 
“Characteristics of Negro Expression”
Perhaps the most recognizable element of hip-hop music is its rhythm or
its driving beat. According to Tricia Rose, “rap music centers on the qual-
De‹ning Hip-Hop Aesthetics / 53
ity and the nature of rhythm and sound, the lowest, ‘fattest beats’ being the
most signi‹cant and emotionally charged.”41 She argues further that hip-
hop “involve[s] the repetition and recon‹guration of rhythmic elements in
ways that illustrate a heightened attention to rhythmic patterns and move-
ment between such patterns via breaks and points of musical rupture.”42
While the idea of the break, the moment where the drummers and bassists
brie›y improvise or solo, has long been a part of music, it took early hip-
hop deejays to repeat this evanescent moment and transform into a song in
its own right.43 By identifying, sampling, and repeating funky bass and
drum tracks, the driving rhythm of hip-hop was born. As Rose suggests,
the “›ow” or rhythm of hip-hop was essentially repetitious because only
the best sections of music were repeated over and over again, frequently for
humorous effect. De La Soul, for example, sampled a familiar section of a
Steely Dan’s “Peg” to ground their “Eye Know,” and Boogie Down Pro-
ductions relied on a sample of ACDC’s “Back in Black” to articulate their
claim that they have a “Dope Beat.” As time passed and the technology de-
veloped, deejays selected only particular instruments within a track to sam-
ple and created layered and “fat” rhythms to drive their sonic collages.44
While hip-hop does not offer a uniform beat that all songs share, it does
contain a fairly unique attitude toward repeated, rhythmic patterns. The
idea that African American music is rhythmically oriented has been long
assumed. Ronald Radano, however, has recently challenged this view and
demonstrated that percussive rhythms have been associated with African
American music only since the Civil War.45 Rhythm is not a natural ele-
ment of African American music, but one that has been nurtured and con-
structed over time. The rhythmic patterns that underlie hip-hop, in its
many forms, are not simply retentions or “holdovers” from African musi-
cal culture, but the product of particular choices made by artists at distinct
historical moments.
Part of hip-hop’s innovation has not just been the repetition of the
break, but the shifting of rhythmic, base, and percussion tracks in the mid-
dle of a song. Tricia Rose has called this rupture.46 Hip-hop both presents
a rhythm or ›ow and deconstructs it, by stopping or modifying the beat. It
is not uncommon that a rhythm or bass line will fade away or be cut off
abruptly, producing this rupture or asymmetrical effect. Audiences learn to
take pleasure in the rhythm and the deejay’s ability to break down one
rhythm or vibe and replace it with a completely different one. Both rhyth-
mic ›ow and asymmetry follow from hip-hop’s extensive use of samples
and layering. Unlike jazz or blues musicians, who tend to improvise from
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or bend notes and melodies from within one song, hip-hop musicians’ at-
titude toward ›ow and rupture requires a much larger palette of sounds,
from which one lays down a rhythm track.47 In this account, sampling and
layering enable the very rhythmic effects for which hip-hop is well-known.
Ideas and aesthetic judgments about samples, repetition, and rhythmic
›ow “push along” not only hip-hop music but other forms of contempo-
rary African American cultural production as well. Frequently, rupture ap-
pears as rhythmic asymmetry in visual and literary art.
Although most commentators and audience members initially notice
the content of her work, or its subject matter, Smith’s On the Road perfor-
mance pieces also constitute experiments in dramatic time and timing.
While many academics have emphasized how Smith performs identity
within a postmodern framework, they have neglected the temporal aspects
of these performances. In other words, even though the postmodern is fre-
quently represented as the compression of space and time, scholars of per-
formance and identity formation tend to emphasize the spatial logic un-
derlying race over the temporal aspects when confronting On the Road.48
Smith’s intervention into the public dialogues about the Crown Heights ri-
ots and the Rodney King verdict both imitate and interrogate the tempo-
rality of contemporary cultural discourse. In the introduction to the book
version of Fires in the Mirror, Smith comments, “American character is
alive inside the syntactical breaks.”49 She adds that the piece “was not orig-
inally intended for the printed word. Our effort has been to try to docu-
ment it in such a way that the act of speech is evident.”50 Smith clearly held
some reservations about publishing a book from her performances because
“words are not an end in themselves. They are a means to evoking the
character of the person who spoke them. Every person that I include in the
book, and who I perform, has a presence that is much more important than
the information they give.”51 In these quotations, Smith signals her trepi-
dation that the book versions of the performances will cause readers to
overvalue the words and neglect the images and sounds that specify the
meaning of these words. Her concern is that words alone lack the rhythmic
or temporal elements that can provide the necessary clues for proper un-
derstanding. For Smith, the rhythms of speech can convey as much mean-
ing as the words themselves. In preparing the written version, she took
great pains to include all of the verbal miscues and accompanying gestures.
Both books also contain photos from the performances, which convey how
Smith’s posture and appearance shaped the word’s meanings as well.
The emphasis on rhythm is not con‹ned to her portrayal of individual
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characters, but pervades the rhythmic ›ow and asymmetry that the perfor-
mance and text create. The pace of Fires in the Mirror and Twilight—Los
Angeles, 1992 is relentless. The viewer/reader does not have more than a
few minutes to acquaint herself with a particular persona and his or her
rhythm. Part of what Smith performs through the vast array of personae is
the hurried pace or rhythm of contemporary dialogues on race. The pace
is more important than the words. In a more musical vein, Smith privileges
conversational rhythm over the topics or melodies of the dialogue. Jazz
music developed the break, what Albert Murray de‹nes as “a temporary in-
terruption of the established cadence . . . which usually requires a ‹ll” or
solo.52 It was in the break between rhythmic patterns that jazz virtuosity
could be displayed and performed. Smith’s performance pieces create a ca-
dence or ›ow, which in turn produces the expectations for rupture. The
audience/reader of Smith’s performance pieces comes to listen and watch
for the breaks and contemplate their meaning, as much as the content pro-
vides. Murray argues that “on the break you are required to improvise, do
your thing, to establish your identity, to write your signature on the epi-
dermis of actuality.”53 Unlike the jazz musician who improvises on the
break, Smith embraces hip-hop’s approach of bending, deconstructing, and
reconstructing a melody or rhythm by layering samples on top of samples.
The emphasis on rhythmic ›ow and asymmetry in her composition
causes the audience to respond in a positive manner toward Smith’s work.
Comparing her work to a ‹lm documentary or a news report, Janelle
Reinelt quite rightly notes that Smith’s performance pieces convey an am-
biguous critique of race relations. Reinelt also observes that Smith’s “ob-
jectivity and fairness is noted in almost every review; she earns the right to
speak for others because the performance creates the impression of ‹delity
and fairness to the interviewees.”54 Keeping in line with hip-hop aesthet-
ics, Smith is trying to “keep it real.” Her ability to weave her interviews
into a ›owing whole creates the semblance of truth despite the many frag-
ment of truth contained therein. In these plays, offering authenticity, or
the illusion of authenticity via ›owing layered samples, becomes more im-
portant than stating a clear or coherent critique. In the introduction to
Twilight—Los Angeles, Smith is very clear that she “is looking at the processes
of the problems. Acting is a constant process of becoming something. It is
not a result, it is not an answer. It is not a solution.”55 Although Smith
never explicitly connects these processes with hip-hop, the dialogue she
performs replicates the very conversations cultivated by hip-hop aesthetics.
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Tricia Rose has described hip-hop as “black noise” or a “black cultural ex-
pression that prioritizes black voices from the margins of urban America.
Rap music is a form of rhymed storytelling accompanied by highly rhyth-
mic, electronically based music.”56 Although not music, Smith’s perfor-
mances also present marginalized voices and stories through ›owing lay-
ered samples. It is not just the content, but the method and rhythm of
presenting that content, which de‹nes hip-hop aesthetics.
Irony and Parody
The Post-Soul imagination, if you will, has been fueled by three
distinct critical desires, namely, the reconstitution of commu-
nity, particularly one that is critically engaged with the cultural
and political output of black communities; a rigorous form of
self and communal critique; and the willingness to undermine
or deconstruct the most negative symbols and stereotypes of
black life via the use and distribution of those very same symbols
and stereotypes.
—Mark Anthony Neal, Soul Babies
Up to this point, my discussion of hip-hop aesthetics emphasizes structures
or methods, not the themes or subject matter of contemporary African
American cultural production. Analysts and critics of hip-hop music, con-
temporary visual arts, and recent literature tend to focus on the meaning,
not the processes that created the texts. As a result, reading contemporary
African American cultural criticism would cause many readers to conclude
that the message dictated the artistic processes that created the resultant
texts. By foregrounding sampling, layering, and rhythmic ›ows and rup-
tures, my goal has been to counter this scholarly trend and suggest that
there is a mutually constitutive relationship between form and content. Ac-
cording to Albert Murray, the blues could be used to narrate tragedy, com-
edy, melodrama (or romance), and farce. The blues, at least according to
Murray, could tell whatever story the artist wanted to tell.57 While most
hip-hop critics acknowledge how hip-hop’s aesthetic structure shapes its
message, it is still not uncommon to encounter scholarly and popular
analyses of hip-hop’s lyrics or messages that separate the two. After re-
viewing a broad array of contemporary African American music, art, and
literature, it appears that hip-hop aesthetics provides an ironic form for
those who deploy it. Sampling, layering, and rhythmic ›ow/asymmetry, as
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a uni‹ed aesthetic system, undermine strong political or cultural state-
ments—either nationalist or integrationist—despite the efforts of some
message rappers.
Traditional analyses of irony, such as Northrop Frye’s, de‹ne the prac-
tice as giving “form to the shifting ambiguities and complexities of unide-
alized existence.”58 The most ironic moments are those where the position
or view of the creator is most submerged, leaving the audience to interpret
the many possible meanings and to wonder whether the irony is intended
or incidental.59 Hayden White has argued that irony can constitute a mode
of historical narration: “Irony tends to dissolve all belief in the possibility
of positive political actions . . . it tends to engender the belief in the ‘mad-
ness’ of civilization itself and to inspire a Mandarin-like disdain for those
seeking to grasp the nature of social reality.”60 Offering a more pragmatic
account, Richard Rorty argues that much postmodern criticism embodies
this ironic attitude and that the ironist questions the value of any and all
terms, ideas, texts, images, or sounds because they offer mere representa-
tions of reality, which in turn can be redescribed.61 Rorty concludes, much
like Hayden White, that irony is irredeemably private and will not serve as
the basis for social justice movements.62
Postmodernists, on the other hand, tend to offer more positive ac-
counts about the potential political effects of irony. Gilles Deleuze argues
that it is the primary way to challenge law’s inequities.63 For Deleuze, irony
creates the very concept of difference because it highlights contradictions,
paradoxes, and language’s complexity.64 Translated to hip-hop aesthetics,
irony—at least for Deleuze–creates the very racial, gender, and class differ-
ences hip-hop frequently seeks to articulate.65 Linda Hutcheon develops
this point further to show how irony can make explicit the con›icting as-
sumptions between interpretative communities.66 Hutcheon’s argument is
premised on the idea that irony is only possible when multiple discursive
communities exist and create contrasting interpretations of a given text.67
In his study of African American satire, Darryl Dickson-Carr examines
how degenerative irony has operated within African American literature.68
Basing his analysis on Hutcheon’s theoretical approach, Dickson-Carr ar-
gues that irony in the post–Civil Rights era targets both the narratives that
found Western culture and the contradictions and tensions within the
African American community.69
Within the logic of hip-hop aesthetics, keeping it real is a claim about
the need for artistic authenticity and being true to one’s roots, not a desire
for realism in art per se.70 When a hip-hop artist insists on keeping it real,
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it does not mean that he or she is producing a verbatim or completely ac-
curate image or description of existence. Rather, realness requires an un-
sentimental perspective on contemporary life that recognizes how the
mere repetition of a text, sound, or image illustrates the ongoing produc-
tion of discursive communities based on race, gender, and sexuality. As the
epigraph to this section notes, Neal has identi‹ed cultural critique and de-
construction of stereotypes (both positive and negative ones) as central
goals of contemporary African American cultural production. Central to
articulating these criticisms, hip-hop aesthetics deploys irony to insist on
the continuing importance of race in shaping discursive communities, so-
cial experiences, and legal doctrines.
Both the music of Dead Prez and the comedy of Dave Chappelle illus-
trate how irony operates by exploring existing social cleavages. Dead Prez is
a hip-hop group whose name simultaneously references both money, be-
cause U.S. currency tends to celebrate past political leaders, and a revolu-
tionary politics, which would lead to the metaphorical deaths of our current
leaders.71 Dead Prez is unusually political by hip-hop standards. Its con-
scious deployment of irony is designed to remind the hip-hop nation of its
putative political commitments and assert that community’s cultural, politi-
cal, and racial difference from the mainstream.72 The group’s race-con-
scious politics have caused them tremendous dif‹culty in securing a record-
ing contract. On the other hand, Dave Chappelle has found commercial and
popular success with his ironic commentaries about the myth of a color-
blind America. In one skit, Chappelle imagines how the country would re-
spond to George W. Bush’s public persona and his policies if he were
black.73 Through his ironic portrayal of President Bush, Chappelle demon-
strates how race still shapes public opinion, the political order, and perhaps
most importantly the country’s sense of humor. Both Dead Prez and Chap-
pelle examine the illusion of authenticity demanded by hip-hop. Dead Prez
reveals the “false consciousness” of hip-hop stars who create radical street
personas but willingly trade that persona for material success, which discon-
nects them from their community. Chappelle deconstructs racial stereo-
types and taboo topics in a putatively color-blind society. Even as he ques-
tions the logic of authenticity, Chappelle relies on his racial identity to save
his own racialized representations from being viewed as racist depictions.74
Unlike Dead Prez, whose antiracist and anticapitalist politics are pretty
clearly presented, Chappelle has politics that are harder to discern.
Perhaps no song more than N.W.A.’s “Fuck tha Police” better repre-
sents the irony implicit within hip-hop lyrics. The song questions legal au-
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thority and seems to advocate armed resistance against the police when
necessary. Due to this song, a number of police departments made it
dif‹cult, if not impossible, for N.W.A. to perform.75 They read the song’s
lyric literally and mistakenly believed that N.W.A. advocated the killing of
law-enforcement of‹cials.76 What such a literal reading missed was the lit-
erary framing of the song. The song begins by claiming that the “NWA
court” has begun and that Ice Cube must take an oath that his testimony
will be truthful. The scene is clearly ‹ctional and fantastic, as Dr. Dre plays
the judge and the prosecuting attorneys include Mc Ren, Ice Cube, and
Easy E. Moreover, by parodying the traditional courtroom oath, the song
clearly understands itself as an imagined response to the struggles of urban
life and a parody of the false racial truths typically offered in courtrooms
during the height of the War on Drugs. The song concludes with the
‹ctional court rendering the judgment that the police of‹cer is a “redneck,
whitebread, chickenshit muthafucka.”77 The of‹cer immediately cries that
he wants justice. Despite the harsh language and vivid imagery, the song is
clearly ‹ctional and ironic. Some whites heard the song as echoing their
own fears about black lawlessness, but N.W.A. seems to criticize how race
affects police actions and legal decisions. It is not the exhortation to anar-
chy some understood it to be, but a plea to inject hip-hop youth’s perspec-
tive on law enforcement into public dialogues. If law enforcement ever ex-
perienced the other side of the police stick, as Ice Cube suggests, it too
would cry injustice. Following Deleuze, N.W.A.’s irony merely accentuates
the social cleavage that already existed.
My study of hip-hop, as a result, suggests that its approach to metaphor
is primarily ironic because the standard meaning for a word or a phrase is
rarely asserted or invoked. Tricia Rose argues that hip-hop relies on a “hid-
den transcript” with “cloaked speech and disguised cultural codes” that can
“comment on and challenge aspects of current power inequalities.”78 Rap-
ping provides emcees a way to articulate social criticisms that still are not
quite “utterable” even if law guarantees formal equality. Hip-hop has thus
become highly metaphorical, creating new words and terms and resignify-
ing established symbols and icons. Sampling and layering have only added
to the obfuscation within hip-hop, because lyrics, beats, rhythms, and even
sound bites all produce and deconstruct messages simultaneously. If blues
testi‹ed to the need to overcome existential angst and jazz attempted to
forge identity and respect through improvisation, hip-hop ‹nds joy in its
technological and lyrical play but doubts that any transcendence or respect
is forthcoming, especially from the world outside one’s neighborhood.79
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Some have found hip-hop nihilistic or self-indulgent. I would argue that its
overall message, especially as articulated in art and literature, is primarily
ironic. This irony, however, can have negative consequences because its
very performance and potential inaccessibility have the potential to reca-
pitulate the very stereotypes the form attempts to deconstruct. This em-
phasis on irony also undermines efforts to build a hip-hop-based coalition
to challenge inequality and injustice.
From the outset, critics both admired the realism of Smith’s perfor-
mance pieces and worried about the potential for her work to reinforce
worn stereotypes. By analyzing Fires in the Mirror and Twilight—Los Ange-
les through the lens of hip-hop aesthetics, it is possible to understand them
as ironic revisions of contemporary American history. Through these per-
formances, Smith asserts that the words themselves should be understood
not as literal truths, but as symptoms of a bigger problem:
I am interested in the dif‹culty people have in talking about race
and talking about difference. This dif‹culty goes across race, class,
and political lines. I am interested in the lack of words and mistrust-
ful of the ease with which some people seem to pick up new words
and mix them in with the old. The new words seem to get old
quickly. This means to me that we do not have a language that serves
us as a group.80
In the introduction to Twilight—Los Angeles, Smith restates her assump-
tions more economically: “Our race dialogue desperately needs this more
complex language [one that can accommodate multifaceted identities].”81
In these quotations from the introductions of both performance pieces,
Smith tries to make clear her ironic use of metaphor and language. Ro-
mantic, tragic, or even comic modes of narration can submerge the “truth”
of identity under stereotypical forms. Instead, Smith refuses to allow the
Rodney King or Crown Heights riots to be understood through these
tropes. Rather, the performance pieces rely on sampling, layering, and
rhythmic ›ow/asymmetry to undermine the narrative renderings various
interviewees use to convey their viewpoint about the events.
The last section of Twilight—Los Angeles, 1992 (“Justice”) illustrates
how Smith deploys an ironic mode of narration to present an unidealized
image of the riot’s causes and effects. To conclude her chronicle, Smith
presents a defense lawyer for one of the acquitted (Harlan Braun), a Ko-
rean who owned a liquor store in South Central (Mrs. Young-Soon Han),
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a Latina activist (Gladis Sibrian), and the organizer of a gang truce (Twi-
light Bey). Through these individuals, Smith articulates a multifaceted cri-
tique of how media accounts oversimpli‹ed the events in order to narrate
the riots as romance, tragedy, or comedy. Unlike the standard versions of
the riots, the picture Smith presents is much more ambiguous. Smith se-
lects Harlan Braun to draw one possible conclusion about the riots:
“ ‘What is truth?’ And it’s a haunting question here too, isn’t it? Is it the
truth of Koon and Powell being guilty or is it the truth of the society that
has to ‹nd them guilty to protect itself?”82 Through Braun, Smith demon-
strates the irony of those who sought to ‹nd a single truth in the riots.
Braun questions the very nature of truth and thus reminds the audience
that Smith has layered her samples to interrogate the “linear” conceptions
of truth in which events result from one primary cause and yield one les-
son. Second, Smith performs the words of Mrs. Young-Soon Han. Han de-
scribes how the riots changed her once-favorable view of the United States
and caused her to question the very ideal of justice. She also wonders
whether Korean Americans will be able to ‹nd common ground with
African Americans and live together with them peaceably. By placing Han’s
voice after Braun’s, Smith deconstructs the racial binary on which most
commentators relied to understand the case and demonstrates the multiple
issues and views that shaped people’s perspectives of the event.
Third, Smith presents Gladis Sibrian, the director of the Farabundo
Martí National Liberation Front. Sibrain discusses the powerlessness that
people, especially African American and Latino/a youth, felt as a result of
the riots. For Sibrian, the violence that ensued constituted anarchy because
no one organized and channeled the emotions the court decision caused.
The riots symbolize a failure because they reinforced feelings of power-
lessness across racial and ethnic lines even as people took events into their
own hands. Through Sibrian, Smith shows that no transcendence followed
from this social explosion. The failure, however, did not result from a fatal
›aw (as in tragedy), but is re›ective of the irony implicit in the post–Civil
Rights era. This section and the play culminate with Twilight Bey and his
metaphor of twilight to describe the metaphysical uncertainty the perfor-
mance piece presents. Although the putative theme of this section is jus-
tice, Smith leaves the audience with the image of twilight, the ›eeting mo-
ments between day and night. This metaphor emphasizes the evanescence
of the historical event and the perspectives on it, suggesting that justice it-
self may be an ephemeral condition.
Ironically, the former gangbanger gets the last word of the play, but
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those ‹nal thoughts do not possess a determinate meaning, nor did he con-
struct them for the exact purpose to which they are here used. Rather, he
comes to embody the failure of grand narratives through his name and his
philosophy. Twilight Bey becomes a metaphor for liminality himself,
thereby losing the very individuality Smith appears to offer her interview-
ees. The layers of samples, culled from her many interviews, suggest that
all perspectives contain some truth, even if no one perspective possesses
the entire truth. The rhythmic ›ow, which is so central to the virtuosity of
Smith’s performances, implies that the play of “time” holds the key to jus-
tice, not a discrete principle. Smith claims, in her introduction to Fires in
the Mirror, that if one repeats a word enough times, it becomes one’s own.83
Yet this statement obscures the ironic form of ownership her performance
methodology confers. The words she comes to own have been transformed
through her own sampling, sorting, and pasting into a “new” composition.
By sampling the words of her interviewees and then reconstructing them
into a layered and ›owing text, Smith interrogates who owns the perfor-
mative spaces that the theater offers.84 While the people portrayed do gain
some access to the stage, it constitutes an ironic access because Smith’s vir-
tuosity as a performer and the stories of Crown Height and Los Angeles
overpower their thoughts and personalities. Moreover, their words gain
value within Smith’s narrative precisely to the extent her performance re-
shapes their meaning.
Hip-Hop Aesthetics and Intellectual Property Law
Anna Deavere Smith’s performance pieces exemplify not only the charac-
teristics of hip-hop aesthetics but how its assumptions con›ict with intel-
lectual property law. Fires in the Mirror and Twilight—Los Angeles, 1992
both share the copyright warning, common to most books or plays:
All rights, including but not limited to live stage performing rights
(professional and amateur), motion picture, radio and television
broadcasting, recording, recitation, lecturing, public reading, and
the rights of translation into foreign languages are expressly re-
served to the author and subject to royalty.
This copyright warning seems particularly ironic because Anna Deavere
Smith did not actually write any of the words she performed. Rather, she
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selected these quotations/samples from her interviews, layered them in
patterns, and then claimed ownership in the compiled or collaged text.
Moreover, this legal claim seems to contradict the very assertion she makes
about who owns the stage in her introductions. While I am not question-
ing her artistic ability or her creativity, there appears to be tension between
the hip-hop methodology employed and the legal form that allows Smith
to assert some level of control over her creation and disseminate her art.
Smith’s plays help reveal how intellectual property law enables texts cre-
ated by hip-hop aesthetes to circulate within popular culture and threatens
the vitality of hip-hop aesthetics as an ongoing cultural paradigm for tex-
tual production.
Intellectual property law creates properties out of written or visual texts
(copyright); manufacturing processes and business inventions (patent);
company names, logos, and slogans (trademark); and even celebrity per-
sonas (right of publicity). Copyright, patent, trademark, and the right of
publicity are loosely connected legal constructions, to which different legal
doctrines frequently apply. What they share, however, is the ability to cre-
ate property out of intangible objects. As is frequently noted in the litera-
ture, especially by its strong proponents, intellectual property law (1) pro-
vides incentives for creators to create intangible property, (2) enables third
parties to invest in other people’s ideas and the expression of those ideas,
(3) allows our intellectual resources to ›ow to their most valuable uses, and
(4) fosters private ownership and thus permits decentralized decision mak-
ing about creativity and scienti‹c discovery.85 According to the U.S. Code,
intellectual property owners have the right to make copies of and distrib-
ute their work.86 The U.S. Supreme Court has recently made it clear that
courts must create a “sound balance between the respective values of sup-
porting creative pursuits through copyright protection and promoting in-
novation [and creativity]” when interpreting and applying intellectual
property law.87
While property rights are ostensibly color-blind and race neutral,
Cheryl Harris astutely notes that they have always been linked to identity
traits, such as gender, religion, race, ethnicity, national origin, and social
class.88 Unspoken assumptions about creators, authors, and scientists have
limited the applicability of intellectual property doctrines because they
tend to include romantic assumptions about authorship: creators of all
kinds work alone, create new works of art or make discoveries through
leaps of genius, and ignore historical or cultural contexts when they
work.89 Hip-hop aesthetics does not follow the romantic conception of ge-
64 / parodies of ownership
nius that underlies intellectual property law.90 As its practitioners and crit-
ics alike note, hip-hop aesthetics is concerned with “keepin’ it real” and au-
thenticity claims as much as it is concerned with monetary rewards—al-
though its practitioners willingly take the money. Even if hip-hop music
has frequently concerned itself with the legality of sampling, hip-hop
artists nonetheless assert their ownership rights over their songs and their
styles.91
Anna Deavere Smith’s performance pieces suggest a similar con›ict of
values and assumptions. Smith must blur the line between verbatim re-
portage and solitary artistic genius as she develops her project in order to
please both the requirements of the theater community and the legal re-
quirements for intellectual property protection. Her attempt to perform
her critique that theater omits the multiplicity of voices that comprise the
United States creates a potential legal conundrum: if she samples too di-
rectly, then she opens herself up to a lawsuit. If she samples wisely, as she
does from excerpts taken from private interviews, she comes to “own” the
very words she claims have been missing from the public dialogue. Thus,
she has “stolen” from the very people with whom she claims solidarity. A
number of groups and hip-hop stars have encountered similar dilemmas,
seeking to include phrases from Martin Luther King speeches or samples
of George Clinton and James Brown as testaments to their groundbreak-
ing artistry. In these instances, hip-hop musicians must either pay up or
delete the homage they wanted to make.
As I have tried to argue throughout this chapter, sampling, layering,
and rhythmic ›ow/asymmetry lead hip-hop aesthetics toward ironic forms
of narration and ambiguous criticisms of American culture. Intellectual
property law and legal discourse, however, have historically assumed that
meaning is directly correlated to the words, sounds, or images of a given
text. While irony revels in ambiguity and double meanings, intellectual
property law operates as if words have a distinct meaning without refer-
ence to any particular audience or cultural context. One of the primary an-
alytical tools upon which courts have relied in copyright law is the idea/ex-
pression dichotomy.92 Thus, an author can own the expression or
particularly wording of a concept, but not the concept itself, because legal
discourse has determined that allowing authors to own particular articula-
tions of an idea provides the necessary balance between innovation and
property rights and between the creator and the public.
This scheme functions properly as long as particular expressions denote
one distinct idea. Hip-hop aesthetics challenges this assumption of copy-
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right law because its aesthetic theory presupposes ambiguity and double
meanings and carefully constructs these texts to produce these ironies
through sampling, layering, and rhythmic ›ows/asymmetries. Rather than
assuming that a particular text constitutes a subset or articulation of a given
idea, hip-hop aesthetics turns this relationship upside down and attempts
to transform a single expression into a multiplicity of ideas. For example,
when Jay-Z samples from the musical Annie in his song “Hard Knock
Life,” he transforms the meaning of a “hard knock life” even if copyright
law required him to pay a royalty for merely copying the song. The
idea/expression dichotomy breaks down when applied to hip-hop produc-
ers because their verbatim copying frequently shows how multiple ideas
exist within a single expression. It is precisely this free play of ideas, which
hip-hop promotes, that intellectual property law regulates and limits.
The goal of hip-hop aesthetics is thus to reconstruct a textual object so
that what appears solidly romantic, tragic, or comic becomes an elusive,
ambiguous, and ironic commentary on contemporary social relations. Em-
phasizing authenticity or “keepin’ it real” is actually an ironic plea that
serves as an antidote to the excesses of other narrative modes. Hip-hop
does not dismiss tragedy, romance, and comedy because these narrative
modes affect social relations even if they fail to represent cultural life ade-
quately. Hip-hop aesthetes must engage tragedy, romance, and comedy to
demonstrate how they saturate American culture and ‹ll it with “white
noise.” Contra postmodernism, hip-hop does not lament the “emptiness”
of mass culture but deconstructs its “weight” and in›uence. It makes fun
out of that “cultural baggage” by transforming the meaning of a text even
as it appears to use a verbatim copy of it. Hip-hop aesthetics reveals that
ownership, especially of cultural texts, is ultimately more bound by cultural
and racial contexts than existing intellectual property law doctrines sug-
gest. Thus, Smith’s claim in the copyright notice that she owns the expres-
sions Fires in the Mirror and Twilight—Los Angeles, 1992 appears more co-
herent because she emplotted them, through sampling, layering, and
rhythmic ›ows/asymmetries, into an ironic collage for the theater.
Smith’s performance pieces exemplify hip-hop aesthetic’s criticism of
intellectual property law. Smith makes clear that the key to her meaning
lies in her performance, not in its composition or as an abstract text. For
her, identifying her work as a performance attempts to protect it from be-
ing reduced to a mere text or expression. Smith resists any effort to trans-
form the ambiguity of her work into a romantic, tragic, or comic tale that
falsi‹es the messiness of the Crown Heights or Rodney King riots. Intel-
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lectual property law, however, cannot protect this kind of integrity because
it does not acknowledge how particular expressions get plotted with dis-
tinct narrative modes. This gap within the assumptions of hip-hop aesthet-
ics and intellectual property law reveals how legal discourse seeks to re-
solve such textual ambiguity by expanding (intellectual) property’s rule.
Given its historic role in creating racial, gender, and class inequality, it is
ironic that contemporary society is asking property concepts to resolve a
whole host of ongoing cultural con›icts in the post–Civil Rights era.
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......chapter 4......
Claiming Ownership in the
Post–Civil Rights Era
The origins of hip-hop can be traced to the late 1960s in Jamaica, but the
music began capturing national attention during the 1980s.1 During hip-
hop’s early years, Ronald Reagan’s election deepened existing cultural divides
and furthered the “culture wars” that dominated the attention of African
American activists, intellectuals, writers, musicians, artists, and politicians.
These activists and intellectuals sought to complete the social transforma-
tion begun during the 1950s and 1960s. Hip-hop aesthetes and critical race
theorists had to confront intellectual “segregation,” which kept the contri-
butions and experiences of African Americans and other historically margin-
alized groups outside of the nation’s classrooms, museums, historical monu-
ments, and legal doctrines. In this cultural context, African American
cultural workers questioned who “owns” American cultural history and how
minority voices should participate in contemporary cultural dialogues.
This chapter seeks to build a bridge between the Civil Rights and hip-
hop generations through close readings of Toni Morrison’s Beloved and
Adrian Piper’s Vanilla Nightmare series, texts produced in the late 1980s.
These works, by two artists whose careers span the end of the Civil Rights
era and the ›owering of hip-hop, explore the politics surrounding property
and cultural ownership and thus link Civil Rights era hopes to the refor-
mulation (not simply a redistribution) of property rights. Neither Morri-
son nor Piper is generally considered part of the hip-hop generation, for
good reasons, and it would be folly to view them solely in this vein. How-
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ever, their work shares basic elements of hip-hop aesthetics (sampling, lay-
ering, rhythmic ›ows/asymmetry, and irony) and consistently questions
what “ownership” means. Both authors also examine the problems African
Americans still encounter when claiming ownership over themselves and
their cultural heritage. Placing Morrison and Piper into dialogue with the
hip-hop culture that Bronx youth created in the 1970s and 1980s allows an
exploration of the connection between popular and “high” cultural forms.
This conversation transforms hip-hop aesthetics from a potentially iso-
lated artifact of youth culture to a response to broader concerns and ongo-
ing dif‹culties in the post–Civil Rights era. It also acknowledges the per-
vasive shift from civil rights to property rights rhetoric within social and
legal discourse. Morrison and Piper, along with other hip-hop aesthetes,
anticipate the centrality of intellectual property law in contemporary de-
bates about American culture because they foresee how the ownership of
cultural texts and cultural memory remains an open question. 
Through Morrison’s and Piper’s work, we can explore how claiming
ownership in the post–Civil Rights era has been transformed by and
through hip-hop aesthetics. Their works assume a critical attitude toward
dominant legal theories of property. Legal decisions, much more so than
scholarly writing on the topic, tend to presume that owners and appropri-
ators share status and power.2 African American writers, painters, and mu-
sicians tend to rely on an alternative assumption: racialized power shapes
the existing distribution of property ownership, including rights in intel-
lectual properties. Hip-hop aesthetics constitutes a primary strategy for
African Americans to articulate ownership over the public sphere, even if
legal discourse has already distributed the ownership rights over some of
the texts, objects, sounds, and images of that “public” sphere. To under-
stand how Morrison’s Beloved and Piper’s Vanilla Nightmare series partici-
pate in this ongoing conversation, one must attend to their examinations of
property within the contexts of literary and visual culture. 
Claiming Ownership of Literature
Freeing yourself was one thing; claiming ownership of that
freed self was another.
—Toni Morrison, Beloved
To link Morrison and her award-wining novel Beloved with hip-hop aes-
thetics may appear problematic because the novel does not reference hip-
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hop explicitly, nor has Morrison identi‹ed such a connection. In a number
of interviews, though, she has linked this and her other works to the social,
economic, and political crises that fueled the growth of hip-hop in the
1980s.3 Literary or cultural studies scholars have generally considered her
work through music, with blues- or jazz-based paradigms the norm, and
with good reason.4 However, I will argue that Morrison’s Beloved and its
trope of rememory constitute a metaphysical inquiry into the ironies of
self-ownership in the post–Civil Rights era, especially as the ghosts of
racism and racialization undermine the realization of the previous era’s so-
cial activism. This focus on property, combined with Morrison’s blend of
Modernist and postmodernist writing strategies, suggest a number of
af‹nities with hip-hop aesthetics.5
Many critics have identi‹ed the unusual structure and rhythmic ›ow of
the novel and struggled to ‹nd an adequate paradigm to contain or repre-
sent it. For example, Linda Krumholz offers a fairly compelling and accu-
rate characterization of Beloved:
To make the novel work as a ritual, Morrison adapts techniques
from modernist novels, such as the fragmentation of the plot and a
shifting narrative voice, to compel the reader to actively construct
an interpretive framework. In Beloved, the reader’s process of recon-
structing the fragmented story parallels Sethe’s [the novel’s main
character] psychological recovery: repressed fragments of the
(‹ctionalized) personal and historical past are retrieved and recon-
structed. Morrison also introduces oral narrative techniques—repe-
tition, the blending of voices, a shifting narrative voice, and an
episodic framework.6
I have quoted Krumholz’s description at length to reveal the conceptual
dif‹culties talented and insightful scholars have encountered with the
novel. Bernard Bell, an astute and in›uential critic, has similarly struggled
to describe Morrison’s text:
In her multivocal remembrances of things past, Morrison probes
the awesome will to live of her characters to celebrate the truth and
resiliency of the complex double consciousness of their humanity.
What she has wrought in Beloved is an extremely Gothic blend of
postmodern realism and romance as well as of racial and sexual
politics.7
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To better capture the aesthetic structure of Beloved and its theme of how to
“own the self,” I propose the then-burgeoning hip-hop aesthetic—which
features sampling, layering, rhythmic ›ows/asymmetry, and irony—as the
principle that can unify this sprawling and seemingly disjointed text. Hip-
hop aesthetics supplies both a poetic and a historical referent for Beloved.
As a forerunner of hip-hop aesthetics, Morrison’s novel captures the cul-
tural tensions of the 1980s, when 1950s and 1960s activism had ebbed, and
African Americans and other historically marginalized people re›ected on
the strengths and limits of Civil Rights strategies. Rememory, Beloved’s
central trope, offers an alternative name for the processes by which sam-
pling, layering, rhythmic ›ows/asymmetries, and irony provide emotional
renewal despite the persistence of race, racism, and racialization. Beloved is
not a hip-hop novel, but it responds to some of the same artistic and polit-
ical challenges, especially as experienced by young African American
artists.8
Morrison’s Beloved relates the stories of a family and a community in the
period leading up to and following the Civil War. Although the novel por-
trays a wide range of characters, its narrative center revolves around Sethe,
who escaped from slavery; Denver, Sethe’s daughter who survived the es-
cape; Paul D, a friend who located Sethe several years after the war; Baby
Suggs, Sethe’s mother-in-law; and Beloved, the ghost of Sethe’s daughter
whom she killed in order to protect her from slavery. The novel constantly
moves back and forth between the 1850s and the 1870s, suggesting how
sampled bits of historical memory, not the events themselves, shape the
present lives of her characters. The novel’s shocking element, which some
have termed tragic, is that upon being cornered by slave catchers in Ohio,
Sethe kills one child and begins attacking the others. By killing her own
offspring, Sethe “wins” her freedom. Beloved is the ghost of the killed girl,
who has returned to demand Sethe’s attention and love. The community,
which once found warmth and self-love through Baby Suggs’s preaching
and hospitality, ultimately shuns Baby Suggs, Sethe, and her children.
Writing initially in the voice of an omniscient author, Morrison moves to-
ward a series of ‹rst-person narratives that alternate among characters.9
Ultimately, through the help of the community, Sethe is able to exorcize
the ghost of Beloved.
As my brief summary implies, the novel does not offer a simple chrono-
logical account of a singular event or a particular character’s development.
Rather, it is comprised of a complex web of voices, events, memories, and
characters. Although few (if any) scholars have drawn such a comparison,
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Beloved progresses through a relentless array of samples. Sampling is not
simply the reshaping and reuse of a recorded text, but a method of textual
production, in this case writing, that proceeds by listening for and incor-
porating discrete parts, rather than completed wholes, and constructing an
aesthetically satisfying text out of them.10 In recent years, hip-hop music
producers have been forced, because of the dif‹culty and cost of clearing
samples, to hide their samples by reworking them or cutting them into
smaller and smaller pieces. As is well-known, Morrison ‹rst learned of
Margaret Garner, the historical ‹gure on whom Sethe is based, when com-
pleting research for The Black Book.11 However, as Steven Weisenburger
has demonstrated in Modern Medea, where he explores the historical events
that led up to Garner’s attempt to murder multiple children and her being
forced to return to slavery, Garner’s real story is more complicated than
Morrison’s version suggests, because the slave owner apparently fathered a
number of the murdered children. The murders thus constituted a “rebel-
lion against the whole patriarchal system of American Slavery,” as Garner
attacked not only her children but her master’s property as well.12 More-
over, unlike Sethe, whose violent actions freed her from slavery, Margaret
Garner’s actions did not result in her freedom, but fated her to being sold
down the river. But Morrison does not aim to tell a historically accurate
version.13 Rather, she reworks the historical details to better ‹t a story, pre-
sumably one relevant to the 1980s situation that Morrison herself con-
fronted.
Morrison’s use of samples can be seen in her serialized description of
Sethe’s violence against her children after Schoolteacher, his nephew, the
slave catcher, and the Sheriff—whom Morrison calls the “four horse-
men”—descend upon Baby Suggs’s house. The chapter opens with an
unidenti‹ed narrator who describes the events based on the view of an
1850s slave owner or proponent of slavery. Through this sampled voice,
Morrison “borrows” or “appropriates” a perspective not generally dis-
cussed or presented in the rest of the text. Rather than narrating the entire
story through a singular narrator, Morrison relies at strategic moments on
such sampled voices to represent the epistemological con›icts that con-
tinue to haunt American culture. For example, a nameless, ostensibly white
narrator observes: “Caught red-handed, so to speak, they [African Ameri-
can slaves] would seem to recognize the futility of outsmarting a whiteman
and the hopelessness of outrunning a ri›e. . . . The very nigger with his
head hanging and a little jelly-jar smile on his face could all of a sudden
roar, like a bull or some such, and commence to do disbelievable things.”14
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In this passage, Morrison potentially shocks the reader because this voice
has been muted or absent from the text and emphasizes the ideological
context for Sethe’s actions. It is irrelevant whether Sethe “knows” this par-
ticular articulation of racism because she is responding to a social structure
and a systemic ideology, in which these comments are ubiquitous. This
sampled voice allows Morrison to foreshadow and explain the unspeakable
thing that Sethe will do.
The nameless narrator, however, does not tell the whole story, only one
aspect of it. Baby Suggs takes over the narrative and describes the immedi-
ate aftermath of Sethe’s deed. This second sample works against the ‹rst
and offers a second perspective from which to view the spectacle. If the ‹rst
narrator emphasizes the “danger” presented by African Americans, Suggs
demonstrates the kindness and love as she attempts to take care of Sethe’s
children.15 Baby Suggs possesses a keen eye for details that the white nar-
rator omits: after Beloved’s initial murder, Denver nurses from Sethe’s
breast, mixing mother’s milk and Beloved’s blood. This sampled image,
only accessible through Baby Suggs’s eyes, suggests the implicit tension for
African Americans in claiming self-ownership after slavery. Any attempt to
possess oneself requires coming to terms with how slavery and segregation
destroyed and dis‹gured families and cultural traditions. There is no
“pure” or “authentic” inheritance that is not tainted with the blood of an-
cestors. Contra Baby Suggs’s exhortations before Sethe’s actions, it is not
enough merely to love one’s hands and ›esh.16 Any attempt to claim self-
ownership, especially in the post–Civil Rights era, is necessarily ironic be-
cause the ›esh or the hands always exist within a historical or cultural con-
text.17 Sethe’s desperate attack to save her children by killing them reinserts
the violence endemic to making any kind of property claim, a violence that
Baby Suggs’s approach to healing had failed to consider.
Morrison’s text, however, is not merely content to provide two ac-
counts. Morrison also includes bits and pieces of Stamp Paid’s and Sethe’s
memories, combined with Paul D’s reaction upon learning of Sethe’s ac-
tions. For Paul D, Sethe’s “love is too thick.” Sethe counters, “Love is or it
ain’t. Thin love ain’t love at all.”18 She then asks Paul D if her love for her
children required that she and her children return to slavery. At this point,
the conversation between them breaks down, and Paul D hurls an insult at
Sethe. Her choice reminds him, and ultimately the entire African Ameri-
can community, of the danger implicit to claiming ownership of and loving
the self when emotional and psychic health are intertwined with property
law. The dissonance between these two discursive regimes produces social,
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cultural, and psychic con›ict because the demands of law and family can-
not be reconciled easily. Property law does not attempt to address the psy-
chological aspects of ownership, even though it takes precedence over psy-
chological discourses within American culture. By describing multiple
perspectives about the realities of slavery, Morrison shows the limits of ro-
mantic or tragic accounts that emphasize one view over all others and
highlights the ironies implicit within any claim of self-ownership.19
As a number of commentators have noted, Beloved and other novels
such as Dessa Rose (1986) and Corregidora (1975) constitute “neo-slave nar-
ratives [which revisit] an era marked by immense faith in the emancipatory
promise of print literacy.”20 However, this return to the slave narrative is
not a simple recapitulation of an older style in which contemporary writers
resurrect a previous generation’s faith in America’s promise of freedom
through literacy. Rather, Lovalerie King argues, “a neo-slave narrative
brings to light information subjugated by the privileging of certain narra-
tives over others, Toni Morrison’s Beloved exists as a form of alternative dis-
course and, thus, takes its place in a continuing tradition of resistance.”21
Morrison offers multiple perspectives on the novel’s events to illustrate the
generic limits, including those of the slave narrative, to describing social
reality and liberating individuals and communities. Although there is no
one slave narrative that Morrison samples particularly, Beloved writes
against this entire genre, as the novel only offers bits and pieces of poten-
tial slave narratives that could have been written by Sethe, Paul D,
Beloved, Baby Suggs, Halle, and others. As should be clear, however, their
stories have been omitted from the genre and thus American literary his-
tory because of illiteracy (in the cases of Sethe, Paul D, and Baby Suggs) or
because they did not survive the journey toward freedom (in the case of
Halle and Beloved). Beloved, as a text produced in the 1980s, attempts to
evoke enough of these slave narratives, via sampling, to demonstrate their
inadequacy as historical representations. At this moment in post–Civil
Rights era history, Morrison and other hip-hop aesthetes must rely on
sampling in order to show the limits of the received versions of history and
to claim ownership over it by reworking it.22
Sampling alone, however, cannot effectively assert the kinds of owner-
ship claims that Morrison wishes to make. Sampling is not another word
for rememory. Rather, samples must be given new levels of meaning by
their deployment in new patterns. Rememory is the pattern, not the recol-
lections themselves, because certain moments stand out against the back-
ground and repeat themselves in the unfolding of chronological time. Like
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a strip quilt, a nonlinear or asymmetrical pattern must be pieced together
from the remnants of American literary history. By reshaping the debris of
Margaret Garner’s story and reorganizing it, Morrison creates a text that
describes the historical trauma of slavery and property law while attempt-
ing to ‹nd a method to heal that pain. Layering is the art of creating pro-
ductive tension.23 For any historically marginalized community to claim
ownership over American literary history, productive tensions must be re-
vealed. In a moment when the comic meets the deadly serious, Morrison
uses the voice of Sixo to signify on the limits of the property law and to em-
phasize its discursive authority to shape cultural relations. In an oft-quoted
section, Sixo receives a beating from Schoolteacher for stealing and “to
show him that de‹nitions belonged to the de‹ners—not the de‹ned.”24
While scholars have tended to view this moment as a critique of Western
epistemology or the Enlightenment, they have neglected or downplayed
its ironic critique of property and the law of evidence, as Schoolteacher’s
methods of cross-examination force Sixo to testify against himself. When
Schoolteacher claims that Sixo has stolen food, Sixo does not classify his
actions as theft. Rather, he states that he has been “improving your
[Schoolteacher’s] property.”25 Sixo’s response exempli‹es signifyin’, illus-
trates hip-hop’s attitude toward intellectual property law, and highlights
how property law itself has always struggled to distinguish among the lay-
ers of ownership. Reading this ‹ctional conversation within the cultural
context of when Morrison wrote Beloved, in the 1980s, Sixo can be under-
stood as asking who owns the sample from a text that gets transformed
through layering or a later act of consumption/production.
Morrison’s textual response to this dilemma can be found a few sections
later. As the story comes to a close, the novel’s layers of samples begin to
fall in on themselves, not merging into a uni‹ed voice but producing what
Tricia Rose calls the “Black Noise” of hip-hop aesthetics. After rewriting
the biblical “Song of Songs” and its heart-wrenching tale of lost love in a
paragraph, Morrison weaves together the interior monologues of Sethe,
Denver, and Beloved to show both the similarities and the differences be-
tween their personal and social desires. Rather than presenting distinct
voices, the text makes clear how their respective identities are produced so-
cially: “Beloved / You are my sister / You are my daughter / You are my
face; You are me / I have found you again; you have come back to me.”26 In
these lines, it is clear that Sethe, Denver, and Beloved are engaged in an
unconscious dialogue about how to order their relationships to one an-
other. Textually, Morrison represents this struggle for order by layering
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their voices. However, she does not portray their voices in fully drawn nar-
ratives. Rather, she samples their voices and then shapes the meaning of
these samples by layering them in asymmetrical patterns. Sethe, Denver,
and Beloved form a triangle in which desires and responsibilities do not fall
evenly or symmetrically upon one another. Instead, their demands may be
incommensurate, meaning that realizing one desire may necessarily frus-
trate a second desire.
The tension that layered samples produce comes to a climax in this sec-
tion’s conclusion, “You are mine / You are mine / You are mine,” in which
Sethe, Beloved, and Denver assert contrasting ownership claims. Layering
their voices and placing these statements next to one another allows Mor-
rison to interrogate the foundations of property law, in which there is an
object and individuals with claims of varying strength. Rather than provid-
ing a neat or ready solution to con›ict, property law must always navigate
con›icting desires and choose one set of interests over another. Even as
they struggle, as individuals and as symbols of a communal struggle, with
the aftermath of slavery and the legacy of being “owned,” Sethe, Denver,
and Beloved continue to make ownership claims. Ironically, it is because
their claims are too strong—or, in the words of Paul D, their love is “too
thick”—that their desires for ownership come to “own” them. Only when
the community returns to 124 can this trio be saved from their excessive in-
ternalization of property law’s assumptions.27
According to the logic of Beloved, African Americans can only ‹nd free-
dom by balancing personal and communal claims of ownership. Excessive
reliance on property law transforms too much into objects to be owned,
while forgoing the logic of ownership creates its own problems. The
choice to present the intertwined stories of Beloved through layered sam-
ples enables Morrison to depict the partial views of American history that
literature provides. It also allows her to assert a certain ownership over that
history, even if dominant groups already believe they own that history or
literature. Morrison’s strategic use of layered samples implies that property
rights do not simply bind a text/object to particular individuals but are con-
structed by social and textual networks. Ownership rights can be created by
producing something de novo or constructing new meaning within a so-
cial/textual framework—the primary tool of hip-hop aesthetics. Reading
rememory and Sethe’s violent acts through this aesthetic principle reveals
that Sethe’s crime shattered the fragile networks of signi‹cation that this
newly freed community had created. The “art” of layered sampling thus
hinges on the ability to invoke memory, but not be controlled by it, to as-
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sert ownership over literary and cultural history in order to reveal the “un-
speakable thoughts, unspoken.”28 In one of the novel’s multiple’s endings,
Morrison writes that “he [Paul D] wants to put his story next to hers.”29
Paul D’s desire, in effect, articulates hip-hop’s strategy of layering as a
method to bring together what dominant society seeks to keep apart. 
The aesthetic structure of Beloved does not simply rely on layered sam-
ples, but layers these samples in rhythmic patterns that defy traditional
narrative and representational modes. Morrison’s approach to storytelling
in the novel swirls through time, jumping up and back, instead of moving
forward in linear, chronological time. Organizing the novel’s events proves
dif‹cult because Morrison seeks not to emphasize historical or representa-
tional accuracy, but to capture the experience of living in an age saturated
with historical narratives and cultural icons. As many scholars have ob-
served, Beloved attempts to show how the absences created by the African
Diaspora have reinscribed themselves as presences or “ghosts” within con-
temporary African American cultural relations.30 Unlike postmodern the-
orists who posit the emptiness of these historical and cultural signs, con-
temporary African American writers and artists struggle against their
weight and oversaturation with meaning. The rhythmic ›ows and asym-
metries of hip-hop aesthetics fashion these samples into pulsing, living
texts, which do not simply haunt the reader but allow her to experience the
past and unequal cultural relations viscerally. In the novel, the ghost of
Beloved returns to life. She moves from being an invisible presence to re-
turning to life to being exorcized. Paradoxically, Morrison suggests that in
order to ‹nd healing from contemporary social problems, the haunting na-
ture of existing narratives, icons, and symbols must be uncovered. If the
chronological time of most narratives orders and thus protects us from ex-
perience, the discontinuities of hip-hop rhythmic ›ows and asymmetries
draw readers/viewers/listeners into texts even as they frequently shift di-
rections and open as many questions as they answer.
Critics have identi‹ed Beloved and other novels from the same period as
neoslave narratives and have explored why writers chose to revise this
genre during the post–Civil Rights era. According to Paul Gilroy, “Morri-
son and others are drawing upon and reconstructing the resources supplied
to them by earlier generations of black writers who allowed the con›uence
of racism, rationality, and systematic terror to con‹gure both their disen-
chantment with modernity and their aspirations for its ful‹llment.”31 I
would argue that the discontinuities within these neoslave narratives antic-
ipate the growth of hip-hop aesthetics. The rhythmic ›ows and asymme-
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tries of these contemporary slave narratives reveal the gaping silences
within the original slave narratives. Most slave narratives operate within
linear, chronological time, characteristic of Enlightenment epistemology.
Even if the slave narratives do not describe every life stage or event, they
move forward through time to demonstrate the transition from bondage to
freedom as a fairly neat movement, without psychological remainder. Mor-
rison ‹lls her text, however, with gaps between samples, stories, and even
historical periods. Instead of moving through time, the narrative moves
across time, the characters’ memories reorganizing the supposedly regular
pattern of chronology as they, unlike the self-created heroes of the tradi-
tional slave narrative, are haunted by what they have experienced. Beloved
refuses to draw rigid boundaries between the 1850s and the 1870s because
those periods coexist within the present time of the characters’ minds.
Morrison’s approach to temporality shares hip-hop’s rhythmic ›ows
and asymmetries. I am not, however, suggesting that Morrison borrowed
from the music or patterned her writing style from it. Rather, Morrison has
interrogated the temporality of African American literature and cultural
criticism since the early 1970s in The Bluest Eye and Sula. Beloved’s repeti-
tions, gaps, and silences constitute a ful‹llment of Morrison’s initial ap-
proach to writing, in which she consciously created breaks or asymmetries
in her texts so as to undermine the tragic or romantic vision proposed by
canonical American authors.32 Following a trajectory similar to that of hip-
hop deejays, Morrison increasingly focuses her attention on the rhythmic
undertow of American literary and cultural production, especially in those
textual moments critics have typically overlooked. In Playing in the Dark,
Morrison argues that American literary critics have “manage[d] not to see
meaning in the thunderous, theatrical presence of black surrogacy—an in-
forming, stabilizing, and disturbing element—in the literature they do
study.”33 In order to make this haunting presence visible, Morrison ulti-
mately decides to display the temporal limits of American literary history.
The breaks among characters, settings, and dates within Beloved and her
other novels require the reader or critic to piece together the connections
that could have been otherwise overlooked. This novel displays the
“cracks” that have always existed but have only become the subject of liter-
ary criticism in the post–Civil Rights era. Morrison’s juxtaposition of ›ow-
ing descriptions and tightly drawn dialogues with awkward gaps and si-
lences depicts how race-conscious rules of etiquette limited public
dialogue about race at the very moment when America should have been
liberated to engage in wide-ranging and transformative interracial and in-
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traracial conversations about race. The pacing of Morrison’s novels plays
with and frustrates settled expectations. The rhythmic ›ows and asymme-
tries invoke racial difference and mark ownership claims over public dis-
course by representing racialized contexts and narratives and by breaking
down the unspoken or unconscious elements of those representations.
Although Beloved has been widely praised and taught as the exemplar of
“multicultural literature,” does this high regard for the novel follow from a
faulty reading of its narrative mode? As this chapter argues, Beloved falls
within the paradigm of hip-hop aesthetics because it relies on layered sam-
ples, rhythmic ›ows/asymmetries, and an ironic recounting of African
American cultural history. Despite an absence of heroes and heroic actions,
characters who are beaten down and haunted from the beginning, and an
ambiguous ending, scholars and critics tend to understand the novel as ei-
ther racial tragedy or racial romance. To read the novel as a romance re-
quires a hero who overcomes a crisis. Most often, those who wish to read
Beloved romantically transform either Sethe or Denver into a hero. Ashraf
Rushdy, for example, argues that Denver is transformed by her experiences
with Beloved and by her action to get the community’s help to protect
Sethe from the ghost.34 Barbara Christian argues that the novel promotes
healing and thus narrates an unsentimental but nonetheless romantic over-
coming of the crisis of slavery and second-class citizenship.35 Both readings
place Morrison’s text within a tradition of social and cultural uplift.
Through this lens, Beloved appears as a story of one family’s and one com-
munity’s attempt to heal and claim ownership over themselves. Jon-Chris-
tian Suggs has argued that Beloved exempli‹es the neoromantic impulses
within contemporary African American literature and signals a break from
the historical concerns of African American textual production in the
post–Civil Rights era.36
Not all view Beloved as romance. In a well-known and frequently criti-
cized essay, Stanley Crouch observes: “For Beloved above all else, is a black-
face holocaust novel. It seems to have been written in order to enter Amer-
ican slavery into the big-time martyr ratings contest.” He continues: “That
Morrison chose to set the Afro-American experience in the framework of
collective tragedy is ‹ne, of course. But she lacks a true sense of the
tragic.”37 Even though Morrison critics tend to dismiss Crouch’s appraisal,
Crouch’s sense that the novel fails to realize the standards of romance is a
telling one. For Crouch, Beloved constitutes a tragic text because it empha-
sizes the horrors of slavery and the general failure of Emancipation to lib-
erate the novel’s characters. He also rightly detects a “pulp style” that un-
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dercuts the tragic impulse, because individuals lack control over their fates,
and perceives a lack of subtlety in the novel’s overstatements and melodra-
matic moments of cultural and historical criticism.38 To Crouch, all of
these failings derive from Morrison’s sentimentality and her attempt to
transform the African American experience into a “martyr contest.”
Crouch’s reading of Beloved suggests how a reader could mistake irony for
tragedy.
For Morrison, “language can never live up to life once and for all. Nor
should it. Language can never ‘pin down’ slavery, genocide, war.”39 Rather,
Beloved offers an ironic and ambiguous account.40 Two moments stand out
as ironic narratives. The ‹rst is the aforementioned discussion of Sethe’s
attempt to claim ownership over her children by killing them both ‹gura-
tively and psychologically. Morrison narrates this event from at least four
points of view. Instead of directly stating the authoritative version of the
events, Morrison chooses to let her characters present possible ways of
reading this moment. In this manner, she provides a realistic account of
the events and their aftermath without placing them within any one narra-
tive. The result of Sethe’s violent acts, however, is clearly ironic. Sethe
wins her physical freedom by killing or psychologically maiming her off-
spring. Within the logic of the novel, this action frees Sethe because she is
no longer deemed suitable for slavery As many have noted, Beloved is not
designed simply to address historical concerns, but to engage contempo-
rary cultural disputes. For Morrison, the central question of the post–Civil
Rights era is: can African Americans claim ownership over themselves and
provide a nourishing and hopeful environment for African American
youth?41 Can the Civil Rights generation free themselves without forcing
their psychological scars onto their children? Sethe’s story illustrates the
ambiguous effects of major social changes. Contra romantic renderings of
the novel, historical forces and cultural relations in›uence Sethe’s actions
and the community’s response to them. Unlike Crouch’s reading of
Beloved, which ‹nds the tidal waves of history and culture structuring the
individual’s experience, an ironic reading of the novel centers on the unin-
tended consequences of Sethe’s actions. Sethe’s choice to claim ownership
over her children and liberate them from slavery by killing them demon-
strates not only the hand of history but her own importance in shaping the
future. Crouch’s tragic reading omits Sethe’s role in shaping the future,
while the romantic version neglects the very real power of history and so-
cial relations.
Beloved’s conclusion presents the second signi‹cant ironic moment,
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with its assertion that “this is not a story to pass on.”42 This sentence
holds two apparently contradictory meanings simultaneously. First, the
passage denotes that readers should not “pass on” or transmit this story to
future generations. The historical trauma of slavery, segregation, and
racism must be ended. However, the second meaning suggests that the
story, as a chronicle of past psychological states and cultural inheritance,
cannot be “passed on” and missed. Creating the necessary conditions for
long-term hope and success for African Americans requires understand-
ing and overcoming historical trauma. These alternate ways of reading
this one expression could be synthesized and translated so that Sethe’s
claim for self- and familial ownership must be remembered, but not re-
lived. Because slave narratives were written for public consumption and
thus cautious about what they revealed, Morrison reminds her readers
that “only the act of imagination can help” reconstruct the interior lives
of enslaved men and women.43 At its heart, the question of “passing on”
the story or not invokes the laws of cultural inheritance and, by implica-
tion, property law. 
Through Beloved, the question Morrison asks is not so much how Sethe
or her contemporaries can heal themselves, but what the post–Civil Rights
generation should inherit from their parents and how their experiences
should be understood. In her speech accepting the Nobel Prize, Morrison
asks this very question through a parable about the young children who ask
the blind griot whether the bird in one of their hands is alive or dead. The
griot answers, “I don’t know whether the bird you are holding is dead or
alive, but what I do know is that it is in your hands.”44 Later in the speech,
Morrison explains that the future is in the hands of children.45 In much the
same way, Beloved articulates the choices African Americans face but ulti-
mately allows future generations to choose their path. I identify this clos-
ing challenge as irony because the passage’s brevity contains multiple pos-
sible readings. The book ends without an ending. If Sethe seeks ‹nality
and closure, Beloved refuses any simplistic endings (tragic or romantic) and
offers ambiguity and irony instead.
Claiming Ownership of Visual Culture
Completed in the same year as Beloved, Adrian Piper’s Vanilla Nightmare se-
ries, examines questions of ownership in visual and popular cultures. Un-
like Morrison, who has become the exemplar of post–Civil Rights era
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African American literary production, Piper occupies a less-de‹ned place
in African American art.46 As Kobena Mercer argues, Piper is more closely
identi‹ed with Conceptualism and Minimalism, movements that seem rel-
atively far removed from developments within African American art and
art criticism.47 Even though her work engages issues of identity and racial
politics, its tendency toward abstraction and its reliance on canonical phi-
losophy, especially Immanuel Kant, has frequently pushed her work out-
side African American art’s boundaries. Moreover, her art pieces and per-
formances, which use funk and R & B to explore identity and racial politics,
have received less critical notice. These factors have shaped an uncertain
legacy around Piper. Her work is relatively well-known, but it does not
quite ‹t the categories used to understand and promote African American
art. Piper’s interventions into racial identity exude ambiguity and irony.
Like Morrison, Piper neither romanticizes nor demonizes race but exam-
ines how it structures contemporary culture and shapes social relations.48
In Beloved and her other historically based ‹ctions, Morrison suggests
that contemporary racialization and racism result from history and its trau-
matic memories. Piper, however, suggests an alternative but equally com-
pelling case for the persistence of racial discourses: visual culture. Jean
Fisher offers an insightful observation on the assumptions underlying
Piper’s work: “Racism is a pathology ‹rst of the visual register. . . . Piper’s
work may be thought of as the development of strategies that would expose
and disarm this gaze by de›ecting visuality into other modalities—text
with image, music, and the immediacy of bodily encounter.”49 In this ac-
count, race constitutes a spectacle that then shapes other discourses. By
contrasting Beloved with the Vanilla Nightmare series, I do not mean to sug-
gest that Morrison overlooks or neglects visual culture, as Margaret Gar-
ner’s actions were memorialized in Thomas Satterwhite Noble’s Modern
Medea, an image that Morrison helped reprint in The Black Book. Rather, I
argue that Morrison and Piper can be read in a complementary fashion in
which both history and visual culture must be reclaimed. Their shared em-
phasis on layered sampling, ›ow, and irony reveals the limited vision of le-
gal discourse, which attempts to produce a stable meaning from dynamic
texts.
Long central to intellectual property law (although increasingly less so)
is the idea/expression dichotomy, which states that speci‹c expressions can
be owned but that ideas, which can be articulated in many ways, exist
within the public domain. The central premise of this idea is that an ex-
pression has a singular or relatively stable meaning. But what if, per Piper
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and Morrison, the words, notes, or images that comprise texts lack a stable
meaning? What if these expressions change with their context? Morrison’s
intervention into the structures of meaning is primarily temporal. Her
novels typically unravel how memory haunts the contemporary era. Her
characters cannot escape the pull of history, even as they attempt to create
a better future. For Piper, the challenge of racism is not so much temporal
as it is spatial and visual. In the Vanilla Nightmare series, Piper interrogates
how a newspaper, the New York Times, and its advertising conceal as much
as they reveal. By sampling representative articles and advertisements and
then layering images, especially raced and sexual ones, Piper questions the
version of reality described by the New York Times and seeks to master and
rework its racialized representations. 
Perhaps even more than Morrison’s, Piper’s work has shifted dramati-
cally from its early Minimalism and Conceptualism to share an aesthetic
terrain with hip-hop culture.50 From its very beginning, her work experi-
mented with sampling, one of the key elements of hip-hop aesthetics.
Piper’s provocative statements about her theory of art echo hip-hop’s con-
cerns with American culture, especially intellectual property and the circu-
lation and dissemination of ideas, symbols, and sounds. In addition, her
work appears to have become increasingly focused on identity and racial-
ization through the 1970s and 1980s. Writing in 1981 about one of her
earliest pieces, Meat into Meat (1968), in which she photographed her then-
boyfriend preparing and eating four hamburgers at certain time intervals,
Piper explores why such a project ought to be considered art. Piper’s an-
swer is revealing because it explores the very meaning of originality and ge-
nius, which intellectual property regulates, especially vis-à-vis hip-hop cul-
ture. Piper writes that her “objecti‹ed perceptions became art by being
registered deliberately as the product of an aesthetically informed con-
sciousness. Thus, I [Piper] functioned as an active Art Selector, conferring
Art status on certain objects in the environment (including human ones) by
virtue of my Art Consciousness. . . . As artist, I use my art awareness as a
tool for ‘discovering’ art.”51 In this explanation of her methods as a con-
ceptual artist, Piper attempts, in effect, to defend the processes of sampling
and layering. The language she deploys of “discovering art” within preex-
isting objects echoes hip-hop producers’ claims that sampling requires
hearing differently, not simply copying.52
In an interview in 1991, at a time when courts were ‹rst examining hip-
hop sampling, Piper adamantly insists that she does not “appropriate im-
ages.” She claims that “as a result of my Afro-American experiences, I see
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appropriation as an excuse for ripping off other people and not giving them
credit. To me, it represents a certain kind of moral degeneration.”53 She
adopts this position because she understands how Western artists have
long sampled without permission from minority cultures: “We ‹nd the
original styles and idioms the cubits, fauvists, surrealists, pattern painters,
arte povera, performance artists, and neograf‹tists, among others have pla-
giarized without acknowledgment—under the ethically disingenuous,
postmodernist rubric of ‘appropriation.’”54 Piper simultaneously con-
demns biting or stealing another’s style or look even as her attempts to re-
gain ownership over visual culture requires a certain amount of borrowing
in order to criticize the racialized nature of American visual culture. Ap-
parently reversing course in 1992, Piper defends her use of sampled music
in her performance piece Funk Lesson, from the early 1980s: 
I had been trained as an art student in the late 1960s and was given
to understand that I could appropriate from popular culture into a
high-culture context just as Andy Warhol had done. I found that
when I attempted to appropriate black working-class culture, in par-
ticular the music and the dance, that medium of artistic expression
was universally condemned and misunderstood.55
Because of the conceptual nature of her work, Piper has argued both for
and against using sampling or appropriation within her work. Although
her critique of appropriation centers on the economic losses that African
Americans have experienced due to cultural theft, her own work, especially
Funk Lesson, borrows freely from African American cultural traditions.56
In the Vanilla Nightmares series, Adrian Piper freely samples from
American popular culture. Despite her apparent ambivalence about appro-
priation art, she clearly samples from the New York Times and its advertise-
ments. However, her own description of this work skips over words such as
appropriation and sampling in favor of selected or chosen. Piper describes her
artistic process as follows:
The Vanilla Nightmares illuminate manuscripts selected from The
New York Times. The manuscripts are chosen for their racially
loaded content, their graphic imagery, their subliminal connota-
tions, and the objective declarative voice in which they purport to
speak. . . . With charcoal and oil crayon, I draw in the subauthori-
tarian news that’s not ‹t to print.57
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Much like hip-hop producers, Piper samples images and texts because they
possess a truth not quite accessible to their creators. In the case of hip-hop
music, producers and deejays liberate bass and drum lines lost under banal
melodies. The original artists had missed the best or most interesting parts
of their recordings, and copyright law imprisons these sections because it
requires almost all samples—even brief ones—to be licensed. Sometimes
deejays displayed their anger and/or comedic skills by establishing aural
links that had gone unnoticed. Similarly, Piper attempts to show the un-
spoken or unconscious images and narratives that allow dominant culture
to make sense of these racialized images. Although stylistically distinct
from graf‹ti art, the Vanilla Nightmares series operates much like graf‹ti
because it disrupts the intended messages the advertisers and newspaper
tried to convey. Graf‹ti art forces its viewers to recognize the ownership
claims being made by historically marginalized people and acknowledge
the stunning artistry of its practitioners. Piper’s work functions similarly
because it attempts to interrogate the nature of Western standards of
beauty and demand a visual and narrative space within the New York Times.
Vanilla Nightmares #18 (1987) provides an exemplary instance of Piper’s
reliance on sampling. In contrast to other drawings in the series, this image
relies primarily on one sample: a print advertisement for American Express
from the March 6, 1986, edition of the New York Times. This advertisement
consists of a full page of white newsprint with the words “membership has
its privileges” in large, capital letters, centered on the page. In small print,
the advertisement states: “It is the privilege of knowing that, even though
there is a number on the card, you will never be treated like a number by
anyone at American Express.” On top of this sampled image, Piper has
drawn a crowd of bald, dark, male faces peering out at American Express’s
target audience. Despite some similarity among the faces, Piper has drawn
subtle differences in bone structure, color, expression, and head shape in
order to represent the faces as part of an undifferentiated mass for those
who quickly view her image and as distinct individuals for those who care-
fully scrutinize her work. Her drawings also feature a number of open
hands that shield the dark faces from the brightness of the page, while also
indicating these people’s desire to be selected for membership. In the bot-
tom right corner of the page, Piper does not simply sign her name but as-
serts her ownership over the revised American Express advertisement and
the New York Times by including the copyright sign next to her signature,
much like Basquiat. The underlying political message of this artwork re-
quires that the viewer knows that the advertisement is a real one that has
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been sampled, not a fake or a substitute one. Piper literally writes over both
the New York Times, then the most prestigious paper in the United States,
and American Express, then the most prestigious credit card. In both cases,
Piper attempts to show that these institutions’ very cultural importance
follows from the subtle and unspoken ways that they continue to margin-
alize African American faces and voices from their products. Like Toni
Morrison’s and Anna Deavere Smith’s, Piper’s methodology requires sam-
pling in order to challenge the unconscious racialization of American cul-
ture. Despite generic differences among literature, drama, and art, each re-
lies on the same aesthetic structure to demand that her audience recognize
the subtlety, intelligence, and humanity of African Americans. Interest-
ingly, they all have chosen to sample others’ stories or voices to articulate
an African American perspective in the post–Civil Rights era. 
Even though Vanilla Nightmares #18 only relies on one sample, it
nonetheless is a deeply layered image. Other pieces from the series include
a variety of news stories and/or images. Vanilla Nightmares #18, however,
only appears relatively thin because the sampled image and Piper’s revision
of it actually reveal the many layers of unconscious cultural narratives that
shape the advertisement’s meaning. The sampled image is actually a dou-
ble sample. It is not simply an American Express advertisement, but one
that appears at a particular spatial-temporal location in the most highly es-
teemed newspaper in the country. As her frequent analysis of the “indexi-
cal present” suggests, Piper “wanted to explore objects that can refer both
to concepts and ideas beyond themselves and their standard functions, as
well as to themselves.”58 In this instance, Piper clearly emphasizes the sam-
ple’s original date, clearly within the post–Civil Rights era, and its location,
the New York Times, by taking great care not to mark over these items as she
did the rest of the page. By stressing its location within the New York Times,
she suggests the tension between the articles this newspaper prints and the
advertisements that support it. In this case, the supposedly liberal slant of
the newspaper’s coverage is undermined by its participation in the market-
place. Piper thus creates a certain ambiguity about the text from which she
is sampling. On a second level, the image appears to provide a modern
retelling of Plato’s “Allegory of the Cave.” As a Continental philosopher,
Piper is clearly aware of this founding allegory of philosophy within Plato’s
The Republic, in which Plato describes how philosophy can enlighten those
who seek the truth. In her contemporary revision of it, Piper depicts the
seekers of knowledge as Diasporic Africans seeking to learn the truth of
their condition. Ironically, they exit the cave of illusions when they see the
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American Express advertisement, which “enlightens” them to their true
position in society. Third, the mass of African American faces might con-
note to some viewers the Middle Passage and the continued disenfran-
chisement of African Americans during the current era. Although ostensi-
bly only sampling one advertisement, Piper carefully layers historical,
cultural, and philosophical arguments within her image to represent and
critique the racialized nature of contemporary visual and popular cultures.
Piper’s work not only contains layered samples but relies on rhythmic
›ows and asymmetries to further her ironic commentary on the New York
Times and American Express. In Vanilla Nightmares #18, the appropriated
or sampled image and her drawings on top of that image are interwoven,
›owing almost seamlessly together even as they move in a jarring or asym-
metrical way between mass culture and Piper’s critique of that mass cul-
ture. The drawing requires this double effect or reading because it invokes
multiple subjectivities that, according to Piper, necessarily con›ict when
they encounter the same object. Piper attempts to represent both ›ow and
asymmetry simultaneously through her drawings because the viewer must
be reminded of the original text and provided an avenue to see that text
through new eyes. Like hip-hop music, this methodology enables the artist
to produce new meanings out of extant and clichéd texts. As Schloss de-
scribes in his discussion of musical producers, Piper’s approach allows her
audience to hear and see according to the aesthetics of hip-hop. Vanilla
Nightmares #18 revels in the breaks between and among her revisionist
drawing of the Middle Passage, the American Express advertisement, and
the New York Times. Implicitly, she asks where the New York Times ends and
her drawings begin and who can claim ownership over the unspoken but all
too real relationship between American Express’s advertising campaign
and the continuing exclusion of many, if not most, African Americans from
the American Dream.
Piper’s answer, like Morrison’s, is an ironic one. Although legal dis-
course suggests that the distinctions between competing property rights
can be clearly delineated, Piper’s entire corpus of art increasingly interro-
gates the spatial and temporal constraints that specify a text’s meaning and
its boundaries. Through the 1970s and 1980s, Piper explores the ambigu-
ity of identity and property within her Mythic Being projects (1974–75); her
installation work, Art for the Art-World Surface Pattern (1976); Aspects of the
Liberal Dilemma (1978) and Four Intruders Plus Alarm System (1980); her
performance piece Funk Lessons (1983); and the continuing Vanilla Night-
mares series (1986–87). Drawing on her scholarly work on Immanuel Kant
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and merging it with her approach to art, Piper disrupts the conventional
idea that an image possesses a distinct or singular meaning:
I believe that in the case of any image the possibilities for interpreta-
tion are in‹nite. One way of directing the interpretation of an image
is to rule out certain interpretations as being inadequate in various
ways. I guess my sense is that it has to be, as I suggested earlier, based
on the speci‹cs of the particular, concrete situation that is occurring
between two people who are interacting in the indexical present.
One cannot prescribe such things as a general policy. . . . Political art
presents the extra challenge of presenting content that is accessible,
on the one hand, but sophisticated or ironic, on the other.59
Although her commitment to ambiguity and irony exempli‹es postmod-
ernism’s impact on art and its critique of representation, this quotation
highlights how Piper’s commitment to racial justice and antiracism has
caused her to develop methods or strategies that only appear to be post-
modern. Piper, however, is critical of postmodernism for its ethical short-
comings60 and because it enables white intellectuals to reify cultural differ-
ence as the one theory to explain social and cultural relations.61
Piper’s art from this same period, however, exempli‹es how concerns
about racism’s effects created the conditions for postmodern, postrepre-
sentational, ironic art. Her installation Four Intruders Plus Alarm Systems
attempts to exemplify, through sampled or appropriated language, the pos-
sible responses to images of black men. In it, the audience views images of
African Americans and hears recordings of clichéd opinions (redneck, lib-
eral, appropriative, etc.) about these images. Instead of “prescrib[ing] the
politically correct one,” Piper “delineates, and holds up for ridicule, what
most black Americans agree are wrong (alienating, condescending, igno-
rant) responses.”62 Four Intruders thus constitutes an ironic narrative be-
cause it does not identify the moral failing that causes racism or the key
trait to eradicate it. Rather, illustrating Deleuze’s and Hutcheon’s ap-
proaches to irony, Piper’s art relies on ironic repetition to make racial dif-
ference visible by highlighting how a text’s meaning is unstable and relies
on the viewer to be completed. Commenting on her entire oeuvre, Robert
Storr argues that Piper eschews tragic and romantic narratives to describe
the condition of African Americans. Rather, she acknowledges that “the
cruel givens of the collective situation in which we involuntarily share are
not the work of the fates but the direct result of our illusions. If it is not en-
88 / parodies of ownership
tirely within the grasp of logic to change the world, changing conscious-
ness, which is the locus and origin of our crippling misperceptions, is.”63
Storr identi‹es Piper’s primary mode of narration as ironic precisely be-
cause it opens the possibility for reinscribing cultural history based on the
experiences of historically marginalized people. 
Through her Mythic Being character and other strategies, Piper has
transformed her own person(a) into an art object that can criticize social
and cultural relations. Her Self-Portrait Exaggerating My Negroid Features
(1981) and Self-Portrait as a Nice White Lady (1995) reveal the “visual
pathology” of race by altering her appearance in subtle ways in order to
transform its racial meaning. Recounting the process behind her Self-Por-
trait, Piper offers:
I sat in front of a mirror and drew myself, making certain key deci-
sions at certain points of representation, so as to heighten certain
features that are often associated with one’s common image of what
a black person looks like. I personally think there is no black person
who corresponds to any stereotype about what Africans or African
Americans look like.64
At one level, Piper makes clear that surface appearances, including her
own, do not possess a determinate meaning. At a second level, she aims to
implicate the viewer’s preconceived ideas in shaping a text’s meaning.
Lucy Lippard classi‹es Piper as a multicultural artist whose art empha-
sizes “turning around,” or what I call irony. Lippard argues that “the effec-
tive turnaround is a doubling back rather than a collusion or a dispersion. 
. . . Transformation of the self and society is ‹nally the aim of all this mo-
bile work that spins the status quo around. While irony, with its tinge of
bitterness as well as humor, is the prevalent instrument, another is healing,
in which the artist, as neo-shaman, heals her or himself, as a microcosm of
the society.”65 Lippard’s analysis makes clear that Piper’s appropriations
constitute not just social criticism or deconstruction of social relations, but
an attempt to promote social transformation. This social transformation
begins with herself and the objects she works with in her art because heal-
ing herself requires claiming ownership over these representations. Piper’s
ironic use of appropriated material both performs difference, as it reveals
hidden layers of meaning, and complicates the viewer’s understanding of
consumer culture. Her work suggests how historically marginalized com-
munities use and make meaning out of popular culture’s imagery. Irony
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empowers Piper because it allows her to deconstruct her cultural reality by
revealing the ambiguity of texts, objects, and bodies. In addition, her work
uncovers the unconscious in›uences shaping that social reality without
reifying them into an irresistible force. Unlike tragic or romantic narrative
modes, irony provides agency and autonomy precisely because its meaning
cannot be ‹xed. Irony, like race itself, always signi‹es a double meaning,
rejecting the rigid boundaries of either/or classi‹cations that identity, art,
and law have traditionally attempted to provide. Revealing these ambigui-
ties provides Piper the imaginative space to revise dominant narratives and
thus reclaim the right to “own” herself.
Reading Beloved and the Vanilla Nightmare series as complementary in-
terventions into the cultural wars of the post–Civil Rights era suggests that
claiming self- and cultural ownership, even after the Civil Rights Move-
ment, requires African American textual producers to rewrite American
history and visual culture. Although the NAACP’s legal strategy ultimately
led to court decisions and legislation that outlawed intentional discrimina-
tion in housing, employment, and other areas of life, Morrison’s and
Piper’s work explores, in terms of both subject matter and aesthetics, how
dominant white interests continued to claim American cultural discourses
as de facto private property. A basic assumption of copyright law is that un-
owned texts remain in the public domain and can be reused and recycled as
needed. African American activists, however, soon learned that the newly
reconstituted legal discourse did not challenge extant cultural narratives
that maintained cultural barriers, even as legal, political, and social ones
had dismantled formal inequality. The post–Civil Rights era has made it
apparent that the imaginary domain remains segregated, private property
despite the legal victories of previous decades. African American writers,
artists, musicians, and intellectuals have frequently relied on irony to show
how color-blind rhetoric, the favored strategy of legal and cultural dis-
courses, actually possesses a double meaning, in which racial hierarchy re-
mains “hidden.”
K. J. Greene, Olufunmilayo Arewa, Keith Aoki, and Stephen Best have
recently examined how these “hidden” forms of racism or racialization
constitute part of the foundation of copyright and trademark law. K. J.
Greene observes that “an underlying assumption of race-neutrality per-
vades copyright scholarship. However, not all creators of intellectual prop-
erty are similarly situated in a race-strati‹ed society and culture. The his-
tory of Black music in America demonstrates the signi‹cant inequality of
protection in the ‘race-neutral’ copyright regime.”66 Greene explores how
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inequalities in bargaining power and pervasive societal discrimination left
most African American jazz, blues, and increasingly hip-hop musicians
powerless to claim complete ownership of their creations. Record compa-
nies and producers found that a combination of contract and intellectual
property law supplied them with the legal means to strip musicians of their
ownership interests. Greene also claims that copyright law, due to its re-
quirement that protected items be written or tangible texts, privileges
Western forms of creativity, emphasizing composition over African Amer-
ican forms that tend to emphasize orality, improvisation, and performance.
He suggests that African American cultural production follows different
patterns and thus receives less protection from intellectual property law.
Following Greene’s analysis, Arewa shows how George Gershwin and his
heirs could “own” his version of African American stylings in Porgy and Bess
and other songs because his creativity focused on composing scores.67 For
Greene and Arewa, it is not simply formal legal doctrines but the social
structure that produces the unequal distribution of ownership interests. 
Beloved and the Vanilla Nightmare series anticipate these criticisms as
they reveal how African Americans have entered property law too fre-
quently as property to be owned or as trespassers to be excluded, rather
than as owners. For Sethe, legal discourse, social institutions, and cultural
relations come together to undermine any attempt to claim ownership
over herself and her family. Baby Suggs, Sethe, Paul D, and even Denver
disagree about exactly what kind of property claims they should make and
what those claims might mean. Legal discourse provides little guidance for
African Americans about claiming ownership rights, either through con-
tract or through intellectual property law, primarily because they had little
ability to participate in the crafting of of‹cial doctrine. Their experiences,
institutions, and cultural traditions do not shape property law’s normative
assumptions. For Piper and today’s hip-hop aesthetes, law continues to
recognize the ownership of raced properties. Copyrights and trademarks
still confer ownership rights over racialized images, texts, logos, and
sounds. Hip-hop texts do not assume that racism or racialization has with-
ered away or that legal discourse operates in a color-blind fashion. Rather,
hip-hop aesthetics reveals how postmodernism’s play and ambiguity stem
from its reliance on the unconscious mapping of racism onto social rela-
tions. These samples recontextualize and thus make obvious what intellec-
tual property law erases or hides. Thus, Piper completes the American Ex-
press advertisement by depicting the unspoken fear behind the company’s
famous slogan.
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Providing a more thorough theoretical critique, Best argues that the
long journey from an economic system based in slavery to one based in in-
tellectual property rights re›ects the ongoing conceptual problem of
de‹ning the relationships among the body, personhood, and property.68
Over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—from the slav-
ery that Morrison describes to the image culture of today, upon which Piper
“draws” and comments—the theoretical elusiveness of de‹ning person-
hood has evolved into new forms but remains tethered to property rights.
For Best, a literary critic, the ambiguous relationship between bodies and
authorial voice presents the challenge of speaking or writing authentically
and establishing ownership of the self, its representations, and its expres-
sions. As legal discourse frees legal personhood from particular bodies,
their labor—both physical and mental—becomes increasingly available for
commodi‹cation. As an example of his thesis, Best provocatively demon-
strates how blackface minstrelsy becomes the trademarked act of T. D.
Rice, a white performer in blackface, precisely because he mimics or copies
“authentic” African American dancing practices, thereby breaking the link
between a movement or ritual and its original performers.69 Rice becomes
the de facto owner precisely because he has transformed a communal ritual,
based in shared knowledge and experience, into an easily consumed and
commodi‹ed form. Racialized slavery is fundamental to capitalism’s devel-
opment and the legal infrastructure the country developed, Best argues, be-
cause it is the pervasive ‹ction of race that permits the distinction between
legal persons and actual physical bodies. Best’s analysis suggests a provoca-
tive explanation for Sethe’s incomprehensible actions: she is not trying sim-
ply to save her children from slavery’s horrors but to demonstrate their hu-
manity despite the law’s attempt to transform them and her into a
commodity, thus refusing to acknowledge their legal personhood. 
Best’s study only examines property law through the Plessy v. Ferguson
(1896) decision, but Best offers some provocative conclusions about how
intellectual property law has become the contemporary battleground for
distinguishing actual minds and bodies from legal persons possessing
rights.70 He also suggests that equality jurisprudence has followed property
law’s assumptions by distinguishing between persons and bodies. By doing
so, equality has proven to be an empty standard for improving the condi-
tions of those African Americans because its reliance on legal personhood
rather than bodies has “made the world safer for commodi‹ed personhood
than for universal freedom.”71 In her study about law and culture, Jane
Gaines lays the groundwork for Best’s conclusion. She argues that estab-
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lishing property rights in cultural products constitutes the ‹rst step toward
a de facto loss of ownership of those products for a cultural group.72 Adrian
Piper, in effect, illustrates Best’s and Gaines’s analysis by juxtaposing the
trademarked slogan of American Express, a disembodied corporate entity
but nonetheless a legal person, and images of African American men. Al-
though Piper herself has never been directly sued over Vanilla Nightmares
#18, American Express threatened to sue a publisher if it chose to use the
image as the cover art for a book. In response, the publisher chose to in-
clude the image within the book, and American Express did not ‹le suit.73
Despite the drawing’s imagery, the unconscious racialized fears upon
which American Express’s slogan plays have most likely affected many
more people than Piper’s revision of it has. As per Bent’s argument, prop-
erty law in effect preordains this outcome because the legal personhood
conferred to American Express establishes its priority over the real bodies
of African Americans, Adrian Piper, or the men depicted in her art. Piper,
the philosopher and the artist, clearly understands the property implica-
tions in both her art and American culture because she signs this work with
a copyright symbol, thereby attempting to assert her property rights over a
racialized image and trademarked slogan. Despite recent efforts by African
American cultural workers, such as Morrison and Piper, to speak the lan-
guage of property rights, Best is skeptical. The Fugitive’s Properties culmi-
nates with this ‹nal sentence: “To that extent, it seems reasonable to con-
clude, in matters of property as well as matters of right, that there are no
rules.”74 The history of property discourses, according to Best, has devel-
oped increasingly abstract concepts of legal personhood, which fortify the
distinction between legal subjects and actual bodies, thus furthering the
marginalization of the disempowered.
In spite of Best’s pessimism about the ef‹cacy of property rights for fos-
tering greater equality, African American artists have frequently asserted
property claims within the post–Civil Rights era. The culture wars of the
1980s can be understood as a battle for ownership of and control over the
intellectual domain from which individual people and the American people
as a whole imagine themselves.75 CRT, the primary response from legal
scholars and activists of color during this period, appears more ambivalent
about property law’s potential. Like Morrison and Piper, CRT writers tend
to adopt a cautious yet optimistic attitude that social change can happen
even though the Civil Rights Movement did not realize all of its aims.
Rather than suggesting a clean break with the Civil Rights Movement,
critical race theorists and hip-hop aesthetes have learned from the
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NAACP’s overreliance on litigation as the key to social transformation. In-
creasingly, they have shifted their approach from legislative efforts to ad-
dressing the persistence of economic inequalities. 
Responding to the same cultural dynamics that informed Morrison and
Piper, Patricia Williams and other critical race theorists began embedding
their legal criticisms within the forms of autobiography, ‹ction, and dia-
logue. Unlike their Civil Rights era precursors, they explicitly examine the
relationships among cultural narratives, normative assumptions, and legal
doctrines. Rather than adopt the more deconstructive tone of CLS, CRT
attempts to “probe, mock, displace, jar, or reconstruct the dominant tale or
narrative” in order to reconstruct these cultural assumptions and recon-
struct legal discourse so that it might more effectively respond to those in-
equalities the Civil Rights Movement failed to address.76 In The Alchemy of
Race and Rights, Patricia Williams explores how Civil Rights era court de-
cisions and legislation no longer provide suf‹cient remedies to the opera-
tion of racial hierarchy during the post–Civil Rights era. Irony proves to be
a central feature of its critique. Seeking both to represent difference
through repetition and to show how the experiences of minorities shape
their social perspective, CRT demonstrates how putatively color-blind de-
cisions and actions constitute de facto, unconscious, and discursive racism.
These “new” forms of racism have replaced the intentional and legally en-
forced racism of earlier periods.
Similar to Beloved and the Vanilla Nightmare series, Alchemy sutures to-
gether a range of perspective issues and time periods within a single work.
Williams also anticipates Stephen Best’s focus on the shifting relations
among body, personhood, and property. She uses a variety of anecdotes
about ordinary events—what I have been labeling layered samples—as en-
try points to explore racialization and racism as quotidian phenomena that
occur within well-trodden paths laid down by legal discourse, rather than
as deviations from American culture. Williams’s text moves from “what
may have been the contract of sale for [her] great-great-grandmother” to
her exclusion from a Benetton store, then engaged in an aggressive multi-
cultural advertising campaign, and her dif‹culty in writing about this ex-
perience for law journals, to her reconstruction of a founding case in prop-
erty law to demonstrate how cultural narratives in›uence notions of legal
personhood and ultimately shape legal doctrine.77 In each of these in-
stances, the cultural ‹ction of race organizes social relations even if its
in›uence remains unseen to most (white) people. Because the Civil Rights
Movement focused primarily on voting rights, public accommodations,
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and housing issues, interventions into the construction of (intellectual)
property discourses tended to fall outside its parameters. The Civil Rights
Movement reviewed existing legal doctrines for their suitability for rede-
ployment within its litigation strategy, not as racist artifacts to be modi‹ed
or destroyed. To demonstrate the injustice of segregation and racism, the
Civil Rights Movement displayed a tragic or romantic facade in which
African Americans, especially of the middle class, existed as living saints,
suffering hardships heroically. Because of this strategy, legal discourse and
American culture more broadly accepted some changes in race relations so
that those African Americans who proved themselves worthy could enter
into dominant culture. Williams, however, speci‹cally repudiates such ro-
mantic or tragic renderings of African American history or culture because
she is attempting to create the discursive openings to reconstruct legal dis-
course for the daily struggles, both heroic and pedestrian, that ordinary
folks face.
Not to diminish voting rights, housing segregation, or job discrimina-
tion, Williams attempts to show how race shapes nearly every interaction
or contract, no matter how big or small, in which most African Americans
engage with white people. To demonstrate the banality of race, Williams
compares her attempt to rent an apartment in New York City with that of
Peter Gabel, a white colleague and founder of CLS.78 In the 1980s, when
she writes, formal housing segregation is prohibited, and there are no
longer designated white or black neighborhoods. Rather, individuals must
make individual contracts to secure housing. Although there is no grand
social policy driving residential patterns, race still shapes where and how
people live. Gabel, as an adherent of CLS, believes that contract law im-
pedes his effort to develop a mutually enriching agreement with a landlord
and thus eschews a formal arrangement with clear rights. Williams, how-
ever, is skeptical of this approach because Gabel’s trust in property law for-
gets or neglects how property law has tended to frame African Americans
as anything but legitimate bearers of rights for more than two hundred
years. Contrasting her experience with Gabel’s and recounting their ongo-
ing dialogue about it, she writes: “For blacks, then, the battle is not decon-
structing rights, in a world of no rights; nor of constructing statements of
need, in a world of abundantly apparent need. Rather, the goal is to ‹nd a
political mechanism that can confront the denial of need.”79 For Williams,
property law will necessarily play a signi‹cant role in the continued libera-
tion of African Americans, but legal discourse will need to confront the vi-
olence against African Americans upon which it was built. Switching ter-
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minology, as CLS suggests, is unlikely to produce a real change in the ma-
terial conditions of African Americans. Nor is it enough to say, as law and
economics tend to suggest, that racism is inef‹cient in the long run be-
cause the skills of creative and hard-working people and money-making
opportunities will be lost or underutilized, so the market will ultimately
persuade all but the most racist individuals to stop discriminating. This
might be true if current property and contract law had developed strategies
“to become multilingual in the semantics of evaluating race” or to recog-
nize irony.80 However, because property law operates in a fairly abstract
manner, it favors abstracted legal persons who are disinterested, who oper-
ate in transactions at arm’s length, and who tend to follow Anglo-American
cultural traditions. Claiming rights within the public sphere requires not
only access to that sphere, which stands as the primary achievement of the
Civil Rights Movement, but a reconstruction of the imaginary resources
available within it and greater freedom in how those resources may be de-
ployed. The Civil Rights Movement laid the foundation for including
foundational texts about the African American experience and presenting a
less idealized representations of black life. Hip-hop aesthetes have sought
to complete this reconstruction of the imaginary domain. The resulting
texts, as a result, frequently examine the meaning of ownership and the dis-
tribution of property rights
One goal of post–Civil Rights era cultural production, such as Morri-
son’s, Piper’s, and Williams’s, is to represent these varied histories and tra-
ditions and suggest how existing institutional and discursive frameworks
elide the experiences of historically marginalized people. Although the
Civil Rights Movement achieved its greatest success when making claims
based on abstract moral principles, contemporary artists, writers, and in-
tellectuals have adopted a less idealistic and more realistic tone in order to
demonstrate the relative failures of settled legal doctrines. Contemporary
African American cultural production increasingly focuses on materialism,
despite its connection with immorality, because abstract rights without ma-
terial consequences constitute empty promises. Patricia Williams con-
cludes The Alchemy of Race and Rights by re›ecting on the relationship be-
tween rights and power: 
In the law, rights are islands of empowerment. To be unrighted is to
be disempowered, and the line between rights and no-rights is most
often the line between dominators and [the] oppressed. Rights con-
tain images of power and manipulating those images, either visually
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or linguistically, is central in the making and maintenance of rights.
In principle, therefore, the more dizzyingly diverse the images that
are propagated, the more empowered we will be as a society.81
For Williams, the creation of any property regime relies, either con-
sciously or unconsciously, on a distinct con‹guration of language and im-
ages. Although she makes no mention of either Morrison or Piper,
Williams articulates the stakes in their efforts to claim ownership over a
portion of visual and literary culture. In addition to sharing a historical
moment and some aesthetic characteristics, these works engage with and
provide alternative lenses for viewing law’s in›uence on contemporary cul-
ture. 
In reading Beloved against the Vanilla Nightmare series in the context of
CRT, the causes of the 1980s culture wars become clearer. The imaginative
resources of literary, visual, and even legal culture had become implicated
in the social reconstruction project begun during the Civil Rights Move-
ment, and the political and social changes necessitated a cultural transfor-
mation. As Morrison noted just after publishing Beloved: “Canon building
is Empire building. Canon defense is national defense. Canon debate,
whatever the terrain, nature and range . . . is the clash of cultures. And all
of the interests are vested.”82 In this frequently cited essay, Morrison
speci‹cally frames debates about culture as debates about property dis-
course. According to Morrison, critics, especially white and male ones,
have neglected the hidden African American presence in canonical litera-
ture in order to claim exclusive ownership in American literature. Her task
in this essay and in her ‹ction is to reveal that ghostly presence and exam-
ine how it has dis‹gured the American cultural imagination. Similarly,
Henry Louis Gates views the culture wars as a battle between those who
wish to see the canon as personal property and those who can imagine a
pluralist alternative of shared ownership. Gates argues that “pluralism sees
culture as porous, dynamic, and interactive, rather than as the ‹xed prop-
erty of particular ethnic groups.”83
Despite modernity’s attempt to distinguish realms of knowledge as dis-
crete disciplines, African American cultural workers have used similar
forms to break these discursive boundaries down and show how discipli-
nary structures form an interlocking framework for creating and maintain-
ing racial and cultural hierarchy. Hip-hop aesthetics, rather than constitut-
ing a break from the Civil Rights Movement, may be its culmination,
because perhaps the only way to realize the movement’s social and political
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goals is through a cultural transformation that necessitates a reconstruc-
tion of the property concept. By examining ownership in literature and vi-
sual culture, Morrison and Piper contribute to the development of aes-
thetic practices that might engage productively with the turn from civil to
property rights within dominant legal discourse. Their attempts to claim
ownership reveal the normative assumptions that have long dominated
property law. As Gates suggests, the pluralist conception of culture views
tradition and extant texts as inspirational and as the raw materials for future
innovations. Of course, this pluralist approach has come into increasing
con›ict with how intellectual property law has structured the rules for fair-
use copying and secondary uses. Not unsurprisingly, the next generation of
artists, writers, and musicians is grappling with these questions. 
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......chapter 5......
“Fair Use” and the Circulation
of Racialized Texts
It was white theft of black culture that most moved the group
to anger and eventually to action.
—Derrick Bell, Gospel Choirs
In his groundbreaking Harvard Law Review article examining post–Civil
Rights era Supreme Court decisions, Derrick Bell challenges the norma-
tive assumptions of legal discourse.1 Anticipating concerns articulated by
participants from the ‹rst CRT workshop, Bell predicts that CLS’s decon-
struction of rights discourse will prove insuf‹cient to challenge the racism
and racialization of the post–Civil Rights era. Even though Bell began his
career within the Civil Rights Movement, he argues that conservative (and
even some liberal) responses to the NAACP’s legal victories necessitate a
revised strategy for transforming social and cultural relations. To illustrate
the limits of existing civil rights legislation, Bell creates ‹ctitious inter-
locutors, such as Geneva Crenshaw and Jesse Semple, who show the lim-
ited improvement in the material conditions of ordinary or average African
Americans. These writings layer disparate voices into conversations that
ebb and ›ow to reveal an ironic reading of legal discourse.
Bell’s characters examine the violence and inequalities that found
American jurisprudence. In the opening chapter of And We Are Not Saved
(1987), Bell relies on a science ‹ction device to transport Geneva Cren-
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shaw, a movement lawyer who now questions the NAACP’s litigation strat-
egy, back to the Constitutional Convention of 1787. Her journey’s purpose
is to convince the delegates to remove the document’s implicit acceptance
of slavery.2 The dialogue between Crenshaw and the founders explores
how traditional doctrinal remedies to racism respond to the symptoms of
inequalities, not their causes. Bell’s writings suggest that the founders’
commitment to property rights undermined the constitutional promise of
freedom and equality. The ‹ctional Crenshaw asks the founders: “Do you
not mind that your slogans of liberty and individual rights are basically
guarantees that neither a strong government nor the masses will be able to
interfere with your property rights and those of your class?”3 In Bell’s
retelling, the founders cannot conceive of any way to create a constitu-
tional structure that could deracialize property law and also provide for a
stable government.4 This decision, according to Bell, created a permanent
disadvantage for African Americans and placed property law above civil
rights law within American legal discourse. Throughout his provocative
writings, Bell returns to property rights and economic inequalities as the
fundamental challenge of the post–Civil Rights era.5
For Bell, cultural products, whether music, art, or literature, document
and serve as catalysts in the African American struggle for political and
economic equality. In Gospel Choirs (1996), Bell relies on gospel music to
anchor his legal critique and demonstrate how this musical form continues
to provide spiritual sustenance. Bell does not, however, ignore hip-hop’s
importance to the post–Civil Rights generation.6 As one element of the
book’s thought experiment, Bell imagines in the chapter “Racial Royalties”
that a group of “talented scientists and computer programmers” have been
passed over for promotions in favor of “less impressive white co-workers.”7
These African Americans “devise a means of metering the greater society’s
use of cultural expressions of subordinated peoples of color” and then
charge a royalty fee for companies that borrow cultural styles without li-
censing or attributing them.8 These programmers and scientists then 
distribute these royalties to advocacy groups, cultural centers, and not-
for-pro‹t agencies. Pretty quickly, corporations notice the loss of revenue
because many of their pro‹ts derive from the commodi‹cation of African
American styles. The group produces a documentary to defend their ac-
tions and demand legal change:
“This nation has long urged people of color to lift themselves by
their own bootstraps,” one of the group reminded the audience.
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“Such admonitions were repeated even when the nation knew, or
should have known, that the boots of many of those people were
nailed to the ›oor by poverty, by lack of education, by racial hatred.
We have simply done as society urged, and we have done it on terms
that, based on history, society should recognize—the involuntary
taking of property. As victims of such takings throughout this coun-
try’s history, we ‹nd it amusing that the nation now calls us thieves
and condemns us.”9
The early 1990s copyright cases about the legality of hip-hop sampling
constitute the unspoken context of Bell’s thought experiment for returning
ownership over African American cultural products to the African Ameri-
can community. Gospel Choirs insists that established property law doc-
trines, especially copyright and trademark, continue to bene‹t the white
majority. Bell’s interest convergence thesis, developed throughout his writ-
ings, argues that the Civil Rights Movement succeeded in making changes
when the interests of blacks and whites converged. In practice, this has
meant that those policies that bene‹ted whites tended to become law, but
that those that would have helped African Americans and other minorities
exclusively languished.10
“Racial Royalties” anticipates recent concerns about the dilution of
copyright’s approach to fair use. It also implicitly questions whether law’s
normative assumption of doctrinal color-blindness has ever existed, espe-
cially within copyright law. In particular, “Racial Royalties” wonders about
what exactly has constituted “fair” about “fair use” for African American
cultural workers. As a metaphor to describe the relationship between ini-
tial creators and later artists, copyright law has generally treated African
American musicians poorly. Bell’s “Chronicle of the Constitutional Con-
tradiction” depicts the dif‹culty African American critics and artists face in
redressing long-standing racism and racialization. In Bell’s ‹ctive account
of the Constitutional Convention, a founder asks Crenshaw, “How dare
you insert yourself in these deliberations?”11 In effect, the delegate argues
that Bell’s reuse of the Constitutional Convention is unfair because it al-
ters his understanding of the event’s purpose and meaning. Although it is
not the direct subject of that chronicle, Bell inaugurates a critique of “fair
use” by sampling speeches, characters, and songs in his work. In his ren-
dering, fair use constitutes both an aesthetic principle, in which tradition
is rewoven, and a doctrinal problem involving competing racial and cul-
tural subjectivities.
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This chapter examines Colson Whitehead’s John Henry Days and the
paintings of Michael Ray Charles to evaluate how hip-hop aesthetes de-
construct “fair-use” appropriations of racialized imaginative properties.
Whitehead’s and Charles’s work questions how property law distributes
ownership rights over copyrighted or trademarked material and seeks to
reveal how fair use itself constitutes a racialized doctrine, which courts ap-
ply in a racially conscious manner even as they claim to engage in a uni-
versal and color-blind analysis.12 This deconstruction and reconstruction
of fair use criticizes the simplistic theories about textual meaning and cre-
ativity underlying intellectual property law. For hip-hop aesthetes, intel-
lectual property law cannot easily regulate such meanings without reifying
a text’s racialized meaning, thus creating a false-origins myth to legitimate
a particular distribution of property rights. Contemporary African Ameri-
can cultural workers demand, ironically, stronger intellectual property
rights to protect African American culture even as they question copy-
right’s historic complicity with racism, racialization, and racial hierarchy.
Fair Use
Copyright law regulates who can reproduce, distribute, or authorize a copy
or a derivative text.13 However, because intellectual property law provides
only a limited monopoly—not the exclusive ownership of chattel or real
property—common law and federal legislation permit fair-use copying un-
der certain conditions. The U.S. Code offers a four-factor test to deter-
mine fair use that examines:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonpro‹t educational pur-
poses;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.14
There is not a single rule for determining whether a particular use is fair.
Rather, courts must balance these various factors. Reviewing cases decided
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by appellate courts between 1994 and 2002, David Nimmer argues that
“courts tend ‹rst to make a judgment that the ultimate disposition is fair
use or unfair use, and then align the four factors to ‹t that result as best
they can.”15 He also concludes that positive ‹ndings about factors 1 and 3
slightly increased the likelihood of a fair-use determination, but that a
party did not need to prevail on a majority of factors to win their claim.16
Because Nimmer’s analysis includes cases whose controversies extend be-
yond the scope of this study, his results do not speak directly to either the
racialization of intellectual properties or legal discourse’s attitude toward
hip-hop aesthetics. They do, however, make clear the ambiguous nature of
fair-use doctrine and its potential complicity in further empowering those
with greater cultural and economic capital. Nimmer’s study does not cap-
ture how the ambiguity of fair-use doctrine shapes the decisions of artists,
agents, publishing companies, gallery owners, and music companies. It is
quite likely that copyright law’s ambiguity chills some protected artistic ac-
tivity because people fear litigation. This is especially true for many
African American artists, writers, and musicians who historically and still
overwhelmingly lack suf‹cient cultural and economic capital to bargain ef-
fectively with either distribution companies or copyright owners.
Many legal commentators have suggested revisions to fair use to better
balance the rights of creators and the public and to further democratic di-
alogue about social, political, economic, and cultural issues. For example,
Julie Cohen has argued that the concept of the user has been underdevel-
oped within copyright law, overemphasizing the owner as the primary fo-
cus of legislation and doctrine. In an attempt to remedy this de‹cit, Cohen
has theorized about the “situated user” (as opposed to the economic, ro-
mantic, or postmodern user) who “appropriates cultural goods found
within her immediate environment for four primary purposes: consump-
tion, communication, self-development, and creative play.”17 In her
provocative analysis, the situated user provides a counterweight against
copyright’s focus on the owner. Cohen recognizes that the public incorpo-
rates cultural texts into their own lives, shaping their identities and their
worldviews.18 She argues that this should be permitted because it “fosters
collective progress.”19
Similarly, Laura Bradford suggests that courts apply insights from cog-
nitive research to copyright jurisprudence. Attempting to create a brighter
line rule regarding secondary uses, instead of what fair-use doctrine cur-
rently offers, and one that better protects users’ rights, Bradford develops
a legal doctrine based on psychology’s insight that “our general attitudes
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toward iconic works, which are most often the subject of disputes, are re-
sistant to change.”20 Rather than the current four-factor test, Bradford sug-
gests that courts should evaluate secondary uses based upon (1) attitude re-
sistance, (2) source effects, (3) frequency effects, and (4) processing
hierarchy.21 Within this framework, the likelihood that a copy would
change a user’s attitude based on the secondary source’s credibility, the fre-
quency with which the user would encounter the secondary copy, and the
amount of time it takes to process the copied item would all affect the out-
come of the fair-use inquiry. The quicker a user could process the copy, the
more an infringing use would be suggested. Bradford’s approach attempts
to evaluate how the viewer’s perception of the original text is changed by
the copying.22
In their attempts to ‹nd a better balance between owners and users
within fair-use doctrine, Cohen and Bradford create legal doctrine based
upon a more robust conception of the user. Their frameworks would con-
stitute signi‹cant improvements over current legal analysis because they
portray individuals not as passive receptacles but as active agents shaping
their world. Despite their proposals’ strengths, they still tend to conceive
of the user as an ahistorical agent, who exists independently of the copy-
righted and trademarked texts, images, and sounds that populate cultural
life. Cohen and Bradford suggest that individual users can deploy intangi-
ble properties however they wish. Contra this assumption, this book at-
tempts to demonstrate how some users layer samples in literary, audio, and
visual texts in rhythmic patterns and breaks, based on their understanding
of hip-hop aesthetics, an extant cultural practice. While individuals cer-
tainly make distinct choices to improvise from and revise the underlying
aesthetic paradigm, cultural boundaries appear to play a greater role than
either Cohen or Bradford suggests. Although both recognize the increas-
ing importance that imaginative properties play in allowing people to de-
velop self-identities, they neglect how such texts, images, and sounds colo-
nize people’s bodies, regardless of people’s attempts at self-de‹nition.
Much contemporary African American cultural production conceives of
American culture not as an imaginative commons or public domain where
individuals can fashion an identity for themselves without outside interfer-
ence, but as a prison where freedom can be found only by resisting social
conventions. While Cohen and Bradford appear to liberate and legalize
certain kinds of copying, Regina Austin argues that hip-hop ‹nds freedom
precisely because it “›aunt[s] the laws of private property.”23 Austin is not
arguing that all hip-hop devotees constitute criminals, but that the aes-
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thetic demands of hip-hop rely for their very meaning on breaking certain
stylistic and/or legal boundaries. Hip-hop aesthetics—especially as ex-
plored by Colson Whitehead and Michael Ray Charles—assumes a more
ambivalent user than the one posited by Cohen and Bradford. Whitehead
and Charles examine how extant copyrighted and trademarked properties
shape raced individuals and seek to reconstruct the unfair uses that have
furthered the racialization of the imaginative realm. In their critical re-
working, fair use may constitute a problematic metaphor because it as-
sumes that identity and subjectivity exist prior to property relations.
John Henry Days
Colson Whitehead’s John Henry Days begins with a prologue that arranges
a series of samples from scholarly works that explore the origins of the folk
song “John Henry.” The song details a steel-driving contest between an
African American worker and a newly invented machine. John Henry wins
the contest but then dies, suggesting that a machine-driven modernity is
destroying what is precious about humanity. Whitehead’s novel then de-
scribes, in hilarious fashion, the efforts of J. Sutter, the novel’s protagonist
and a modern-day John Henry, a son of Striver’s Row in Harlem, to secure
receipts to pad his reimbursements from publishing and advertising out-
lets. The novel proceeds to narrate J. Sutter’s visit to Talcott, West Vir-
ginia, as part of a public relations junket to write a story for an Internet site
about the town’s John Henry festival, which coincides with the U.S. Post
Of‹ce’s release of a John Henry stamp. Over the course of the book,
Whitehead introduces his readers to various fragments in the John Henry
myth’s journey, from Henry’s thoughts before his famous battle with the
machine, to the composer who copyrighted his version of the song, to Paul
Robeson’s failed play about the hero. He also explores the world of publi-
cists, stamp collectors, and freelance writers. J. Sutter also encounters and
begins a romantic relationship with Pamela Street, the ambivalent heir to
her father’s collection of John Henry memorabilia. Street, a New Yorker
like J. Sutter, is considering selling her inheritance to the town so that she
can unload this unwanted legacy.
In addition to its other intersecting plotlines, the novel focuses on J.
Sutter’s thought process as he endeavors to break the record for nonstop
junketeering, a contemporary analogue to John Henry’s competition with
a machine. Sutter must negotiate the demands of the information age, the
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Internet, and intellectual property law, in which man continues to battle
for his humanity against the increasing commodi‹cation of information
and culture. Unlike John Henry, however, Sutter decides to opt out of his
own battle with intellectual death, or what the novel describes as being
“devoured by pop,” after journeying with Pamela Street to the supposed
location of John Henry’s original battle with the machine. They also visit
Henry’s likely grave atop a local mountain where the railroad company
buried the bodies of African American workers who died during the con-
struction of the Big Bend Tunnel, the site of the mythical battle between
John Henry and the machine. Street buries the ashes of her father there
and decides to sell the town her father’s collection. Sutter and Street then
disappear into an indescribable future, as they have apparently shed his-
tory’s weight. The novel ends when Sutter and Street leave the festival be-
fore it reaches its ceremonial height. Through a series of hints, Whitehead
suggests that the planned apogee in this celebration of John Henry goes
awry when Alphonse Miggs, a collector specializing in railroad stamps, de-
cides to use this occasion to shoot himself and an unspeci‹ed number of
those attending the gathering. The novel thus does not provide a clear res-
olution to its main con›icts but implies that the cultural logic underlying
the John Henry myth must be transcended so that the main characters can
‹nd real freedom and escape the ubiquitous and pernicious in›uence of
popular culture.
Although the novel provides a kaleidoscopic view of American history
and culture, Whitehead devotes considerable narrative attention to the in-
tellectual property issues that the information age has provoked. Like
Smith’s Twilight—Los Angeles, 1992, Morrison’s Beloved, and Piper’s Vanilla
Nightmares series, John Henry Days displays the signs of hip-hop aesthetics:
layered samples, rhythmic ›ows and asymmetries, and an ironic narrative
mode. Beyond claiming ownership over imaginative properties, including
John Henry, Whitehead re›ects upon how such texts get transformed as
they move through American culture. Regardless of the original intent or
meaning behind his story, African Americans and cultural outsiders have
used John Henry as a cultural resource to explore what it means to be hu-
man—for some what it means to be a raced being—in both the industrial
and the information ages. In this hip-hop and postmodern version, John
Henry the steel-driving man constitutes a familiar rhythm or narrative that
has become cliché or stale. Writers and artists must deconstruct and re-
construct this tale to carve out narrative space to capture the challenges
and choices of contemporary life.24 By laying down sampled versions of
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John Henry as the basis of his hip-hop revisionist version, Whitehead im-
plicitly criticizes copyright’s fair-use doctrine because it fails to account for
how texts, especially racialized ones, produce cultural memory, in›uence
future creative activity, and shape individual identities. Whitehead also re-
minds legislators and judges that limited copyright protections proved
more than suf‹cient motivation or incentive for the hundreds of musicians,
storytellers, playwrights, and visual artists who fashioned their own John
Henrys, even if those rules limited the ownership rights of these cultural
workers in their creations. His critique of copyright suggests that a nar-
rowly constructed fair-use doctrine would impede, if not prohibit, certain
cultural forms and the critical conversation around those forms.25
The novel documents how the circulation of the John Henry myth
through several genres enriched American culture, writ large, even as it
failed to alleviate the relative economic poverty of African Americans.
Whitehead never states that fair use and the distribution of ownership in-
terests within copyright or property law constitutes a primary theme of
John Henry Days, but the circulation of imaginative properties and the eco-
nomic effects of that movement always remain central to the novel’s narra-
tive trajectory. Since Reconstruction, or the putative 1872 contest between
John Henry and the machine, intellectual property laws have consistently
favored those white individuals who wrote down, composed, drew, or mar-
keted the story over those African American individuals who lived or expe-
rienced it.26 Whitehead sprinkles evidence of this redistribution of owner-
ship rights over the American imaginary domain throughout the novel. In
what appeared to some initial reviewers as extraneous material, Whitehead
attempts to illustrate the many ways that African American creativity got
transformed into other people’s intellectual property, owned by ‹ctional
individuals such as Jack Rose, who copyrighted his version of the song af-
ter overhearing a pedestrian humming a version, or Andrew Goodman,
who offered to record a traveling bluesman’s version of the song.27 A name-
less participant in the writing of the John Henry folk song opines: “Like a
dollar bill it changes hands. Others will hear it and add a verse, goose the
rhythm, slow it down to ‹t their mood . . . . This is his own John Henry.”28
In a humorous rant by Dave Brown, one of the senior statesmen among the
junketeers, Whitehead reminds his readers how the Rolling Stones began
their careers by borrowing riffs and lyrics from Mississippi bluesmen.29
In addition to these individual actions whereby speci‹c white creators
appropriate and pro‹t from African American culture, Whitehead empha-
sizes time and again how institutions and corporations borrow select im-
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ages of African American life whenever it’s convenient. One of the junke-
teers, Tiny, remembers that his elementary school read kindergartners a
version of John Henry after the local school board determined that Little
Black Sambo contained negative imagery about African Americans.30 The
U.S. Post Of‹ce’s use of folk heroes most obviously exempli‹es this at-
tempt to circulate a popular image of African American life,31 even if this
event attracted relatively few African Americans.32 Pamela Street and J.
Sutter even encounter and re›ect upon a John Henry statue designed and
built by Talcott’s Ruritan club after they persuaded Johnny Cash to donate
money for their statue because he mistakenly identi‹ed Beckley, West Vir-
ginia, as John Henry’s home.33 Pamela muses after viewing the statue: “He
is open to interpretation. Talking out of both sides of his mouth. You hear
what you want to hear.” Whitehead then adds that Pamela “is confusing
the statue before her with the man, and the man with her conception of the
man.”34 To further the irony, J. recognizes this particular John Henry
statue because Jim Beam licensed from Ruritan the use of this image for
one of its whiskey bottles.35 Whitehead deploys these textual moments to
demonstrate how cultural properties circulate far beyond copyright’s as-
sumptions about the ›ow of cultural materials.
John Henry Days also serves as an intellectual property ghost story on at
least two levels. First, Josie, one of the white owners of the Talcott Motor
Lodge, where J. Sutter, Pamela Street, and the junketeers stay, knows that
a ghost haunts the motel and the region. Through her, Whitehead relates:
“The ‹rst ghost any child of the region hears of is John Henry. Each time
a train leaves the Talcott station and rushes into Big Bend Tunnel, the en-
gineer blows the whistle for old John Henry, poor John Henry.”36 Josie,
however, is convinced that there is a ghost, apparently John Henry’s, living
in the hotel and disturbing guests. She is concerned about the weekend of
the John Henry festival because they have booked all of the rooms, mean-
ing that the ghost will likely inhabit a guest’s room. After searching for
some clues, she suspects that the ghost will haunt room 27, J. Sutter’s
room.37 Of course, the ghost shares a room with J. Sutter, as he constitutes
a contemporary analog for John Henry. Second, the ghost of John Henry
haunts Pamela Street as an ambivalent inheritance. For Pamela, the novel
details her attempt to heal the wounds associated with her father’s obses-
sion with John Henry memorabilia, a bizarre contest of his own construc-
tion in which he pitted his own commitment to the folk hero against the
world’s neglect and misunderstanding.38 Her father ‹lled Pamela’s child-
hood home with the ghostly presence of John Henry. The memorabilia
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crowded out her needs and snuffed out Pamela’s and her mother’s dreams
for the future because of her father’s obsession with John Henry and the
past. In both instances, the ghost of John Henry constitutes an unwanted
paradigm for perseverance in a racialized world as Pamela and J. Sutter
seek freedom from historical limitations endured by their parents and
grandparents. By selecting John Henry and the many iterations of his story
as a primary metaphor for the historical legacy inherited by African Amer-
icans, Whitehead fuses the common theme of historical racism with more
contemporary concerns about intellectual property law.
Whitehead’s exploration of John Henry’s legacy offers a surprisingly
rich cultural matrix from which to explore the ef‹ciency and ethics of fair-
use doctrine. As discussed above, intellectual property law relies on four
factors (purpose, nature, amount, and market effect) to determine whether
a particular instance of copying constitutes infringement. Enacted in 1976,
this legislation was passed by Congress to codify fair-use doctrine because
a con›icting body of case law had emerged. The legislative history suggests
the many concerns, from educational use to parody, that shaped the
speci‹c language adopted. The linked concepts of culture, cultural matrix,
and/or cultural formations, however, are conspicuously absent, because in
1976 few American scholars had yet adopted cultural studies as a primary
method for understanding texts. As many others have noted, copyright law
generally re›ects a romantic conception of authorship in which a genius
creates in isolation with full consciousness and knowledge about her cre-
ation. Fair-use doctrine generally shares these assumptions, even if later
scholarly investigations of cultural and imaginative texts by the Birming-
ham school and their American progeny question this founding truth of in-
tellectual property law. Given the many powerful criticisms of the roman-
tic model of authorship, it would be redundant to simply add John Henry
Days to the already long list of works that rebut this theory due to liberal
use and refashioning of extant cultural objects and texts.
Rather, Whitehead’s engagement with cultural icons re›ects a more
speci‹c criticism of fair use: how copyright confers ownership rights in
racialized and often stereotyped images that dominate popular memory and
shape individual identities. Examined through the lens of racialization and
the long history of racial caricatures within American culture, the appropri-
ation of images, whether moving the characters from Harriet Beecher
Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin into minstrel shows or Public Enemy’s satirical
rendering of Driving Miss Daisy in “Burn, Hollywood, Burn,” illustrates the
false binaries that fair-use doctrine arranges because it ignores the racialized
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nature of imaginative properties. The 1976 congressional codi‹cation of
fair-use doctrine addressed neither the systematic redistribution of owner-
ship rights over African American cultural forms nor the complicity of cul-
ture industries’ perpetuation of racial hierarchy. Rather, it sought to provide
clearer guidance for institutional and corporate actors as commerce in in-
tellectual properties burgeoned. In this context, cultural in›uences or ef-
fects had little relevance to Congress’s deliberations, even if the unacknowl-
edged circulation of racialized texts frequently creates the very value
intellectual property owners wish to capture. Racialized images, characters,
and sounds possess meaning and thus market value precisely because they
trade on the preexisting recognition of stereotypes and caricatures.
Fair use’s ‹rst factor divides potential uses into two categories: com-
mercial purposes or nonpro‹t educational purposes.39 While courts tend
not to apply this as a strict binary and recognize that these categories over-
lap, the concepts of culture, cultural memory, and cultural formation are
conspicuously absent. Although scholars, intellectuals, and activists have
vigorously debated its meaning recently, culture cannot be reduced to
merely commerce, education, or some synthesis of the two. Rather, culture
involves shared ideologies, habits, rituals, objects, practices, beliefs, values,
and/or communal attitudes toward texts and textuality. Most cultural crit-
ics conceive of these items as public-domain property, in effect, because
they form the basis of public communication, understanding, and social in-
stitutions. Susan Sca‹di, Michael Brown, and others have attempted to de-
velop concepts of communal ownership for cultural properties in order to
enrich indigenous and minority cultures whose knowledge, artistic prod-
ucts, and rituals have become prized commodities by outsiders. This ap-
proach, however, privileges traditional practices and knowledge over on-
going developments and the vibrant expressions of living cultural groups.
In October 2005, the United Nations Educational, Scienti‹c, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) adopted a convention in which it rati‹ed the
importance of fostering a diversity of cultural expression and urged states
to protect, maintain, and promote diverse cultural expressions.40 The 
UNESCO convention illustrates the limitations of the commerce-educa-
tion binary offered by the ‹rst factor in fair-use analysis. It suggests that a
third purpose should guide fair-use inquiries: the promotion of diverse cul-
tural expressions. Whitehead’s deployment of John Henry illustrates the
importance of constructing a fair-use doctrine that validates and promotes
a rich cultural imaginary in which potentially copyrighted texts, images,
and sounds can be recrafted to speak to contemporary dilemmas.
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Even though John Henry Days clearly possesses a commercial purpose,
it explores and creates an imaginative universe that reveals the shifting ten-
sions facing African Americans speci‹cally and all Americans more gener-
ally. The segregation and intentional racism of the Industrial Revolution
have morphed into the putatively color-blind but nonetheless racialized in-
formation age. In its own way, John Henry Days educates its audience about
changing conditions of economic production and organization. However,
it can be best understood as part of an ongoing cultural dialogue both
within the African American community and across racial lines. Although
Whitehead could have written about these ideas without reference to John
Henry, the transformation of this mythic tale and moral fable for contem-
porary readers provides a particularly compelling and revealing articula-
tion of current economic, cultural, social, political, and psychological chal-
lenges. As the ambiguous ending suggests, some images must become
museum relics so that speci‹c individuals can be liberated from the cruel
hand of history. Any “fair-use” analysis must engage with the commercial-
ization of cultural products by outsiders, the racialized effects of protected
images, and the continuing need to refashion symbols and metaphors
based on contemporary events and challenges. Because the fair-use doc-
trine does not speci‹cally or consciously explore the effects of protected
texts, images, and sounds, it neglects the very conditions and structures
that give cultural objects meaning and importance.
The second factor of fair-use analysis explores the nature of the copy-
righted work.41 Arguably, this allows courts to explore the cultural rela-
tions a speci‹c text invokes. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court found
that 2 Live Crew’s “Pretty Woman” constituted a parody of Roy Orbison’s
song and thereby needed to copy substantial portions of it to perform its
satiric function. The predictable result of this decision has been that paro-
dies receive considerable latitude in fair-use decisions when compared to
other genres or forms. The court’s decision in this case, however, distin-
guished parody from other satiric forms, arguing that satire alone does not
provide license to copy material because the articulated criticism does not
speci‹cally address or is limited to the appropriated text.42 Analyzing this
decision, David Sanjek concludes that Judge David Souter’s opinion im-
plicitly permits artists to refashion texts for criticism and transformative
uses.43 In this decision, Judge Souter makes it quite clear that “this is not,
of course, to say that anyone who calls himself a parodist can skim the
cream and get away scot free.”44 For Souter, what permits 2 Live Crew’s
appropriation of Roy Orbison’s song is not that it transforms the song from
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romance to irony but that it effects a parody, a distinct form within the
ironic mode.
Courts typically rely on the second factor of the fair-use test to deter-
mine whether a work is ‹ction or non‹ction and quickly move onto the
third factor. In determining a text’s nature, courts tend to rely on common-
sense approaches even if there exists considerable scholarly debate about
how best to classify a given text. For example, in SunTrust Bank v. Houghton
Mif›in, the court determined that Gone With the Wind was ‹ction and that
it required a high level of protection.45 Hip-hop aesthetics, however, sug-
gests that a text’s meaning is invariably related to its context and its narra-
tive mode. The SunTrust court acknowledged that Alice Randall’s The
Wind Done Gone “de-mysti‹ed” and “stripped the romanticism” from Mar-
garet Mitchell’s Gone With the Wind.46 Although both parties offered con-
siderable expert testimony about the nature of Randall’s work and whether
it was parody, signifyin’, or just plain copying, neither party needed to
present testimony about the nature of Mitchell’s novel. Because the two
differed in narrative mode (romance vs. irony/satire), the texts operate in
necessarily con›icting ways. The court’s ‹nal decision, however, tended to
omit the considerable academic debate about the relationship between the
two works in favor of a common-sense perspective. The court cautioned
that “literary relevance [or meaning] is a highly subjective analysis ill-
suited for judicial inquiry.”47 The court reluctantly concluded that when
copyright-infringement claims and defenses invoke aesthetic interpreta-
tions, legal discourse cannot easily render clear and ef‹cient guidance.
In John Henry Days, Whitehead contributes to ongoing discussions
about fair use by examining the relationships among texts, their predeces-
sors, and the cultural relations that give those texts meaning. By charting
the many renderings of John Henry, Whitehead suggests that cultural con-
text de‹nes the nature of a copyrighted text. Because particular cultural
sensibilities are crystallized in songs, images, and stories, their very exis-
tence hinges upon their relationship to an interpretative community.
Whitehead explores how the relationship between text and context deter-
mines a work’s meaning. For example, Pamela Street’s father’s museum, as
a private collection, fails to attract visitors and eventually estranges him
from his family because the objects and songs lack a clear narrative context
other than his own obsession.48 Mr. Street’s museum that lacks visitors il-
lustrates the dangers of severing a text from its cultural moorings. Street’s
collection of John Henry memorabilia has become disconnected from the
cultural formations that gave the song its initial meaning. Street desper-
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ately wanted to absorb the romantic/tragic myth associated with early ver-
sions of the song. However, Whitehead makes all too clear that these nar-
rative modes no longer speak to contemporary sensibilities. Instead, he fre-
quently invokes irony to depict contemporary culture.49 For this reason,
John Henry achieves considerable popularity as postmodern pastiche, a
postage stamp, and the inspiration for a town’s marketing plan.
Contemporary ironic appropriations of John Henry differ qualitatively
from earlier borrowings because they alter our understanding and attitude
toward the original folk tale and its cultural meaning. In these iterations,
corporate actors have refashioned or reconstructed John Henry into a new
object, related to but distinct from earlier versions. By contrast, White-
head’s ‹ctional Jake Rose, the Tin Pan Alley–style composer, simply wrote
down the melody and lyrics he overheard sung by a nameless African
American on the street.50 Earlier in the novel, Whitehead describes the
creative process of a nameless singer/songwriter who is developing his own
John Henry. The musician re›ects upon his efforts in crafting his version
of the song: “He’s practically stealing the song today; it’s not his but he’s
got his ‹ngers on it and that’s half the battle.”51 A page later, this nameless
composer acknowledges that his is just one version in which each artist
struggles to fashion a John Henry that represents his or her experience.52
Jake Rose does not seek to bare his soul. He does not care why a song is
popular. Rather, he just wants to get a start in the music business by what-
ever means necessary.53 For legal discourse, the difference between these
two composers may be dif‹cult, if not impossible, to distinguish. However,
in the realm of creation and cultural expression, such distinctions allow one
artist to be viewed as real, while another will be viewed as a fraud. Even if
law cannot detect these ‹ne differences, many audiences can. For African
American artists, the problem has been that white singers and songwriters,
who appropriate their styles, have had greater access to the recording and
music-publishing industry and thus could pass themselves off as originals
even when they present pale imitations of African American cultural forms.
In this context, the second factor for fair use needs to get beyond the sheet
music, image, or written word and account for the creative and cultural
processes that generate particular copyrighted texts. Failure to do so pro-
duces an arbitrary but nonetheless raced distribution of intellectual prop-
erty rights in which those who have the greatest access to copyright and
contract lawyers, not the greatest amount of creativity, will ultimately
come to own a greater share of the imaginary domain. This situation fur-
thers romantic conceptions of authorship because these copyright owners
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appear to have created texts, songs, and images out of thin air, as their in-
tellectual properties may have little connection to their own cultural prac-
tices. The existence of a fairly weak approach to a text’s nature, which em-
phasizes genre over cultural connections, only furthers the redistribution
of intellectual property ownership rights from marginalized communities
to dominant corporate interests.54
The third fair-use factor examines the “amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.”55 The
amount and substantiality test explores how much the second text borrows
from the ‹rst and how central the borrowed element is to the meaning of
that ‹rst text.56 This factor considers the borrowed portion only in relation
to the ‹rst text. Courts will examine what percentage of the original or ‹rst
text is used in the later text and whether the appropriated material consti-
tutes the central message or artistic sensibility of that ‹rst text. In applying
this factor, the only signi‹cant analytic distinctions involve the original
meaning or operation of the sampled portion, not how a second text re-
works it or reshapes its meaning. Legal discourse thus implicitly assumes
that the borrowed material will function and signify in a similar or identi-
cal fashion in later texts as it did in its original setting.
Olufunmilayo Arewa argues that because courts tend to emphasize
melody, as opposed to rhythm and percussion, in their fair-use analysis of
music, they neglect how context determines the meaning or signi‹cance of
notes and pitches. For Arewa, hip-hop and other music created in the
African Diaspora emphasize orality and linguistic play as central features,
rather than textuality or composition.57 Courts, however, simply listen to
the music and apparently determine if there is any kind of literal or frag-
mented similarity between the putative original and the alleged copy.58 Al-
though Arewa points out that “orality and linguistic play are . . . not
suf‹ciently considered in analysis of hip hop,” her system to license sam-
ples, however, returns to a test of recognizability, which would apparently
require legal actors and courts to return to the very forms of analysis she
criticizes.59 Despite this limitation, Arewa’s approach goes beyond current
legal doctrine because it would require courts to attend not only to the ap-
propriated text but to how a secondary user deploys the borrowed mater-
ial. Arewa encourages courts to go beyond simplistic applications of the
third fair-use factor and examines how the meaning of words, images, and
sounds changes as their context does. Such an approach offers copyright
law, which has become increasingly signi‹cant as an arbiter or regulator of
multicultural exchange, a richer model of culture.
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In its incessant critique of how marketing and public relations have re-
shaped the contours of cultural life, Whitehead’s John Henry Days implic-
itly provides a corrective to fair-use doctrine’s romantic approach to textu-
ality. Arewa’s analysis of fair use’s failings interrogates copyright discourse’s
grounding assumption that creators write and produce their work as com-
pleted wholes, free from historical and contemporary popular culture
in›uences. For the John Henry myth, partial and unlicensed borrowings or
appropriations have allowed the story to develop and suit its message to a
wide range of audiences. Although this is not explicitly stated, Arewa ap-
pears to rely on post-structuralism and performance theory to criticize le-
gal discourse’s tendency toward ahistorical understandings of particular
texts. Her analysis allows judges and scholars to transcend narrow spa-
tial/temporal boundaries and determine the relationships among the cre-
ator’s likely initial intent, the text’s probable initial social meaning, and
later appropriations of that text. Whitehead’s novel attempts a genealogi-
cal reconstruction of John Henry’s myth. Weaving together diverse strands
of the tale, Whitehead demonstrates that cultural texts can quickly take on
a life of their own, regardless of their creators’ intent. John Henry quickly
became part of a de facto public domain, and musicians, playwrights, mar-
keters, and even the U.S. Post Of‹ce drew on John Henry’s iconic status to
articulate their own hopes and dreams or to appropriate some of his signi-
fying power for their own purposes.
Although both Pamela Street, through her father’s collection, and J.
Sutter, due to his attempt to break the nonstop junketeering record, pos-
sess forms of ownership over the John Henry myth, the novel culminates
abruptly with the pair apparently leaving the festivities early. In what
would be unthinkable, or at least highly unlikely, within legal discourse, J.
Sutter and Pamela Street simply relinquish control and ownership over the
John Henry myth once they realize its pernicious effect on their lives. Even
as it excavates the origins of John Henry, the novel also reveals Sutter’s and
Street’s dawning consciousness of how the John Henry myth has ensnared
them and shaped their life choices. Much like his earlier The Intuitionist,
with its ironic deconstruction of uplift metaphors within African American
culture, Whitehead’s John Henry Days re›ects upon the limits of received
myths and narratives for the ultimate liberation of African Americans. The
novel deploys sampled elements from and about John Henry in order to
produce a rupture with the past. Echoing Paul Gilroy’s examination of
black vernacular uses of futurology, John Henry Days encourages readers to
liberate their imaginations and free themselves from stories that leave
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African Americans trapped in a racialized and white-supremacist past.60
John Henry thus appears to constitute a narrative or myth whose existence
has outlasted its political utility. What remains is merely a text ripe for
sampled appropriations and other derivative uses. The novel’s ambivalent
ending suggests that, despite the importance of remembering history, es-
pecially the horror of racial hierarchy, African Americans need to generate
new myths. As the novel’s numerous hints suggest, the continued celebra-
tion of the John Henry myth will produce sometimes violent effects.
Whitehead’s novel thus implies that even though derivative uses of John
Henry can proliferate and constitute new texts in and of themselves, which
his own novel clearly exempli‹es, overreliance on historical narratives can
result in an unconscious reproduction of racial stereotypes.
The ‹nal factor that in›uences fair-use determinations considers the
“effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.”61 This element of fair-use analysis connects recent copyright dis-
course with its founding concern about piracy. The fourth factor asks
courts to consider whether the derivative use will serve as a market substi-
tute for the appropriated text. In other words, will the borrowing of
sounds, images, or words result in the earlier writer, artist, or composer
losing sales or pro‹ts? The 2001 Napster litigation, for example, focused
on whether the music-sharing service caused fewer college students to pur-
chase music and impeded the recording industry’s efforts to create new
markets for music.62 The court concluded that although time- or space-
shifting can operate within the parameters of fair use, Napster’s customers
exceeded those limits.63 This decision, along with others, makes clear that
this fourth factor contemplates whether the copying serves as mere dupli-
cation and thus negatively impacts the sales of the earlier version. Con-
versely, recent litigation involving Google’s search engine examined
whether its use of cached images constituted copyright infringement. The
U.S. District Court for Nevada held that such copying leaned toward a
‹nding of fair use because it did not impact the potential market for the
claimant’s works.64 In Ty v. Publications International Limited, the Seventh
Circuit differentiated between complementary and substitutional uses.
The Ty court held that only substitutional uses violate copyright law.65 In
these fair-use decisions, courts establish fairly clear rules to determine per-
missible kinds of appropriation and differentiate them from prohibited
forms of copying.
Copyright law, however, permits criticism of earlier works even if it
persuades consumers not to purchase the initial text. Critical appropria-
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tions differ from pirating because the resulting text incorporates previous
material and shapes it into something that exceeds the original. In Sun-
Trust, the court held that while its commentary might affect the sales of
Gone With the Wind, The Wind Done Gone constituted a fair-use appropria-
tion of Margaret Mitchell’s book. The court noted in a footnote that the
publication of The Wind Done Gone did not curtail or limit the sales of Gone
With the Wind.66 Judge Marcus, in his concurring opinion, noted that the
two books “aim at different readerships; to the extent that there is any
overlap between these respective markets, further fact‹nding [sic] may well
reveal that these two books will act as complements rather than substi-
tutes.”67 The court clari‹ed the meaning and scope of this fourth factor to
limit this category of copying that adds little to the original but only harms
the ability of the copyright holder to realize income from that intellectual
property. It appears as if Margaret Mitchell’s heirs sought to use copyright
law as a shield against any criticism of Gone With the Wind, which might af-
fect sales. The SunTrust court, however, held that copyright infringement
occurs only when that diminution of value occurs through blatant piracy,
not critical rewritings.
Whitehead’s novel charts the various rewritings, reworkings, and reuses
of the John Henry name and myth. Within John Henry Days, the activities
of and references to the eponymous hero generate considerable revenue for
the various songwriters, performers, marketers, and advertisers. The end-
less repetition of the John Henry sign does not appear to diminish its value.
Rather, the John Henry myth appears to be an inexhaustible cultural re-
source that retains its value, no matter how many people tap or mine its
power, even if these various uses transform its initial meaning. Over the
novel’s course, Whitehead suggests that any attempt to trace the mysteri-
ous origins of John Henry will be partial and incomplete. Whether it fo-
cuses on the future or on the past, the book deconstructs the myth that
John Henry is the product of a particular creator or that any one person can
control its meaning. The novel, for example, identi‹es two failed scholarly
(one black and one white) attempts to locate the myth’s origin. The novel
also exposes how the song appeared to take on a cultural life of its own,
jumping from composer to composer, writer to writer, advertiser to mar-
keter, and picking up steam all along the way. Echoing Rosemary Coombe’s
argument in The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties, John Henry appears
to possess a cultural life of its own, irrespective of its creators. Through acts
of appropriation and recontextualization, John Henry becomes a textual
space where democracy gets articulated and rearticulated.
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Perhaps ironically, John Henry’s transformation into American myth
and the basis for democratic dialogue requires Pamela Street and J. Sutter
to abandon this cultural inheritance. The nation’s adoption of an African
American folk story, in effect, “dispossesses” African Americans of the
story and severs the link between them and the story. The
commodi‹cation of John Henry elides the very historical subjectivity the
story initially articulated and thus effects a revision of American racial his-
tory. Both the town and the U.S. Post Of‹ce participate in this racial myth-
making in their attempt to demonstrate their multicultural values. Al-
though Street and Sutter struggle with abandoning the myth and the many
artifacts it has generated, the novel’s ending suggests that they ultimately
escape the John Henry celebration’s concluding violence precisely because
they have renounced the myth before it has been completely commodi‹ed.
Within the novel’s twisted logic, John Henry’s value grows as songwriters,
advertisers, and marketers use the myth for their own ends. In terms of the
fourth fair-use factor, the deployments of John Henry do not hurt its eco-
nomic value even as they transform its cultural value.
John Henry Days invites a range of questions about intellectual property,
fair use, and post–Civil Rights era African American culture. It examines
whether multiculturalism’s attempt to broaden the boundaries of American
culture has effected a dispossession of African American cultural memory.
Whitehead skillfully notes the irony that copyright law, which has limited
or impeded hip-hop’s development of sampling, has proven quite receptive
to corporate attempts to appropriate African American culture, such as
Talcott’s and the U.S. Post Of‹ce’s efforts.68 He illustrates that the very di-
versi‹cation or “multiculturalization” of post–Civil Rights America has re-
quired that African Americans give up ownership rights over their history
and folk culture so that it, too, may become incorporated into commodity
culture. Ironically, the demand to transform African American folk or pop-
ular culture into a broader or multicultural vision of American culture, writ
large, coincides with what Phillip Richards has termed the rise of the
“signi‹ers,” a group of literary and cultural critics who “seek to convert
this rhetorical method . . . into a literary institution embodying black cul-
ture.”69 Richards persuasively argues that their work posits a false and trou-
bling romanticization of vernacular culture because it omits or elides the
very real ways that African Americans have always drawn on European
forms to articulate cultural, social, legal, and political criticisms. The turn
toward vernacular forms within African American studies at this historical
moment romanticizes folk culture, including hip-hop, and frames it as a
118 / parodies of ownership
proxy for racial authenticity precisely when intellectual property law en-
ables and protects corporate uses of such materials. Sutter and Street’s exit
from the John Henry festival at the novel’s conclusion suggests that once
folk culture possesses signi‹cant economic value, it is no longer folk cul-
ture. Thus, the critical effort to locate signifyin’ or any other folk protégé
at the center of African American culture, ironically, transforms the very
rituals they seek to protect.
Whitehead af‹rms the importance of signifyin’ to African American
culture and the need for legal discourse to recognize the latent creativity in
such methods even as he suggests that the search for authenticity, which
frequently underlies the critical support for signifyin’, will ultimately prove
futile. Exemplifying a post-structuralist sensibility, John Henry Days ulti-
mately questions whether any return to the romanticized past is possible or
whether folk culture can ultimately ground African American cultural
identity.70 The growing public interest in John Henry, which the novel ex-
plores, appears to re›ect nostalgia for a past that never existed. Instead of
the romantic version proposed by marketers, John Henry, as cultural in-
heritance, haunts individuals such as Sutter and Street. As a result, the
novel offers an ambiguous, perhaps slightly negative conclusion about in-
tellectual property law’s role in distributing ownership interests in African
American folk culture and history. While Whitehead is quite clear that
copyright plays a disproportionate role in shaping cultural relations, the
novel expresses considerable doubt about who bene‹ts from subsequent
uses of the John Henry story. The transition from folk culture to intellec-
tual property, whether in the guise of popular music or academic theory,
presents numerous challenges and dangers. It is unclear, within the novel’s
universe, whether continued ownership over the myth would improve the
lives of African Americans. John Henry Days thus presents as many ques-
tions as it answers about copyright and fair use.
Fair Use and Racist Images from 
(African American) Popular Culture
Not all ownership claims regarding folk culture involve romantic ‹gures or
myths, such as John Henry, nor do they all fall within the purview of copy-
right law. The circulation of putatively racist images and words has become
a central concern within post–Civil Rights era African American culture.
For example, a diverse group of African Americans, from Damon Wayans
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to Randall Kennedy, have attempted to reclaim ownership over the term
nigger or nigga, despite its tremendously negative meaning within Ameri-
can culture in general.71 The use of the word and its variants are common
within hip hop-lyrics. Depending on the context, the speaker, and the au-
dience, the N-word can denote either an insult of an African American or
a recognition of friendship and group af‹liation.72 Comedians such as
Chris Rock and Dave Chappelle use the word both critically and af‹rma-
tively in their routines. In his ‹lm Bamboozled, Spike Lee explores a mid-
dle-class African American’s attempt to use the N-word and other racial
stereotypes ironically. Lee, however, has criticized Quentin Tarantino, a
white ‹lmmaker whose work has frequently paid homage to blaxploitation
‹lms and their directors, for using the N-word. In his analysis of the Lee-
Tarantino controversy, Randall Kennedy argues that Lee, and others like
him, want to “cast a protectionist pall” over the word and so limit the abil-
ity for American culture to rehabilitate the word and thus repair one of the
most damaging legacies of racism.73 While I maintain my skepticism about
the ef‹cacy or logic behind his argument, Kennedy’s position is shared by
numerous African American cultural workers even as others within the
community criticize the use of the N-word in equally strident terms.
Within the context of intellectual property law, the debate over the N-
word and other in›ammatory words and imagery presents a question of
fair use: who can use the term and in what ways? Put otherwise, who has
the right to claim ownership over or register a trademark for the N-
word?74
Unlike the constitutional foundation for copyright and patent law,
trademark law developed through the common law, and Congress eventu-
ally codi‹ed it in 1946. Copyright and patent originate in a “bargain” be-
tween inventors and society in which the public gives creators a limited
monopoly in their inventions as an incentive to engage in creative work.75
Trademark, however, does not rely on a contract between the trademark
holder and society. Rather, trademarks protect consumers by minimizing
public confusion about the origin of a particular product.76 The Lanham
Act de‹nes a trademark as “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof—used by a person . . . to identify and distinguish his
or her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold
by others.”77 According to Sheldon Halpern, courts developed methods,
such as the Abercrombie factors, to determine the distinctiveness of a par-
ticular trademark or trade dress and decide whether a particular mark
seemed merely descriptive or generic, and thus undeserving of protection,
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or arbitrary and fanciful enough to be properly considered a trademark.78
For Halpern and other scholars, trademarks and trade dress operate as a
stamp of authenticity, informing consumers that the product or service is
the “real thing.”
Both post–World War II trademark jurisprudence and the Black Arts
Movement79 shared a concern with protecting consumers from inauthen-
tic or counterfeit goods—no matter whether they are ordinary commodi-
ties or ones that hold particular racial or class signi‹cance. The turn to-
ward vernacular criticism and the signifyin’ school of cultural criticism,
according to Phillip Richards, sought to identify the essential artistic dif-
ferences between white and black artists so that authentic black voices
could be nourished and developed. Skeptical of this project, Richards ar-
gues that establishing one’s credentials as a complete or genuine African
American artist or critic caused African Americans to minimize Anglo-
American in›uences and broke down necessary dialogues between the hu-
manities and the social sciences and between African Americans and other
ethnic/racial groups, including whites.80 Both the Black Arts Movement
and hip-hop culture rely extensively on the logic of trademarked identities
even if not all of the goods, symbols, and icons are registered with the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Of‹ce. R. A. T. Judy argues that “rap becomes an
authentic African American cultural form” precisely to the extent to which
it “adapts to the force of commodi‹cation.”81 For Judy, hip-hop and other
cultural-nationalist forms rely on the logic of authentic human experience
within a world of hypercapitalism.82 Hip-hop aesthetics, in effect, serves as
an “anti-trademark,” recuperating the very authenticity lost due to the
commodi‹cation of African American cultural styles. If the Black Arts
Movement tended to deploy such identity trademarks romantically by as-
sociating them with an uncompromised racial identity, hip-hop deploys
trademarks ironically or with ambivalence.
Perhaps the best example illustrating this faux ownership, or parody of
ownership, might be the life and career of Jean-Michel Basquiat. Basquiat
began his career as a graf‹ti artist, known for his trademark tag “SAMO,”
or “same old shit,” and then transformed himself into a high-culture
painter who deployed hip-hop methods to “dismantle [his] historical
precedents by showing mastery over their techniques and styles and [put]
them to new uses, in which the new becomes the ‹nal product layered over
the past.”83 The “typical” Basquiat canvas includes multiple misspellings;
copyright symbols;84 scratched-out phrases; crude or faux-primitive draw-
ings; ambiguous allusions; and liberal borrowings of trademarked ‹gures,
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especially superheroes and famous personas. The images intentionally in-
vite comparisons with primitivism, even though Basquiat’s work clearly
subverts and mocks Modernist appropriations of primitivism. Following
the long trajectory of African American Modernist experimentation,
Basquiat relies on the interplay between text and orality to deconstruct the
stereotype that African Americans rely solely on oral culture. Frequently,
Basquiat’s images depend on textual literacy in order to decode the puta-
tively primitive writing. For example, in his 1982 painting Natives Carrying
Some Guns, Bibles, Amorites on Safari, Basquiat twice connects the words
“TUSK$” and “$KIN$” with arrows. Within the context of the painting’s
stated theme of exploring colonization, this repetitive blending of letters
and symbols requires viewers to “read” the painting at least twice because
it is unclear whether the blend of symbols and letters refers to the rela-
tionship among tusks, skins, and money or tusks, kins, and money. Analo-
gous to hip-hop’s use of misspellings or neologisms for lyrics and names,
Basquiat’s paintings play with the slippage between oral and textual cul-
tures. Analyzing experimental and avant-garde African American literature
of the post–World War II era, Aldon Nielsen argues that an African Amer-
ican tradition, in which “orality and textuality were not opposed to one an-
other and did not exist in any simple or simplistic opposition to modernity
or postmodernity,” had been well-developed by the time Basquiat began
painting.85 Basquiat transformed this textual and oral wordplay by con-
sciously merging avant-garde African American styles with putatively
“working-class” or “street” styles, thereby forging a synthesis of both pop-
ular and high-culture aesthetics. This blended approach deconstructs es-
sentialized or essentializing approaches to identity, where a person’s au-
thenticity as an African American appears directly correlated with her
connection to street life.86 Oddly prescient, Basquiat predicts white Amer-
ica’s fascination with gangsta rap and thug life.87 Basquiat’s mapping of the
complex relationship between mimicry and authenticity, ostensibly regu-
lated by copyright and trademark law respectively, provides a ready re-
minder that authenticity remains the primary or dominant criterion for
evaluating and rating African American cultural production. Conse-
quently, trademark—the legal device that regulates authenticity—has
proven an inescapable but unspoken analytic within contemporary African
American cultural criticism.
Within this context, it appears that the debate over who can or cannot
use the N-word in comedy, ‹lm, music, clothing, and literature increas-
ingly presents a question of authenticity and cultural capital—the primary
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concern of trademark law. The discussion among Chris Rock, Spike Lee,
Quentin Tarantino, Randall Kennedy, and others fundamentally involves
determining the relationship between the word and its speaker. If the
speaker possesses the requisite “blackness,” he or she can recast an appar-
ently racist phrase into a more positive identity claim. Todd Anten argues
that self-disparaging trademarks, such Wayan’s attempt to trademark
“Nigga” for his clothing line, can promote social change and that the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Of‹ce ought to allow them if a member of the ref-
erenced community puts forth the trademark petition.88 This argument
mimics trademark’s underlying logic because the producer’s identity deter-
mines the authenticity or the quality/meaning of the good. Such trademark
claims would enable African Americans to commodify their racial identity
and permit further consumption of racialized goods and services.
Anten’s logic for supporting self-disparaging trademarked terms and
the probable cause for their contemporary popularity relies on the implicit
irony within the dialectical relationship between body and text/word. Re-
cent debates about the N-word echo Rosemary Coombe’s application of
Foucault’s conception of the author-function to trademarks:
Although trademarks are not conventionally understood to have
“authors” because they require no necessary genius, originality, or
creativity, the legal recognition that trademark “owners” have a pro-
prietary interest in marketing signs increasingly relies upon a reen-
actment of the author-function described by Foucault. This is evi-
dent in judicial acceptance of the belief that through investment,
labor, and strategic dissemination, the holder of a trademark creates
a set of unique meanings in the minds of consumers.89
Coombe does not speci‹cally or systematically apply this insight to poten-
tially contradictory uses of such self-disparaging trademarks within
African-American art and literature. Such self-disparaging terms and
trademarks provide authors and artists the means by which to assert them-
selves as raced authors even as they aim to deconstruct and/or interrogate
the very logic of race. Trademark, especially in the context of hip-hop aes-
thetics, allows cultural workers to transform their labor and creativity into
ownership rights over the very illusion of authenticity hip-hop offers.
Distinct from copyright law, trademark has developed its own approach
to fair use. Traditionally, trademark law permitted “fair use of a famous
mark by another person in comparative commercial advertising or promo-
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tion to identify the competing goods or services of the owner of the famous
mark.” Only in 2006 did Congress amend the Lanham Act to allow paro-
dies of trademarked logos.90 Stephanie Greene argues that promoting free
speech, within the framework of “preventing consumer confusion and pro-
tecting the goodwill of the trademark holder,” has guided the development
of trademark’s approach to fair use.91 Courts, however, have split upon the
best method for applying fair use to trademark disputes. Greene suggests
that the current statutory scheme provides fairly clear guidance for resolv-
ing disputes, especially in limiting the rights of descriptive marks (i.e.,
trademark names that provide a generic description of the item rather than
arbitrary or fanciful names, unrelated to the item’s function), while permit-
ting “an appropriate balance between consumer confusion and competi-
tion.”92 She contends that trademark law cannot prohibit or enjoin all po-
tential confusion, but only that customer confusion that would cause
uncertainty about a particular product’s origin. Her reading of trademark’s
approach to fair use contemplates that some comparative uses of a trade-
marked name might cause consumers to decide against purchasing the
other trademarked name. This, according to Greene, is analytically dis-
tinct from the problem when one commodity borrows the reputation of
another, thereby diluting the value of the original trademarked name
and/or free-riding on another’s good name. Unlike copyright law, which
has expanded the scope and duration of copyrights, Halpern and
Doellinger argue that recent court decisions have limited trademark rights,
especially to promote free speech.93
While copyright law has received considerable notice from hip-hop
aesthetes and their critics, much less attention has been focused on fair use
within trademark law. Certain cases, such as Damon Wayans’s trademark
application for the term “Nigga,” have received general public notice, but
it has been fairly disconnected from research in contemporary African
American art, literature, and music. By connecting Whitehead’s John
Henry Days and the artwork of Michael Ray Charles, this chapter seeks to
explore how African American cultural workers have represented and crit-
icized the ongoing circulation of raced imaginative properties. Unlike legal
discourse, with its historically clear boundaries, which Moffat argues ap-
pear to be eroding with the increased demand for overlapping forms of
protection for all forms of intellectual property, between trademark and
copyright, African American creativity and critical analyses of imaginative
properties have adopted their own discursive framework for analyzing and
regulating imaginative properties.94 John Henry Days presents the problem
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of how the transformation of folk culture into intellectual property creates
a disenabling cultural inheritance for post–Civil Rights era African Ameri-
cans, such as J. Sutter and Pamela Street. Whitehead apparently concludes
that the only way to free oneself from the history of racism is to alienate or
abandon stultifying cultural traditions or narratives. The artwork of
Michael Ray Charles has adopted a much more controversial style by re-
working established trademarks (even though he uses copyright symbols
liberally in his work, like and/or in homage to Jean-Michel Basquiat). Ig-
noring the subtle legal distinctions between copyright and trademark,
Charles promotes his own version of “fair use” of racist caricatures in or-
der to liberate himself from their power. No less than Whitehead, Charles
illustrates how intellectual property law, especially trademark law, has cre-
ated raced property interests that operate through racist stereotypes and
that have effected the transfer of ownership rights of the American cultural
imagination to white people and the corporations they own.95
Drawing on advertisements from the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, Charles has created scores of paintings that illuminate the racial
‹ctions that structure popular culture’s imagery. Central to his critical
project is the ongoing deconstruction of unconsciously (and sometimes
consciously) raced trademarks and trademarked styles. Everything from
the Pillsbury Dough Boy and Aunt Jemima to Wonder Woman and Clorox
Bleach has become subject to Charles’s critical eye. Charles even reworks
images that have become trademark signatures of other artists, such as
Grant Wood’s American Gothic and Norman Rockwell’s Saturday Evening
Post imagery. In working with and through popular-culture icons and
trademarks, Michael Ray Charles draws on strategies developed by earlier
African American artists, especially their use of Aunt Jemima. As Michael
Harris ably demonstrates by collecting dozens of artworks including
and/or commenting on Aunt Jemima, artists during the 1960s and 1970s
“manipulated them for effect, deconstructing the visual sign, questioning
Aunt Jemima’s role as a popular trademark, and giving voice and humanity
to all the black women aggrieved by the stereotypical representation of
Aunt Jemima and the mammy image.”96 Calvin Reid also notes the
in›uence of Robert Colescott and David Hammons and their use of ap-
propriation on Charles’s work.97
Charles’s approach to such trademark images, however, diverges from
that of earlier artists because his work condemns the stereotypes less
clearly. Unlike his Black Art predecessors, Charles presents a more am-
biguous attitude toward these trademarked images. He typically relies on
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hip-hop aesthetics to stylize his representations of African Americans and
develop a sociopolitical critique of African American cultural life. (Forever
Free) Aneminentevaluation (1995) displays the same sampling, layering,
rhythmic ›ow/asymmetry, and irony as other hip-hop-in›uenced texts.
The painting depicts three stereotypical minstrel-style men tearing
through a two-dimensional image of a Clorox bottle. Two of the ‹gures
smile broadly and sport patriotic neckties, while the third ‹gure gestures to
the viewer to be quiet. All three ‹gures wear minstrel gloves and possess
hair that sticks up in all directions. On the left side, the words “DISTRIB-
UTED BY LIBERTY PERM PRODUCTS” are printed. On the right side,
the painter’s signature doubles as a copyright sign: “MICHAEL RAY
©HARLES ’95.” Across the bottom, Charles has painted “ANEMINEN-
TEVALUATION.”
At the most basic level, the painting samples the trademarked image of
a Clorox bottle and classical minstrel ‹gures. Layered on top of these im-
ages, Charles offers an allusion to Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man. In the
novel, the invisible narrator forgets his name after an industrial accident at
Liberty Paints when a coworker sabotages one of the machines because the
narrator has tainted the company’s Optic White paint and appears sympa-
thetic to union organizers.98 This layered allusion deepens the signi‹cance
of the Clorox bottle when paired with the marginal note that the image it-
self is distributed by Liberty Perm Products, a ‹ctional company common
to many of Charles’s paintings. The minstrel ‹gures have apparently
in‹ltrated the most known and trusted bleaching/whitening agent in
American culture. Like Ellison’s ‹ctional Lucius Brockway, the minstrel
‹gures seem to have commandeered the purported “bleaching” action of
Clorox and shifted the product’s real effects. Offering an analogy to the
in›uence of African Americans on American popular culture, the minstrels
appear to have penetrated the heart of American culture despite the best
efforts to “bleach” it and many of its citizens white.
Beyond its use of layered samples, Aneminentevaluation revels in rhyth-
mic ›ow and rupture. Obviously, the words in the title ›ow together into a
single word, thereby rupturing the viewer’s initial expectation when
searching for the painting’s title. The viewer must locate the “breaks”
themselves because Charles has blended the words, much like a hip-hop
deejay weaves tracks and beats together to form a looped beat. On a deeper
level, the title suggests that someone or something will be evaluated, but it
is unclear whether the minstrel ‹gures or a bleached American culture will
be the subject of that evaluation. In addition, “eminent evaluation” evokes
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the legal procedure of eminent domain by which government takes private
property for a public purpose. The slippage between the painting’s title and
this feature of modern property law suggests that the minstrel ‹gures have
invaded the Clorox trademarked image in order to remedy the violence as-
sociated with the history of “bleaching” American culture. In addition to
the title’s ›ow/rupture, the image itself depicts a rupture within American
culture. The painting disrupts how viewers consume advertising images of
Clorox without considering historic inequalities in the job market or the
metaphorical signi‹cance of this very ordinary cleaning product. By juxta-
posing the trademarked Clorox bottle with the white gloves and dark faces
of the minstrel ‹gures, the painting forces the viewer to consider how such
trademarked images conceal the real work African Americans have done,
because such marketing campaigns have rarely exalted the labor of African
Americans, and how such menial labor has rarely translated into greater
cultural or economic capital.
By offering several critical commentaries on cultural bleaching and em-
inent domain/evaluation within his series Forever Free, Charles produces
an ironic vision of contemporary American culture. The putative freedom
the series explores ultimately seems both less liberating and more ominous
than the term initially suggests. It appears as if Charles concludes that free-
dom in the contemporary era involves resisting the stereotypes offered by
popular culture and refashioning this imaginary domain. Charles describes
his project in the following terms:
I’m choosing to speak about the African-American experience in a
different way. By talking about what we have been calling the nega-
tive. By trying to speak about the invisible image, the invisible real-
ity. I don’t think that we can speak about the black experience and
not conjure up all the stuff about stereotypes. I think a lot of art that
is being done in that vein is real safe. I think my work has the same
feel, but I’ve just decided to take more risks.99
For Charles, his work seeks to reclaim ownership over what American cul-
ture has bleached out or made invisible. By evoking the negative images of
the past, Charles necessarily engages in an ironic project because he aims
both to remind his audiences of what they have chosen to forget and to of-
fer these stereotyped ‹gures as potentially ambiguous and thus potentially
reconstructable.
Trademarks and their fair use constitute linchpins to understanding
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Charles’s imagery. As a legal symbol denoting authenticity, the trademark
allows its owner to control the public image of its products and build good-
will with customers. Dilution—harming a product’s good name—and free-
riding—when a competitor selects a name close enough to an existing
trademark to cause confusion—present potential threats to the holders of
trademarks because they create ambiguity about the item’s identity and
worth where none existed before. Trademark protects against these harms
because it assumes that any reputation was gained honestly and that com-
petitors must compete fairly, not merely foster confusion. Charles’s art-
work questions these basic assumptions and suggests that the apparent sta-
bility of trademarks constitutes more of a problem than their ambiguity.
Without a thorough examination of the invisible racial history they con-
ceal, trademarks can further both material and imaginative disadvantages
for African Americans. In particular, they can create a stereotypical world-
view where African Americans are reduced to hackneyed clichés such as
mammies or minstrel ‹gures. For Charles and other hip-hop aesthetes,
“fair use” ought to permit cultural workers the opportunity to create am-
biguity and transform the meaning of objects or texts central to the Amer-
ican cultural imagination. Hip-hop aesthetics asks what is “fair” about
copyright and trademark doctrines that permit the continued circulation of
racist or racialized caricatures in American culture or hide racial inequality.
Obviously, this is one instance where of‹cial legal discourse and African
American culture con›ict. Until now, legal discourse has persisted in rely-
ing on the metaphor of fair use, even though the doctrine appears to priv-
ilege one cultural perspective over another. In effect, Michael Ray
Charles’s deconstruction of trademarked images seeks to highlight the
con›ict between these competing norms.
Although generally critical of Charles’s work, Michael Harris argues
that Charles’s most effective “critiques may be those of NBA basketball
players, athletes he lampoons as coons acting out stereotypical behaviors
and showing little responsibility.”100 In (Forever Free) The NBA (1995),
Charles reworks the logo of the National Basketball Association (NBA).
Instead of the ostensibly white athlete on the original trademarked logo,101
Charles paints a blackface player, replete with white gloves and the wild
hair characteristic of Golliwog dolls. In the painting, Charles includes the
echo of minstrelsy by replacing the word Fantastic in the NBA’s slogan
(“The NBA is Fantastic”) with Tantastic, another minstrel reference. The
‹gure also displays a price tag with seven dollar signs, suggesting that the
millions of dollars most players earn merely con‹rm racial stereotypes. By
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inverting the popular trademark and logo of the NBA, Charles notes the
irony that many African American youths dream the sport will lift them out
of poverty despite the ways the sport commodi‹es a particular form of
blackness that stereotypes and pigeonholes other African Americans. For
Charles, this constitutes an “unfair use” of racial stereotypes. By turning
the basketball player in the NBA logo into a minstrel ‹gure, Charles sug-
gests that basketball, despite the success and fame of Michael Jordan and
others, has been transformed into a modern-day minstrel show. Basketball
has long been a “raced” sports spectacle in which racial identity stereotyp-
ically confers certain stylistic and physical advantages on a player’s game.
In its contemporary form, the NBA increasingly gravitates toward an
African American aesthetic, a development that both fascinates and
horri‹es various segments of its white audience.
Because Charles relies on imagery with historically racist associations,
his critics argue that his “recycling of stereotypes is insulting and degrad-
ing and should not be exhibited. They also feel that the artists [such as
Charles] are making their reputations off of their own people’s suffer-
ing.”102 Although his critics suggest that Charles cannot control his explo-
sive imagery, his work rebuts this assumption by revealing unspoken or in-
visible relations between his subject matter and African Americans from
many different walks of life. For example, in (Forever Free) Servin with a
Smile (1994), Charles paints the Pillsbury Doughboy in the style of a black
minstrel ‹gure. This “unfair use” of Pillsbury’s trademark offers a re-
minder that historically African Americans cooked for white folks and that
the famous icon’s smile makes invisible the inequalities experienced by
house slaves and domestic servants.103 I reference Charles’s appropriation
of this logo as an “unfair use” not because it causes consumer confusion or
dilutes the value of Pillsbury’s trademark, but because it suggests the power
of racialized icons. For Charles, such racialized imagined properties oper-
ate unfairly or discriminate, whether they intend to do so or not. The very
metaphor of “fair use” implies a racial subjectivity. The copyright or trade-
mark holder presumptively engages in fair use of their intellectual property
because no existing doctrine has proven consistently effective in prohibit-
ing or sanctioning racist or discriminatory uses. In many cases, logos or
trademarked images operate at a subconscious level to make racial hierar-
chy invisible.
In (Forever Free) The NBA, Charles draws an analogy between artists
and basketball players in which artists must produce art within the same
racist or racialized culture that converts basketball players into well-worn
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stereotypes. The painter, no less than the athlete, must grin and play the
minstrel ‹gure, according to Charles. In a relatively ubiquitous picture ac-
companying many of his shows, Michael Ray Charles has been pho-
tographed with a penny in his mouth, echoing the very blackface images to
which his work frequently refers.104 The catalog for his 1997 show at the
Baf›er Gallery at the Art Museum of the University of Houston has a
penny af‹xed to the back cover. Charles also frequently uses the markings
from copper pennies to produce his blackface or minstrel-inspired images.
In an interview, Charles explained his use of the penny:
All the other coins are silver and re›ect. And they are all facing one
direction. The only coin of color, with Lincoln on its face, suppos-
edly the Great Emancipator, is looking the other way. I made a
painting entitled Quota Piece and it was after hearing Jesse Jackson
speak. I was looking for something to balance the composition. The
penny came to me as a token, a token coin. I balanced the composi-
tion between a Sambo image and the penny. . . . So I began signing
my paintings with it as a trademark, as a cosignature. Every product
has a trademark. It was my acknowledgement of tokenism.105
Through his strategic use of pennies, Charles suggests that the very images
contemporary African American visual and basketball artists create must
satisfy American consumer culture’s demands for familiar imagery. The
penny, which is seen as virtually worthless, frequently appears next to a
copyright symbol in his work and offers an ironic commentary on its status
as Charles’s trademark.
Charles’s decision to fuse trademarked images from Norman Rock-
well’s Saturday Evening Post and Disney with minstrel-era racist imagery il-
lustrates an ongoing conundrum: how can African Americans and other
historically marginalized groups contest such racialized imagery when
those icons are privately owned? Obviously, Charles answers this question
by engaging in what I have termed unfair use to make vivid the racist un-
derpinnings or connotations of such trademarked icons or copyrighted im-
ages. This deconstruction of racist imagery, however, has not been em-
braced by everyone, especially other African Americans. They question his
choice of subject matter and argue that it appears to merely recapitulate
racist messages and provide only negative stereotypes for African Ameri-
can youth.106 Exploring the recent trend toward examining minstrel and
other racist imagery, Michele Wallace argues that work like Charles’s is at-
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tempting to recuperate authentic African American culture from a lost era,
whose racist advertising images constitute an abundant and integral part of
American cultural mythology.107 For Wallace, it is the relative absence of
cultural memory that has fostered interest in racist imagery because these
images offer a unique lens through which to view the genealogy of African
American culture. Echoing Wallace’s claim, Charles suggests that the
Sambo image “was a tool used by blacks to survive—to escape lashings,
etc.”108 Charles culminates this interview by suggesting how he and
Whitehead share a view about copyrighted and trademarked images: “I’m
most interested in the evolution of images, ideas, and people. Despite the
presence of these images and the stereotypes, blacks continue to strive.”109
In their tracing of the “evolution of images, ideas, and people,” White-
head and Charles share critical race theory’s shift from race and racism to
the racialization of American culture. In a fascinating 1996 law review arti-
cle, Alex Johnson Jr. argues that racial classi‹cations, especially within the
black-white binary, have functioned like trademarks.110 Johnson accepts
Richard Posner’s law-and-economics rationale for trademarks in which he
posits that trademarks guarantee customers uniform product quality and
thus minimize the consumer cost of evaluating or inspecting each individ-
ual product for ›aws.111 Johnson then lists a set of racist assumptions that
have historically been associated with black racial identity: intellectual infe-
riority, athletic prowess, sexual superiority or excessive sexual libido, lazi-
ness, and violence.112 He argues that African Americans, like a trademarked
product, are assumed to possess these characteristics unless or until a par-
ticular African American demonstrates that they possess different attri-
butes.113 This “showing” does not dispel such racial stereotypes; rather, it
simply releases one lucky person from their punishing grip. Johnson con-
cludes that race, due to its binary structure in American culture, maintains
racial hierarchy and continues to “preserve the economic status of the white
community.”114 The only way to dismantle racism, according to Johnson, is
to “destabilize” racial trademarks, “(1) by improving the quality of the mark,
or (2) through the process of shade confusion.”115 Historically, the Black
Arts and Black Power movements sought primarily to “improve the quality”
of black identity. Johnson supplements this strategy and argues that we must
also create market confusion by replacing our primarily binary racial
classi‹cation scheme with one that is multivalent and thus less ef‹cient for
creating and sustaining stereotypes.116 Johnson turns to ethnicity as a posi-
tive identi‹cation system that is passively ascribed but must be actively
maintained. Such classi‹cations, because they are based in history and cul-
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tural rites, require much greater research to ascribe than the passing glance
associated with race. While this destabilization of race as a trademarked
identity may make current af‹rmative-action and other antidiscrimination
programs dif‹cult to administer, Johnson argues that such strategies show
signs of having decreased utility.117 Preserving race as the identity category
for these programs would be a poor strategy. Rather, Johnson argues that
the trademark exclusivity of black and white racial identities, even if race is
still used as a basis for some community actions or cultural traditions, must
be abolished. In other words, the idea that race denotes uniform identity or
behavior must be destabilized. While Johnson admits that there may be
short-term confusion or backsliding, the ultimate gains from dismantling
racial trademarks as proxies for behaviors and identity characteristics would
clearly outweigh any intermediate growing pains.118
Johnson’s article, which appeared at the same moment that both Colson
Whitehead and Michael Ray Charles emerged on the literary and art
scenes, captures the challenge against which post–Civil Rights era activists
struggle in resisting new/persisting forms of racism and racialized think-
ing. It grapples with how race ‹nds a refuge within trademark rights. Fur-
ther developing Johnson’s argument, David Troutt has created a wonderful
hypothetical exploring the tension between trademark law and racism dur-
ing the post–Civil Rights era. For Troutt, any trademarked identity,
whether positively or negatively charged, necessarily limits human ›our-
ishing.119 As part of his analysis, Troutt observes that “it is no great surprise
that a discourse on commodi‹cation and signi‹cation in a consumption-
based society should be able to draw on the example of so many African
American men,” including Martin Luther King, Kareem Abdul-Jabbar,
Tiger Woods, and Bobby Seale, all of whom have been involved in trade-
mark and publicity-rights cases and controversies.120 He also notes that
much cultural studies scholarship has lavished an equal amount of atten-
tion on the commodi‹ed images of African Americans, such as Michael
Jackson, Michael Jordan, Tupac Shakur, and other hip-hop stars. Troutt’s
observations about the interrelationships among trademark law, com-
modi‹cation, and race reveal the ongoing economic value of black identity
within the marketplace. Despite or because of the love/hate relationship
white America appears to have with stereotyped assumptions about African
Americans, corporations want their products associated with African
Americans as long as it titillates white audiences. If, however, the product
becomes too “black,” it will likely fail or have a limited market. African
American endorsers can mark a product as cool, or they can just as easily
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mark a product as exclusively black and thus too dangerous or “low” class.
In this context, the increasing commodi‹cation of black identity requires
post–Civil Rights era intellectuals or hip-hop aesthetes to engage with and
criticize the logic of the trademark, even if it has furthered racial stereo-
types and limited the “human ›ourishing” of many African Americans.
Colson Whitehead’s recent novel Apex Hides the Hurt narrates the story
of a disabled nomenclature consultant who has been hired to select the
name for an African American town that was named for a white business
leader. The town adopted the name Winthrop after its only white busi-
nessman, who made a fortune selling barbed wire. A black entrepreneur,
however, wants to change the town’s name to “New Prospera” to improve
its image and has thus hired the naming consultant. This name, however,
does not impress the narrator, who sets out to ‹nd another one. The novel
recounts the nomenclature consultant’s exploration of the town, its history,
and its current inhabitants and records his ruminations about the function
and meaning of names in American culture. He learns of a deal between
one of the town’s African American founders and the white businessman
that led to its current name of Winthrop. The African American commu-
nity had earlier chosen the name Freedom over the other proposed name,
Struggle. The narrator, ironically an unnamed African American man, thus
inviting comparisons to Ellison’s Invisible Man, ultimately concludes that
the town ought to return to the name it originally spurned. The novel cul-
minates with the nomenclature consultant wryly observing the absurd
phrases that will become common to the town’s inhabitants: “I was born in
Struggle. I live in Struggle and come from Struggle. We crossed the bor-
der into Struggle. Before I came to Struggle. We found ourselves in Strug-
gle. I will never leave Struggle. I will die in Struggle.”121 Like many con-
temporary African American novels and artworks, Whitehead’s novel
includes abundant references to African American people and their cul-
tural history without offering explicit racial claims or arguments. The
novel’s end, like that of John Henry Days, offers an ambiguous conclusion
about the current state of African American life. It refuses to depict African
Americans in stereotypically positive ways, and Whitehead’s characters,
unlike those created by previous generations of writers, are not clearly
“race” men or women. Moreover, their connection to African American
history and culture seems less certain and more optional than ever before.
The narrator’s decision to impose, in effect, the name of struggle on the
town suggests that the specter of race remains, even if the town wishes to
adopt the more color-blind “New Prospera.”
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Paired with Michael Ray Charles’s paintings, Whitehead’s work testi‹es
to the ongoing struggle contemporary African American artists and writers
face in creating images and narratives as race has become a key element of
trademarked identities. However, unlike earlier generations, they present
and explore a wider range of artistic and life options for African Americans.
Their work exempli‹es the changing nature of property, from tangible to
intangible goods, and how this new terrain offers a fundamental challenge
to the ethos and activism that have historically underwritten African Amer-
ican cultural production. John Henry Days, Apex Hides the Hurt, and the
Forever Free series focus almost exclusively on how African Americans
struggle with and against racist and/or racialized narratives within the
American cultural imagination, as opposed to the intentional and overt
racism of previous generations.122 Claiming ownership over oneself and
one’s representation in this imaginary domain requires engaging with the
legal rules that govern its distribution and control. For Whitehead and
Charles, the imaginary domain and, by implication, intellectual property
law provide an entry into the tortured psyches of both whites and African
Americans, who continue to be marked by racism and racialization even if
how it shapes social life has changed. Their work, like much contemporary
African American cultural production, examines and signi‹es upon the
fair/unfair use of extant symbols, icons, and narratives. Hip-hop aesthetics
provides an artistic and narrative framework to explore how race continues
to in›uence American life even after the Civil Rights Movement. The shift
from ‹ghting segregation to interrogating the continued circulation of
raced images has challenged social justice activists. Unlike those involved
in earlier movements that focused primarily on material inequalities, to-
day’s intellectuals must ‹nd a way to blend those traditional concerns with
the increasing appropriation of African American cultural sensibilities.
Ironically, borrowing African American style and/or authenticity is consid-
erably more marketable and valuable than developing long-standing cor-
porate relationships with African American people or communities and
their leaders. This dynamic has led to a perceived (and probably real) crisis
in leadership within the African American community.123
The work of both Charles and Whitehead re›ects these tensions and
emphasizes how copyrighted texts and trademark icons produce social
fragmentation because they have become the primary path for individuals
to enter into an imagined community (as opposed to the church or Civil
Rights organizations for African Americans from the 1950s and 1960s) and
are simultaneously the source for racism and racialization. This ambiguity
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in signi‹cation cannot be easily understood through legal discourse, even
if its structures and concepts de‹ne intellectual property law, because law
tends to view texts as thin and univocal, rather than as layered, rhythmic
objects located in a speci‹c narrative trajectory. Artist and writers—no
matter their racial, ethnic, or gender identity—have examined the effect of
advertising and marketing on American culture. For white artists, trade-
marked and copyrighted images tend to show the ubiquity and banality of
American popular culture. Andy Warhol, for example, appropriated every-
thing from his well-known Campbell soup cans to Mickey Mouse to Aunt
Jemima. His work deployed trademarks’ very repetition, fundamental to
their value, as a metaphor for their corrosive in›uence on our interior lives.
Warhol, however, traced the problem to their status as commodi‹ed im-
ages. Feminist artists such as Sherrie Levine and Cindy Sherman have used
repetition to comment upon the circulation of received images, demon-
strating how their ubiquity reenacts certain gender and classed narratives
and distinctions. Like other hip-hop aesthetes, Whitehead and Charles un-
derstand such trademarked images and copyrighted texts as both constitu-
tive of social being, and thus central to one’s self-understanding, and per-
petuating the circulation of racist myths and mythologies. Their work
revels in the fair use of imagery from folk or popular culture even as it in-
terprets that use as frequently anything but “fair.”
The best example of the dual function of such imagery is Michael Ray
Charles’s attempt to recuperate Aunt Jemima, although it could just as eas-
ily be applied to Whitehead’s revision of John Henry. Black
Arts–in›uenced painters, including Jeff Donaldson, Joe Overstreet, and
Betye Saar, deployed Aunt Jemima’s image to promote cultural nationalism
during the 1960s and 1970s.124 These earlier paintings sought to correct
the injustice done by over one hundred years of stereotyped advertising125
and depict Aunt Jemima in angry, de‹ant, and/or rebellious poses. By con-
trast, Charles employs Aunt Jemima in a more ambiguous fashion to ex-
plore and illustrate the contradictory effects of her continuing circulation,
albeit in a recently updated form.126 Marilyn Kern-Foxworth has identi‹ed
a number of modi‹ed or improved Aunt Jemimas in Charles’s work, in-
cluding Aunt Jemima as Wonder Woman, Rosie the Riveter, a presidential
candidate, a pin-up, the Statue of Liberty, a farmer’s wife in a remake of
Grant Wood’s American Gothic, and Marilyn Monroe.127
In two related images, Charles’s For Women paintings from the Forever
Free series depict Aunt Jemima as a mammy and as a recently updated mid-
dle-class woman. The words For Women also appear to reference Nina Si-
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mone’s famous song “Four Women,” in which she gives voice to the strug-
gles of four ordinary African American women who encounter extraordi-
nary dif‹culties due to racial, gender, and class inequalities. By connecting
his images to Simone’s song, Charles suggests that this image not only is
dedicated to women but acts as a representation of their ongoing struggles
as well. In President (1993), Aunt Jemima is represented in typical blackface
manner. Her face is so dark that her bulging eyes and white teeth, outlined
with dark red lips, provide the only contrast to her skin. In addition, her
head is adorned with a bright red handkerchief with white spots. Echoing
Norman Rockwell’s Saturday Evening Post drawings, Charles places this
Aunt Jemima on the yellowed and faded front cover of “The Forever Free
Post.” PRESIDENT is painted across the bottom, with the slogan “It’s time
for a clean sweep” printed underneath. In contrast to this faux-historical
image, Charles also signi‹es on Aunt Jemima’s most recent trademarked
image in Vote Black (1993). In this companion painting, Aunt Jemima is
portrayed as a successful middle-class woman with more fully developed
features, replete with earrings and a professional hairstyle. The painting’s
setting has shifted from the front page of a newspaper to an election poster,
encouraging the viewer to “ELECT” Aunt Jemima “FOR PRESIDENT”
and to “VOTE BLACK.” The poster redeploys the red-and-white hand-
kerchief pattern as the top half of its background, with the bottom portion
colored blue with white stars, thereby completing a ›ag motif. Even
though much has changed between the respective creations of the two
Aunt Jemima trademark logos, the tagline remains the same: “IT’S TIME
FOR A CLEAN SWEEP.”
In both versions, Charles is engaging in a fair/unfair use of Aunt
Jemima’s trademark image. Relying on and criticizing its historical and
current iterations, these paintings interrogate the meaning and the effects
of the trademarked image. On the one hand, Charles notes the ironic un-
dertones of the original icon by reprinting it on the “Forever Free Post,”
thereby suggesting that any purported freedom for African Americans has
existed within a racialized and racist American culture. On the other hand,
Charles’s second painting acknowledges that public perceptions and
stereotypes have improved. However, the improvements still operate as
stereotypes, just more positive ones. The older stereotypes lurk in the
background, represented by the handkerchief transformed into a back-
ground print. The need for a “clean sweep” remains, even after the Civil
Rights Movement. His copying of these trademarked symbols serves as a
political and cultural commentary on the racialized ideas Aunt Jemima has
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fostered. They do not cause consumer confusion about the origin of his
paintings. Thus, they would likely satisfy either copyright or trademark’s
de‹nition of fair use. Charles implies that we must purify American cul-
ture, starting with the image of Aunt Jemima herself. But she remains, in a
sanitized form. The idea that somehow Aunt Jemima, either the mammy
or the middle-class version, could become president, while desirable, still
seems a bit like a science ‹ction, even after the recent election of Barack
Obama. From this angle of vision, Charles’s Aunt Jemima represents what
I call an unfair use because she reminds us that the very ownership inter-
ests that copyright and trademark confer continue to effectively disenfran-
chise African Americans by reducing them to minstrel ‹gures, even in a
new and improved form. Although consumers elect to purchase Aunt
Jemima thousands of times a day, this consumer choice has not translated
into all those consumers deciding to “vote black,” as the painting suggests.
The slippage between the two kinds of choices, consumption and repre-
sentation, questions the recent corporate interest in channeling consumers
to commodifying their dissent by purchasing particular products and/or
services. Rather, the For Women series implicates the very structures of
commodi‹cation in furthering racial stereotypes, even if they put a kinder
and gentler face on them.
Through their deconstruction of popular icons, such as John Henry
and Aunt Jemima, Whitehead and Charles use hip-hop aesthetics to
demonstrate that even putatively fair use of intellectual properties, by
rights holders and critics alike, can result in unfair or unjust effects on his-
torically marginalized people. In its current, color-blind form, trademark
and copyright law provides little recourse to challenging such representa-
tions without recirculating the offending images and texts. Fair use, as le-
gal doctrine and cultural metaphor, ultimately offers an ironic reading of
the relationship between African Americans and intellectual property law.
Derrick Bell’s ‹ctional tale of “racial royalities” ultimately concludes that
the American cultural imagination has appropriated African American
styles and enriched many white Americans. Despite the fantastic mecha-
nism described in his short story, legal doctrines and cultural interventions
have proven only partially successful in remedying these historical wrongs.
Critical race theorists and hip-hop aesthetes have sought to imagine alter-
native ways of conceiving of and distributing imaginative resources, but the
ongoing circulation of raced images and texts has proven resistant to trans-
formation. Although cases such as Campbell and SunTrust suggest that
African American artists can deploy existing texts in either parodic or
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transformative ways, both rulings eschew race or racial subjectivity as an
explicit component of legal doctrine. Rather, the rules they apply/an-
nounce continue the ‹ction of an unraced intellectual property law. Cases
involving hip-hop music also avoid cultural explanations and have become
increasingly confused and confusing regarding the state of sampling, fair
use, and the de miminis defense. Despite the widespread popularity of
sampling and appropriative borrowings within African American culture,
intellectual property law still clings to a color-blind jurisprudence even as
race and ethnicity frequently structure the unspoken subtext for these
seemingly contradictory decisions.




Many scholars and activists have concluded that Civil Rights era reforms
only affected a partial transformation of the American political, economi-
cal, and social structure. Recent multiculturalist and CRT activism seeks to
emphasize culture as a key component in the continued ‹ght for social jus-
tice. Drucilla Cornell, a postmodernist and a feminist, de‹nes transforma-
tion as “change radical enough to so dramatically restructure any system—
political, legal, or social—that the ‘identity’ of the system is itself altered.”
She explains further that transformation requires engaging the “question
of what kind of individuals we would have to become in order to open our-
selves to new worlds.”1 Homi Bhabha, a proponent of postcolonial theory,
argues that transformation occurs through “the process of reinscription
and negotiation” and “happens in the temporal break in-between the sign,
deprived of subjectivity, in the realm of the intersubjective.”2 Moments of
agency or articulation, for Bhabha, arise in the space between discourses
when words, texts, icons, and logos gain a new meaning as they shed their
old “skin” but before a new one limits their potential or softens their radi-
cal edge.
These feminist and postcolonial approaches build on and inform CRT
and hip-hop approaches to transformation. In Teaching Community: A Ped-
agogy of Hope, bell hooks provides an extended meditation about social and
cultural transformation. She insists that the concept of white supremacy,
rather than racism, ought to be the focus of inquiry because it more fully
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describes the systematic and unconscious operation of race. Further, she
observes that activists “once naively believed that if we could change the
way people thought we would change their behavior.” However, she also
notes that “in a culture of domination almost everyone engages in behav-
iors that contradict their beliefs and values.”3 She concludes that this in-
consistency between words and deeds suggests that American culture relies
on a series of lies that blur fantasy and reality. In another book, hooks ar-
gues that “to break with the ruling hegemony that has a hold on images of
the black male body [and African American culture], a revolutionary visual
aesthetic must emerge that reappropriates, revises, and reinvents, giving
everyone something new to look at.”4 Hooks reveals the dif‹culty of trans-
forming social and cultural relations when legal discourse of‹cially pro-
hibits intentional racism but permits de facto racism. Existing racist im-
agery and stereotypes must be reworked; they cannot simply be ignored.
Patricia Williams echoes hooks when she argues that antiracist activism
now needs to focus on “creating a livable space between the poles of other
people’s imagination and the nice calm center of oneself where dignity re-
sides.”5 For Williams, hooks, Cornell, and Bhabha, transformation is si-
multaneously the personal project of ‹nding a safe space and the bigger
project of helping historically marginalized people represent themselves in
popular and political culture.
Lani Guinier, best known for her failed nomination as President Bill
Clinton’s assistant attorney general for civil rights, offered a series of pro-
posals to reinvigorate democratic principles during the early 1990s. Her
scholarship argues that our current emphasis on geographical districts and
the idea of “one person, one vote” assumes “relative homogeneity within
[a] district” and con›icts with the complex shifting of coalitions that
in›uences most elections.6 The voting system the United States currently
follows—the winner-take-all approach—endures, Guinier argues, “be-
cause it promotes a two-party system that, accompanied by the high costs
of campaigning, gives incumbents enormous power to retain their seats.”
This approach, she argues, is “ill-suited to the multiracial and polyethnic
society of today because [it is] unable to ‹ll the need for diverse debate and
broad representation.”7 The rhetoric of “color-blindness,” within election
law among other discourses, has been a major impediment to transforming
social, legal, political, and cultural relations. Supporters of color-blindness
argue that a color-conscious jurisprudence would violate constitutional
commitments to neutrality and fairness because such approaches rely on
racial or ethnic calculations. Guinier counters that color-blindness is not a
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virtue “but a visual defect” and “not a solution to centuries of discrimina-
tion based on race.”8 To ignore the historical and current meaning of race
in American culture is to blind oneself to the very real ways that majority
interests and perspectives continue to structure the political landscape for
their bene‹t.9 Guinier’s efforts to empower African Americans to gain po-
litical representation offer a compelling analog to the role of hip-hop aes-
thetics during the post–Civil Rights era.
Hip-hop aesthetics has allowed contemporary artists, musicians, and
writers to articulate a demand for social, political, economic, and cultural
transformation. The concept of representation links the multifaceted con-
cerns articulated by the hip-hop generation because neither their voices
nor their likenesses are readily seen or heard even in a media-dominated
society. Rather, worn racial stereotypes continue to circulate, in part be-
cause intellectual property law doctrines permit the ownership of racial-
ized images or texts. The emphasis on consumption within hip-hop has
only intensi‹ed the racialization of texts, images, objects, and logos and
furthered their role as identity markers and avenues for self-representa-
tion. Social, political, economic, and cultural transformation necessarily
involves engaging with and claiming ownership over extant texts within the
American cultural imagination—even if they are (always) already owned
either of‹cially, through intellectual property law, or unof‹cially, as mem-
bers of the Western canon.10 Given the skepticism of postmodern move-
ments, including CRT and postcolonial theory, about grand narratives and
universal ideals, the concept of transformation, however, presents a prob-
lem, what Derrida might term an aporia. While CRT and postcolonial the-
orists attempt to use theory and scholarship to improve the lives of mar-
ginalized people, they also realize that any solutions they offer will
necessarily be culturally bound and thus partial and incomplete. Conse-
quently, their approach to cultural transformation is deeply imbued with
irony, questioning whether real change is possible.
Intellectual property law, as a mediator between the public good and
private property, has historically negotiated precisely these kinds of ques-
tions, increasingly so with the burgeoning of digital culture. The doctrine
of transformative use permits copying when, echoing Bhabha, it dislocates
the original from its conceptual and theoretical moorings, thereby opening
up a new perspective or critical commentary. Unlike fair use, transforma-
tive use allows the creator who appropriates a text, image, icon, sound, or
symbol to receive a cognizable legal interest over his or her creation. A
transformative work does create new property. However, this new property
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must also either license the right to copy any borrowed material or demon-
strate that the copying constitutes a fair use.11 In an in›uential law-review
article from 1990, Judge Pierre Leval argues for a ‹nding of transformative
use when “the secondary use adds value to the original—if the quoted mat-
ter is used as raw material, transformed in the creation of new information,
new aesthetics, new insights and understandings—this is the very type of
activity that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of
society.”12 The boundary or borderline between derivative copying, which
simply borrows elements from an earlier text, and transformative copying,
which “adds value” to the original, appears to vary based on the court en-
gaged in the review. Recent commentators have begun to articulate the
concern that transformation has crept into fair-use analysis, changing the
reserved public right to make copies in certain situations to an implied re-
quirement demonstrating creative or critical purpose in the copying.13
Some scholars have noted that courts are considerably more receptive to
transformative borrowings in certain art forms (i.e., literature and paint-
ing) than in others (i.e., hip-hop music).14 By analyzing and comparing the
aesthetic structures of Alice Randall’s The Wind Done Gone and Fred Wil-
son’s Mining the Museum, this chapter contrasts the legal de‹nition of
transformative use with the one offered by hip-hop aesthetics. This focus
on transformation helps clarify the shared critique of representation of-
fered by hip-hop aesthetics and CRT.
The status of “transformative use” is murky within copyright and trade-
mark law, even if courts are increasingly requiring it in fair-use defenses.
Not speci‹cally de‹ned in either statutory framework, transformative use
alternatively has been categorized as a special kind of fair use, because it
permits copying if it signi‹cantly alters or comments upon the original15 or
as a noninfringing activity that is therefore outside the scope of fair use.16
The Wind Done Gone, as a parody and with its distinctive perspective, nar-
rative, and style, was deemed a transformative use of Margaret Mitchell’s
Gone With the Wind.17 Quoting from the Campbell v. Acuff-Rose decision,
the Court of Appeals concluded that “the fact that a parody may impair the
market for derivative uses by the very effectiveness of its critical commen-
tary is no more relevant under copyright than the like threat to the origi-
nal market.”18 In his concurring opinion, Judge Stanley Marcus empha-
sized both free-market and free-speech concerns, arguing that the “two
books will act as complements rather than substitutes” and that Randall’s
version of parody is “a vital commodity in the marketplace of ideas.”19
Many legal and cultural critics viewed the litigation as an opportunity
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to highlight how current intellectual property law regulates and sti›es
freedom.20 Jeb Rubenfeld, Alice Randall’s legal counsel, characterized the
case as one involving the “freedom of imagination” and argued that “no
one [ought to] be penalized for imagining or for communicating what he
imagines.”21 By recasting the First Amendment around the freedom of
imagination, Rubenfeld attempted to develop constitutional protections
for “readers, viewers, and listeners as well” as speakers, artists, and writers
to invigorate democracy, free speech, and creativity.22 His approach was
endorsed neither by the SunTrust court nor by other courts. Rather, they
viewed the case through the lens of transformative use. My reading of
copyright law suggests that it would not prohibit anyone from imagining
or even producing a derivative musical, visual, or literary work, contrary to
what Rubenfeld suggests. It is not communication or speaking that gives
rise to a claim of infringement, but selling those expressions in the market-
place and creating a market substitute. Consequently, if hip-hop artists and
aesthetes did not seek to “get paid” and merely enjoyed their music and art
on their own, there would be an open question as to whether their fair use
or transformative copying would violate intellectual property law.23
Transformative use, unlike some of the issues explored here, can be use-
fully approached by law and economics scholarship, a form of legal analy-
sis that competed with CRT during the 1990s and promoted legal change
based on economic theory.24 Richard Posner, a founding member of the
law and economics movement, argues that intellectual property law, be-
cause it provides monopolies, can sti›e the ›ow of those imaginative re-
sources by enabling unproductive owners to engage in rent-seeking behav-
ior that charges exorbitant licensing fees.25 Posner’s concern about rent
seeking, however, does not indicate that he argues intellectual property law
needs a wholesale revision. Rather, he and William Landes ‹nd basic con-
cepts in law and economics, such as the difference between complementary
and substitutional copying,26 to offer ef‹cient solutions to the challenges
brought about by the increased propertization of cultural life. For Landes
and Posner, the transformative, complementary, or “productive use is one
that lowers the cost of expression and thus tends to increase the number of
original works, while reproductive use simply increases the number of
copies of a given work, reduces the gross pro‹ts of the author, and reduces
the incentives to create works.”27 They argue that intellectual property law
ought to maximize the incentives for authors to produce new works with-
out creating arti‹cial barriers for newer artists; hence they criticized the
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 that lengthened the
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term of existing copyrights.28 Referencing The Wind Done Gone and other
works, Landes and Posner argue that because parody, by de‹nition, occa-
sionally attacks the original and its author, there are some instances in
which the market is unlikely to arrive at an ef‹cient agreement because the
bene‹ts of the transformative use accrue to society, not to the parodied
artist. Fair and transformative uses, as result, promote creativity and timely
criticism better than a strong property regime does.29 Throughout their
book, they make it clear that copying itself is not the problem. Rather, un-
productive copying, which merely reproduces another text, disrupts the
ef‹cient operation of intellectual property law. This substitutive copying
creates the problems of “free riders” who steal away the goodwill and orig-
inality of another. Ironically, their defense of copyright’s fair-use doctrine
borrows the idea of “consumer confusion” from trademark law. Rather
than arguing that infringement primarily disrupts copyright’s incentive
structure, they blur boundaries between incentives for creativity and pro-
tecting the creator’s goodwill.
Both Posner and Rubenfeld conceive of originality, fair use, and trans-
formative use as transcultural and color-blind strategies to regulate the cir-
culation of texts, including raced texts. Neither connects texts to speci‹c
genres, to cultural traditions, or to how popular culture’s taste for Roy Or-
bison and Gone With the Wind derive, in part, from interaction with Amer-
ica’s racial history. Although both agree that Randall’s book constitutes a
transformative use, they rely on the color-blind literary category of parody
to de‹ne and limit its critical edge. To represent Randall’s engagement
with Mitchell’s Gone With the Wind as parody alone severs the link between
her work and African American culture, hip-hop aesthetics, and CRT. This
characterization undermines Randall’s critical impulse—displaying the
racist narrative underlying Mitchell’s novel—because it prematurely re-
solves the con›ict between Mitchell’s property rights in that narrative and
efforts like Randall’s to demonstrate the unconscious racial subjectivity
that marks a putatively color-blind discourse.30
Re/Writing History: The Wind Done Gone
Gone With the Wind, Margaret Mitchell’s dramatic rendering of the South
before the Civil War, has frequently been criticized by African American
writers and cultural critics.31 Mitchell’s novel explores the antebellum
South through the eyes of Scarlett O’Hara, the young daughter of a rich,
144 / parodies of ownership
white plantation owner. Determined to ‹nd love and wealth as the Civil
War approaches, Scarlett interacts with many African American charac-
ters, who appear lazy, stupid, and childlike. Scarlett alone stands as a frus-
trated romantic hero who must overcome numerous obstacles, including
the general ineptitude of her African American slaves and servants, as the
South disintegrates following the war. Upon its release, the book and sub-
sequent movie produced a wide range of responses—from adulation to dis-
gust.32 Although sixty years have elapsed between the release of the book
and the movie and the present day, Gone With the Wind, in both movie and
book form, still remains popular and constructs popular memory about an-
tebellum Southern life, even as it depicts African Americans in stereotypi-
cal ways.33
Alice Randall’s The Wind Done Gone takes the original and turns it on its
head, perhaps following the paradigm offered by Margaret Walker’s Jubilee
(1966).34 Randall appropriates the original’s elements and reshapes them
through her version of hip-hop aesthetics.35 Randall’s revision focuses on
the viewpoints of the slaves on the plantation Tara. Unlike Gone With the
Wind, which does not include any characters that suggest sexual liaisons
between whites and blacks in the antebellum South, Randall creates a new
narrative center for her retelling by developing a character—Cynara, the
illegitimate daughter of Planter (Gerald O’Hara)—who was not present in
Mitchell’s version. Cynara’s life is a direct contrast to Scarlett’s and demon-
strates the differences between black experiences and memories of that pe-
riod and those described by Mitchell. Randall changes the character and
place names. Scarlett is now named Other. Ashley Wilkes, the white gen-
tleman after whom Scarlett pines, is named Dreamy Gentleman, and he is
gay. Melanie Wilkes, Ashley’s wife, is called Mealy Mouth in Randall’s par-
ody. Other changes include transforming the main plantation’s name from
Tara to Tata, Rhett Butler to R., and the plantation’s nickname from
Twelve Oaks to Twelve Slaves Strong as Trees.
The ‹rst half of The Wind Done Gone retells the basic plot of Gone With
the Wind from an African American perspective, particularly that of a
mixed-race child of a slave and her owner. Her owner/father sells Cynara
to a friend, but at a discounted price and with the caveat that she should be
spared hard labor.36 Planter undertakes what he perceives as a benevolent
act, but this separates Cynara from her mother and the African American
community on the plantation. This also initiates a competition between
Cynara and Planter’s daughter, Other, over Mammy’s affection and culmi-
nates in a battle for R.’s affection.37 The Wind Done Gone narrates Other’s
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sexuality as Mammy’s calculated attempt to torment and torture white
men, rather than as the product of Scarlett’s inner strength, as portrayed by
Mitchell.38 Randall also reverses Mitchell’s account of Gerald O’Hara’s
luck and hard work. For example, she describes how Garlic, Planter’s
trusted servant, arranged for Planter to win him and Tata at cards.39 She
also provides an alternative account of the plantation’s construction and
meaning. Randall relates that the African American slaves shaped the
building’s architecture, encoding themselves as the twelve pillars that
cleared the land and constructed it. In their minds, the twelve slaves repre-
sented the twelve disciples.40
The second half of Randall’s book follows the life of Cynara as she ex-
plores the upper echelons of African American society during Reconstruc-
tion, including a ‹ctional party at Frederick Douglass’s house in Washing-
ton, D.C. This second section departs signi‹cantly from the original. It
narrates Cynara’s thinking as she decides whether to marry an African
American congressman, which would symbolize her identity as a race
woman, or R., signifying her triumph over Other in their competition for
affection. This choice causes Cynara to contemplate the meaning of her
newly found freedom. She remarks: “It has nothing to do with politics or
elections. It has to do with having many things you want and being free to
choose between them or free not to choose and remaining safely the
same.”41 In this passage, Randall blurs Reconstruction and post–Civil
Rights era concerns. Echoing the law and economics movement and hip-
hop culture, Randall argues that freedom follows from choosing between
desires, not simply participating in elections or democracy. Within this
framework, slavery and segregation limit the life choices for African Amer-
icans and thus sti›e their freedom. The post–Civil Rights era, by contrast,
emphasizes material and sexual satisfaction, for better or worse, as the ulti-
mate feeling of freedom. Despite her own re›ections on freedom, Cynara
‹nds herself forced to select R. as her husband because he is what she
names “my Debt.”42 R. constitutes her debt because she cannot escape her
past, especially the emotional and psychological effects of being dispos-
sessed by her father and mother. Later, Cynara tries to leave R. and resume
her affair with the engaged congressman, Adam Conyers. She leaves R. and
all his things but takes Other’s prized family possessions because she feels
that she should have inherited them, as Planter was her father too.43 An
African American doctor, who is examining her about a mysterious skin
blotch, tells her that her role as a “Confederate’s concubine” would taint
Conyers within the African American community.44 Cynara ultimately
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sells “Lady’s earbobs [her retrieved inheritance] and [buys] a little house”
with the proceeds.45 The novel’s closing intimates that Conyers’s wife can-
not bear children, but that Cynara, his lover, gives her child to them so that
the boy can be liberated from her past and its racial-sexual trauma.
In addition to their respective endings, the two books differ in that
Mitchell’s possesses an omniscient narrator, who focuses primarily on de-
veloping Scarlett’s subjectivity. Randall’s book, by contrast, is a ‹ctional di-
ary that exclusively relates Cynara’s point of view. This shift of perspectives
is critical for understanding the transformative aspects of Randall’s revision
of Mitchell. In a key moment of the diary, Cynara writes: “It is not in the
pigment of my skin that my Negressness lies. It is not the color of my skin.
It is the color of my mind, and my mind is dark, dusky, like a beautiful
night.”46 Anticipating the litigation surrounding her book, Randall empha-
sizes how subjectivity, both the writer’s and the reader’s, determines a text’s
meaning. Based on this reasoning, logic suggests that any revisionist ac-
count would most likely be a wholly new creation, as the later one reworks
the earlier based on a particular viewpoint or perspective. However, as The
Wind Done Gone also explores, establishing ownership over one’s self and
one’s perceptions requires social recognition. About her relationship with
R., Cynara observes: “Without mutuality, without empathy to join and
precede sympathy, I am but a doll come to life. A pretty nigger doll dressed
up in ‹nery, hair pressed for play.”47 Although she desperately wants to es-
tablish a formally recognized relationship with R., she cannot do so with-
out R. and society abandoning stereotypes and preconceptions around
such interracial relationships.
As might be expected, Randall’s The Wind Done Gone caused consider-
able controversy and resulted in a copyright infringement lawsuit, which
threatened to enjoin publication of the novel. Many African American
scholars, including Henry Louis Gates and Toni Morrison, supported
Randall’s right to publish the novel. They relied on two claims about how
it transformed, or attempted to transform, the American cultural imagina-
tion. First, Gates asserted the role of parody in African American cultural
production:
Scholars have long established that parody is at the heart of African
American expression, because it is a creative mechanism for the ex-
ercise of political speech, sentiment, and commentary on the part of
people who feel themselves oppressed or maligned and wish to
protest that condition of oppression or misrepresentation . . . and
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The Wind Done Gone is only the most recent instance of a long and
humorous tradition.48
Gates claims that Randall’s reliance on and use of African American aes-
thetic forms, what I have termed hip-hop aesthetics in its contemporary it-
eration, enable her to protest social inequalities and racial stereotypes.
Bridging politics, art, and literature, Gates suggests that artistic creations
help foster fuller and more systematic forms of democratic representation.
Randall’s novel merges the political and the literary to dissent from current
representational regimes, in which historical conditions and cultural hier-
archy limit the democratic potential of either discourse alone. By locating
Randall within a speci‹c cultural tradition, rather than the universal cate-
gory of literature or even parody, Gates implicitly suggests that legal dis-
course must engage in a color-conscious jurisprudence in order to under-
stand the copyright and trademark claims brought forth by the litigation.
The Wind Done Gone litigation also provided an avenue for African
American and copyright activists alike to expose how legal discourse ig-
nores cultural context when applying intellectual property law doctrines.
Toni Morrison articulated the second argument about how an African
American novel could challenge its use of an extant text, written by a white
author. She argued that the novel “imagine[s] and occup[ies] narrative
spaces and silences never once touched upon nor conceived of in Mrs.
Mitchell’s novel: that is the interior lives of slaves and ex slaves, their alter-
native views; their different journey.”49 Echoing Bhabha’s postcolonial ar-
ticulation of “transformation” as negotiation and reinscription, Morrison
insists that writers, artists, or musicians who engage questions of racial or
ethnic difference frequently refashion artifacts of dominant culture to
challenge the worldview encoded in those texts. Unlike Gates, who tends
to omit or elide ownership questions, Morrison characterizes the entire lit-
igation as an effort to determine the relation between property law and cul-
tural memory: “Who controls how history is imagined?” and “Who gets to
say what slavery was like for the slaves?”50 For Morrison, such representa-
tions of history do not involve simply the past but the continued ownership
of Mitchell’s slaves for future generations. The extent to which Randall’s
text transforms Mitchell’s hinges on Randall’s ability to show the represen-
tational limits and blind spots in Gone With the Wind. Mitchell’s omissions,
which her heirs claim to own as much as they possess the actual text, re›ect
Mitchell’s racial subjectivity and the copyrighted material that ›ows from
it. According to Morrison, Randall must be free to create and own a coun-
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terversion of those events because the only way to transform the future is
to present an alternative vision of the past. It would be ironic, however, to
say the least, if Mitchell’s heirs could demand ownership over and pro‹t
from an act intended to remedy the racist effects of her text. An appropri-
ate analogy would be if a company dumped toxic chemicals that seeped
onto their neighbor’s land and then demanded to be compensated for the
unlicensed use of the contaminating products because their neighbor
sought to remove them. Racialized texts like Mitchell’s should be viewed as
environmental polluters, not the neutral or innocent victims that the fair-
use doctrine suggests. Lovalerie King ingeniously notes that only the com-
mercial success of Gone With the Wind, in part due to its racialized imagery,
could later ‹nance the Mitchell heirs’ lawsuit against Alice Randall and
Houghton Mif›in.51
Although her testimony does not engage with legal discourse at this
level of speci‹city, Morrison implicitly questions both the distributive and
the metaphorical effects of the fair-use doctrine. Fair use, in either its
copyright or its trademark form, allows and perhaps reinforces the original
ownership claim and forces artists, writers, musicians, and others to en-
dorse earlier uses as “fair” even if they intend to engage in an “unfair” use
that transforms the earlier text. The metaphor that permits cultural criti-
cism thus undermines the very cultural or political claims these critics of-
fer. Based on his review of property rhetoric in American culture and its
racial effects, Stephen Best cynically concludes that the rhetoric of equal-
ity or neutrality within property discourses has always operated in a racist
or racialized manner in which African American bodies, cultural practices,
and ideas seem to regularly get transformed into property by whites and
their corporate interests.52 The ‹ction of fair use elides the very way this
doctrine stabilizes the transformative potential of the radical utterances of-
fered by hip-hop aesthetes because fair use does not fundamentally alter or
redistribute property rights. Ongoing critical dialogues about whether
“fair use” applies or ought to apply to a given situation cause antiracist ac-
tivists to adopt a seemingly color-blind language. Although critics and
scholars of African American literature and culture read the novel in ways
outlined by Gates and Morrison, copyright law’s doctrine affected how
Houghton Mif›in marketed the book and how some consumers read the
book. In response to the threat of litigation, Houghton Mif›in marketed
The Wind Done Gone as a parody to augment its fair-use claim, and readers
were encouraged to understand the book in this way once the cover de-
scribed it as an “unauthorized parody.” I would argue, however, that view-
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ing the novel as an example of hip-hop aesthetics, although not a view
adopted by either court during the litigation, might be more useful.
Like other texts that exemplify hip-hop aesthetics, Randall’s relies on
sampling, layering, rhythmic asymmetry, and irony to produce its
metaphoric structure, tone, pace, and ultimately its overall effort at repre-
senting the subjectivity absent from Mitchell’s novel. As the SunTrust court
noted, Randall does not sample or appropriate the entire novel. Rather, she
engages in what courts describe as “fragmented literal similarity” because
she borrows elements almost exactly from the source but then creates a
substantially different text.53 The sampling is thus selective and tactical,
deviating from the original frequently. Randall engages in layering, as she
appropriates only key moments from Mitchell’s text to present its racial-
ized nature and then juxtaposes those samples in rapid succession to
demonstrate how this textual foundation could have uncovered alternative
subjective realms. Randall’s use of staccato-like journal entries, instead of
the ›owing chapters employed by Mitchell, both reinforces the layered
quality of her novel, because she provides an intentionally uneven and
slightly disjointed narrative, and captures the tell-tale rhythmic ›ow and
asymmetry of hip-hop music. Unlike Mitchell’s novel, which appears ency-
clopedic and complete in its description of Southern plantation life, The
Wind Done Gone highlights the novel’s many “breaks.” Through its struc-
ture, Randall’s text reinforces its partial and subjective rendering of events,
calling attention to silences and gaps. The foundational ‹ction upon which
the novel rests—that it is the found journal of a forgotten hero—re›ects
the hip-hop ethic of digging in the crates to ‹nd “phat” beats that have
gone unrecognized. These found sounds, however, serve as both a testa-
ment to the original and an opportunity for the listener/dancer to ‹nd
something new in this material and display their own dancing skills or
moves. The resulting rhythmic ›ow and asymmetry of Randall’s text pro-
vide an opportunity for the reader to look inward and ‹nd his or her own
truths, connecting and disrupting the reader to/from the historical events
the novel describes.
Cynara’s journey, unlike Scarlett’s romantic transcendence of the Civil
War and Reconstruction, offers a more ironic or ambiguous account of
what the era and Mitchell’s novel mean for contemporary African Ameri-
cans. Exploring the inverse of Scarlett’s struggle to maintain her identity
despite the abolition of slavery, Cynara relates her struggle to claim own-
ership over herself during the failed effort at Reconstruction:
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Everything about ownership is changing: land, people, money, gold
into foreign currency back into foreign gold, and gold back into
money in our banks. It doesn’t seem in this time of hurricanes and
storms and other acts of God, with winds of every sort of change in
the air, that hearts would be any different. Why couldn’t she who
couldn’t own, who now owned forty acres and a mule—if I could
own a former plantation—could I not own a planter’s heart?54
In this quotation, Cynara contemplates how newly freed African Ameri-
cans must navigate numerous challenges after the Civil War. Fairly
quickly, Cynara makes a transition from owning wealth to “owning” affec-
tion—suggesting the affective dimensions of ownership and commodi‹-
cation. Although property law traditionally understands its subject as reg-
ulating the relationship between people and things, this passage
intentionally undermines these assumptions by characterizing love under
the rubric of property rights. Cynara’s re›ections bring attention to how
property rights, despite the law’s stated intentions, regulate emotional and
personal landscapes as much as physical ones. Randall’s word choice also
reminds readers that antebellum law offered white men the legal form to
realize their desires, against the wishes of the objects of their affection.
Foreshadowing current debates over intellectual property law and the
likelihood of being sued by Mitchell’s heirs, Randall describes Cynara’s re-
action when R., without permission, reads her diary: “It is thrilling to be
known even when the knowledge is stolen, stolen like rubies.”55 Once
again, Randall frames personal, emotional, psychological, and cultural
con›icts in the language of property law. However, her deployment of
property rhetoric does not offer clear solutions to persistent legal prob-
lems. Property law necessarily appears as both a natural language for artic-
ulating such claims and wholly problematic because it transforms people
and their emotions into commodities. R. ignores Cynara’s ownership over
the journal, and thus she is quite rightly outraged at his behavior. Despite
this violation, Cynara nonetheless relishes the attention being paid to her.
R.’s desire to read her diary in effect validates her worth because R. views it
as something worthy of stealing, which is a perverse honor in its own right.
Through this incident with the diary, Randall shows that the culture in-
dustries have treated African American culture like a colony with raw ma-
terials worth plundering. In the realm of copyright law, jazz and blues mu-
sicians frequently found themselves forced to sign bad contracts that
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transferred their rights to white producers. Having a bad recording con-
tract was better than not having one.56 Hip-hop musicians have seen how
the Federal Communications Commission’s decision to deregulate the air-
waves during the 1990s has contributed to the overexposure of gangsta rap
and the underexposure of other forms of hip-hop.57
For Randall, the prospect of enduring the wrath of the Mitchell estate
presents a surprisingly analogous dynamic. The estate’s copyright infringe-
ment lawsuit against Houghton Mif›in emphasized that Randall’s book
would limit its ability to authorize derivative works, even though its own
guidelines for licensing such works speci‹cally prohibited writers from ex-
ploring miscegenation or homosexuality.58 It appears that through its law-
suit, the Mitchell estate recognized the suppressed subjectivities only to
engage in an act of neocolonialism that retraumatizes African Americans
by refusing them ownership rights to their very thoughts and imaginations.
Because Randall’s subject matter—race and sexuality—contradicts the
Mitchell estate’s wishes, Mitchell’s heirs refused to even consider negotiat-
ing a license with Randall. What caused this con›ict was a concern about
race and sexuality, not the length of copyrights, the topic upon which many
commentators focused. Intellectual property law merely proved an effec-
tive strategy for increasing the value of a copyrighted text and impeding so-
cial and cultural criticism of that product.
A CRT response to intellectual property must engage with how its cen-
tral principles unconsciously invoke, evoke, and protect racism, racializa-
tion, and racist structures. Their transformation likely requires copying,
dilution, and unfair use of existing images, texts, logos, and sounds. The
challenge for antiracist activists will be to become knowledgeable about le-
gal discourse even as they maintain suf‹cient grounding in other discursive
spheres, including music, literature, art, and popular culture, to highlight
the ruptures, ambiguities, and ironies in law’s understanding and regula-
tion of culture and vice versa. Increasingly, cultural practices and legal dis-
course regulate and write over one another. Hip-hop aesthetics, as articu-
lated in and through Randall’s The Wind Done Gone, suggest that the
freedom to innovate, in either law or culture, will be found in the breaks or
ruptures between sampled material.
Fragments of Memory: Mining the Museum
Fred Wilson’s 1992 show Mining the Museum captured the attention of au-
diences and institutions, causing even popular magazines such as Rolling
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Stone and the Economist to review the show.59 Drawing on the work of
David Hammons, Betye Saar, Allison Saar, and others, Wilson’s work takes
ordinary objects, from both high and low culture, and examines the racial-
ized nature of contemporary power relations within them. Wilson does not
merely copy or appropriate but explores the possibility of transforming
American culture. He juxtaposes objects to make explicit the ‹lters or
lenses that limit the American cultural imagination. In particular, Wilson
makes vivid the arti‹cial boundaries created by and reinforced through art
galleries, museums, and curatorial practices. Like Alice Randall, Wilson
helps clear the intellectual landscape so that alternative subjectivities and
perspectives may be heard or seen. Implicitly applying insights from CRT
and postcolonial theory, his installations challenge white supremacy, not
simply as an ideological system but as an ongoing set of unconscious racial-
ized and racist practices perpetuated by well-meaning people whose ac-
tions frequently frustrate their stated intentions or values.60 Some of his
most disquieting pieces demonstrate that apparently color-blind or neutral
categories, such as cabinetmaking and woodworking, have helped maintain
white supremacy in the United States.61 If Whitehead and Charles ques-
tion the fairness of particular images and texts, Wilson interrogates the op-
eration of the entire institutional structure of art in the United States.
In Mining the Museum and other shows, Wilson waits until he is ap-
proached by a museum or institution and then builds a strong relationship
with them.62 Unlike Randall, who had to defend herself from a copyright
infringement suit, Wilson receives permission to appropriate before begin-
ning his installations. This method protects him from legal liability but
limits his art to those institutions that permit him access. Even though he
does not operate as a copyright or trademark outlaw, Wilson’s pieces deploy
hip-hop aesthetics to question how a museum collects and displays objects.
Like other hip-hop aesthetes, Wilson deploys layered samples, borrowed
from the museum, to create ruptures in the American cultural imagination
and ironic commentaries on institutional practices. Wilson describes his
own artistic process: “I appropriate, reuse, and combine things that already
exist. I am guided by concerns that preclude painting, sculpture, and draw-
ing as they are usually known.”63 Following Andy Warhol and many con-
temporary artists, Wilson deploys the museum collections into a critique of
how those institutions aid and abet cultural hierarchy.64
Unlike other practitioners of museum-based art, Wilson seeks to
demonstrate how the host museum perpetuates racism and racial hierarchy
through its curatorial practices and processes.65 He speaks with the mu-
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seum’s curatorial staff, docents, and local experts to deploy the museum’s
collection to show how race, racism, and racialization affect the museum’s
shows. Reviewing Mining the Museum, Maurice Berger concludes that the
installation’s “meaning . . . emerges out of this con›uence of dialogues—
between historical and newly created objects, between artifacts and
‹ctional wall labels, between the codes and styles of exhibition and the ob-
jects they validate and de‹ne, between the artist and the institutions he cri-
tiques, between the spectator and the exhibition itself.”66 Lisa Corrin ar-
gues that Wilson’s work “provides a strategy to reclaim the terrain of the
museum for itself” and “to make cultural experiences ‘mine’ by participat-
ing in the process of writing and presenting history.”67 Somewhat surpris-
ingly, neither Berger nor Corrin (nor other critics who have written on his
work) has connected its aesthetic structure to any musical form, despite the
tendency for such comparisons in African American cultural studies. While
Wilson has casually mentioned that both Romare Bearden and Richard
Hunt inspired him, few scholars have examined how African American art
or music has in›uenced him.68 His transformative use of museum materi-
als displays the elements of hip-hop aesthetics, particularly as his work as-
serts a form of cultural-ownership claims over the host institution. Because
he has received permission to sample the materials he uses, Wilson does
not assert a direct property claim over the museum, but the right of African
Americans to represent themselves within the museum.
For Wilson’s work, the distinction between text and context is blurry if
not nonexistent. Even the book associated with the Mining the Museum
show contributes to this blurring by including comments from docents and
visitors. This leads to the question of whether the docents and visitors, and
their experiences, constitute part of the display.69 Although critics and Wil-
son himself have identi‹ed his primary form as installation, Leslie King-
Hammond suggests that this designation does not do justice to his art’s
complexity. Rather, she argues that “space arrangements may be more ap-
propriate because part of your [Wilson’s] process involves interpreting or
reinterpreting or trying to de‹ne an experience within space.”70 This
dif‹culty in de‹ning the appropriate genre for Wilson’s art re›ects both its
innovative nature and the limits of generic classi‹cations. It also presents a
challenge in describing and analyzing his work. Rather, per King-Ham-
mond’s and Berger’s observations, his work’s central features include its
layered samples and its ideological ruptures that pierce the apparent ›ow
of the museum.
Critics such as Irene Winter and Ira Berlin have analyzed or viewed
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Wilson’s museum installations primarily through the lens of postmod-
ernism or as an application of Foucault’s concept of genealogy. In their
analyses, Wilson deploys documents, objects, and other texts to provide a
counterhistory that explains how America arrived at its current ideological
state. While their analysis provides much of the historical context of his ex-
hibitions, they neglect the aesthetic dimension of his installations. Wilson
deploys these items primarily as samples to be recontextualized into an al-
ternative narrative, not as independent facts that can stand on their own
merit. Wilson has even commented that he sees “beauty as a way of help-
ing people to receive dif‹cult or upsetting ideas.”71 Characteristic of hip-
hop aesthetics, Wilson relies on the logic of the sample to quickly make a
connection with the audience, only to rework the sample and transform its
meaning.72
Perhaps the best examples of his use of sampled materials to visually
convey an idea might be Baby Carriage and Hood, from his installation piece
Modes of Transport, 1770–1910, in the Mining the Museum show. In a 1908
black baby carriage, Wilson placed a white hood, found in Maryland and
presumably used by a member of the Ku Klux Klan. The explanatory cards
accompanying the objects indicated that the makers of both were un-
known. The hood was an “anonymous gift,” a description that ironically
comments on the owner’s ambivalent relations to the hood and the ongo-
ing anonymity surrounding racist activities in the United States. Wilson
produced neither object; rather, he found them within the Maryland His-
torical Society’s collection. Wilson did, however, write the explanatory
note. His creativity, like that of Adrian Piper’s conceptual art, consists in
his ability to juxtapose the objects within a new framework that transforms
their meaning and causes viewers to make new connections between the
objects that had not been obvious but can no longer be denied. In his
analysis of musical sampling, Joseph Schloss argues that the break beats
sampled by hip-hop only come into existence as samples once the deejay
hears and deploys them, thus creating the sample.73 By analogy, the mate-
rials Wilson ‹nds within the Maryland Historical Society’s archives do not
exist as museum objects (neither had been previously displayed) until he se-
lects them for this installation, where they become linked. The connection
between a black baby carriage and a Ku Klux Klan hood is by no means ob-
vious or necessary. However, once joined, they become powerful symbols
of the role African American slaves and domestics played in raising white
children who ultimately became responsible for maintaining and promot-
ing white supremacy. It also presents the irony that many African Ameri-
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can women devoted disproportionate attention and care to white children
who would likely grow up and engage in acts of racial violence against
them, their families, and their community. For some viewers, their juxta-
position constituted the single most powerful moment of the entire ex-
hibit.74 Through these combined samples, Wilson represents the complex
and intertwined relationship between raising children and fostering racial
hatred. The sample thus becomes a key building block in producing the
tensions and contradictions his work seeks to expose. It allows him to un-
dermine the representational practices of museums through mimicry that
takes the familiar and makes it unfamiliar.75
As the relationship between Baby Carriage and Hood suggests, it is not
simply the use of sampled material but how the samples are layered that
structures Wilson’s artwork and differentiates it from other museum-based
installations. For example, Punt Gun juxtaposes a gun with a series of
posters advertising rewards for capturing runaway slaves. On the reward
posters, Wilson highlights the frequent references to distinguishing marks
or traits that resulted from the owner’s violence against the African Amer-
ican slaves.76 The posters, which could be found in both the North and the
South, evidence how such signs and symbols were deeply embedded in
American culture. Further illustrating the quotidian nature of white su-
premacy, Wilson uses not a ri›e but a punt gun in this piece. Hunters used
this gun and others like it for hunting ducks and other fowl, not chasing
runaway slaves. Nonetheless, Wilson tries to demonstrate or jar the audi-
ence into considering how closely related such hunts were, even if today
duck hunting is still commonly practiced and slavery is nearly universally
condemned. Nearby, Wilson has posted a description of game hunting, of-
fered by a white man, and the testimony of a former slave about how whites
raised and trained dogs for tracking runaway slaves. Through this layering
of objects and texts, Wilson’s exhibit relies on the interaction between sam-
ples to raise questions and demonstrate how context determines the mean-
ing and signi‹cance of the text or object.
Irene Winter argues that Wilson’s museum installations force viewers
to confront the contingent or plural histories possessed by artifacts.77 For
Winter, Wilson’s installations undermine the assumption, adopted by fair-
use doctrine, that a particular text possesses a singular and determinate
meaning. Rather, Wilson’s method of juxtaposing objects and texts sug-
gests that museums regulate meaning, much like intellectual property law,
by ‹xing or imprisoning art into a distinct context. By segregating the punt
gun and the reward posters for runaway slaves, museums had in effect
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erased the social or cultural ethos of nineteenth-century white supremacy,
even as they displayed or possessed the objects that told that story. Accord-
ing to Wilson, the context creates a text’s or an object’s meaning. Like in-
tellectual property law, museums discourage transformative uses, as they
tend to protect the expectations of audiences and adopt a “status quo” ver-
sion of visual culture. They can operate more like copyright owners than
like spaces fostering public dialogue because frequently they are heavily in-
vested in the artwork they own and thus inclined to transform their hold-
ings into icons, which conceal the darker side of American history. As in-
stitutions, they prefer stability or continuity to bold change so that they
can purchase art with the con‹dence that their holdings’ value, both eco-
nomic and cultural, will remain high or increase.
The expectations of museums and other cultural institutions run di-
rectly counter to one aspect of African American creativity—signifyin’—
especially as developed by hip-hop aesthetes. Signi‹ers can turn the mean-
ing of any particular text or utterance upside down, depending on how it is
employed or cited. Copyright and trademark law, in part, seek to regulate
the context to which a particular text or mark can be applied. Hip-hop aes-
thetes and other African American cultural workers, however, assume that
a primary artistic challenge is to show mastery over existing texts by re-
working them. Wilson’s creativity centers on the intangible intellectual
and emotional bonds his work elicits, rather than on producing new ob-
jects or texts. The fair-use doctrine purportedly promotes free speech, but
it does so at the cost of characterizing Wilson’s methods as copying, albeit
under the doctrine of fair use, rather than as signifyin’ or some other cul-
tural category, because legal discourse views such texts as static. Wilson’s
deployment of layering undermines this assumption by demonstrating
how historical and cultural context shape a text’s meaning. Layered sam-
ples provide an aesthetic structure to criticize how intellectual property
law protects the status quo, especially in terms of the American cultural
imagination. Because commodities, especially in copyrighted and trade-
marked forms, have become the focus of cultural struggle, efforts to artic-
ulate alternative or subaltern perspectives through those very commodities
increasingly are regulated by intellectual property law and the fair-use
doctrine.
Like other hip-hop texts, Wilson’s installations operate through rhyth-
mic ›ows and ruptures. By offering an elaborate mimicry of curatorial
practices, Wilson’s work deploys layered samples to defamiliarize the fa-
miliar.78 Destabilizing both temporal and spatial dimensions, Wilson relies
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on the structure and feel of the museum precisely to demonstrate what
these institutions consciously or unconsciously hide. In Mining the Mu-
seum, Wilson disrupts the ›ow of the Maryland Historical Society in nu-
merous ways. In one room, he displays the busts of famous non-Marylan-
ders owned by the museum and the absence of busts of famous African
American Marylanders, such as Harriet Tubman, Frederick Douglass, and
Benjamin Banneker. In another room, he displays a portrait by Henry Be-
bie with a rip in it, breaking the general museum practice of only showing
undamaged paintings. Another gallery uses lights and recorded questions
to draw viewers’ attention to how eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
painters used black ‹gures to balance their compositions. The questions
encourage viewers to consider the lost or hidden subjectivities of those
African American ‹gures. At other shows, Wilson has identi‹ed purport-
edly Native American skeletons as “Someone’s Sister” or “Someone’s
Mother” in Friendly Natives (1991) and placed Egyptian-style heads on
Greek statuary in Panta Rhei: A Gallery of Ancient Classical Art (1992). Like
a skilled hip-hop deejay, Wilson’s installation pieces create a particular ›ow
or feeling only to deconstruct the very familiarity offered by that ›ow,
thereby representing the historical gaps in art history.
These moments of rupture allow Wilson to interrogate the assumption
of race-neutrality or color-blindness within art, culture, and law. In an in-
terview with Martha Buskirk and elsewhere, Wilson explains that because
contemporary art, especially its lineage from Duchamp and Warhol, suc-
cessfully destroyed the barrier between high and low culture, the only way
to create ruptures is “look at the museum itself and to pull out the rela-
tionships that are invisibly there and to make them visible.”79 Every ele-
ment of the museum, for Wilson, re›ects the history of race and racism.
While Duchamp, Warhol, and others successfully demonstrated the class
biases and ideology of museums, Wilson extends their critique to racism.
Through his work, it has become clear that museums provide the intellec-
tual space where legal, cultural, and art discourses converge to produce a
racially encoded narrative about genius, creativity, and originality. In this
narrative, individual artists, primarily from Europe, produce paintings
purely from their imaginations based on their interpretation of or response
to Western European culture. Within this narrative, African Americans
and other racially or ethnically marked people produce naturalistic, utili-
tarian, or imitative work that lacks the imagination or creativity of Western
Europeans. African or Asian in›uences on Western art tend to be down-
played, if not ignored. Museum staff and art historians also quietly elide
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the horrors Europeans in›icted on non-Western people by omitting that
art from museums and keeping silent about the historical conditions that
allowed Western museums to gain ownership of non-Western art. The art
museum thus typically provides a history from above that not only refuses
to acknowledge the experiences of ordinary citizens but also makes invisi-
ble colonialism, slavery, and their attendant horrors.
In his museum pieces, Wilson ruptures the unspoken narratives of
racialized genius, elite patronage and ownership of the arts, and color-
blind curatorial practices. Citing Homi Bhabha, Jennifer Gonzalez argues
that Wilson’s exhibit The Other Museum (1990) “present[s] a subaltern per-
spective on colonial conquest and the subsequent international trade in
material goods, aesthetic artifacts, and people.”80 Like Randall’s Cynara,
Wilson’s mining of the museum’s archives allows him to reveal the stories
hidden from dominant culture. Rather than acting as a neutral testament to
artistic achievement, the museum enshrines a set of racialized hopes, fears,
dreams, and aspirations. This unconscious racialized and class gaze appro-
priates and commodi‹es other cultures’ artifacts and practices even as it
devalues the creativity and genius of historically marginalized people.
Gonzalez astutely notes that in The Other Museum the “objects were
identi‹ed neither as the ‘gift’ of a particular donor, nor as having been
anonymously ‘acquired’ by the museum, but rather as ‘stolen from’ a par-
ticular community or sacred burial site.”81 In this exhibition and others,
such as Guarded View (1991) and Friendly Natives (1991), Wilson clari‹es
the regulative function of the explanatory card. Although frequently the
size of a note card, these cards assert ownership and interpretative claims
over the artwork they label and describe. By mimicking the structure/form
of these cards, Wilson questions their banal and frequently color-blind de-
scription of provenance and historical context. This rupture reminds audi-
ences that these cards seek to maintain the status quo and transform po-
tentially dynamic artwork into static representations of white supremacy.
By intervening in the ephemera associated with art, Wilson produces a
break in art history discourses, as well as questioning the allocation and
distribution of ownership rights over art.
Wilson’s imaginative reworking of museum collections frequently re-
sults in irony and ambiguity.82 In these works, Wilson deploys the artifacts
not as unique objects, but as symptoms or effects of institutional practices
and ideology. By making previously hidden curatorial decisions visible,
Wilson offers an ironic reading of textual meaning. While Duchamp and
Warhol used the museum space to criticize high culture’s faux elitism and
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the growing in›uence of popular culture, Wilson’s irony aims at the neces-
sarily contradictory roles museums perform in contemporary culture. The
museum, as George Stocking observes, possesses the twin goals of collect-
ing (i.e., owning) art objects and of creating a public space to observe and
discuss art.83 These goals con›ict because successful collecting requires
catering to market ideas and values even if they promote invidious racial
stereotypes and white supremacy. Consequently, museum collections are
unavoidably marked by the potential con›ict between public service and
private ownership. Most institutions resolve this potential con›ict by serv-
ing the public as long as it generally promotes their collections’ market and
cultural value. Through their organizational and taxonomic methods, mu-
seums promote their private interest by downplaying the ambiguity and
irony in their galleries. Wilson observes that “with curating, the whole no-
tion of irony is not involved, often for good reason—because the public in
the museum space expects some form of universal truth or knowledge.”84
What Wilson identi‹es as the curatorial goal of universal truth, I would
characterize perhaps more cynically as mere satisfaction of market de-
mand, or giving audiences what they claim to want. Due to persistent eco-
nomic inequalities and the ongoing cultural hierarchy maintained by many
institutions, meeting market demands frequently means repeating domi-
nant (i.e., white) historical perspectives.
In the exhibition catalog accompanying Wilson’s retrospective show,
Maurice Berger de‹nes Wilson’s narrative form as allegory. For Berger, al-
legory involves “the appropriation of preexisting or familiar narratives in
order to generate a secondary narrative of extended metaphors or associa-
tion.”85 What distinguishes allegory from other appropriative genres, ac-
cording to Berger, is that it “isolates what is culturally signi‹cant from the
past and then interprets it in ways that give it relevance to the present.”86
For Berger, Wilson’s work is not ambiguous but generative because it
demonstrates that past curatorial practices and exclusions continue to
shape public memory. Berger argues that Wilson’s museum installations, in
effect, claim ownership over public memory by reorienting the past and
making its in›uence on the present visible. Berger concludes that this turn
to allegory enables Wilson “to make cultural experiences ‘mine’ by partic-
ipating in the process of writing and presenting history.”87 For Corrin,
Wilson’s art provokes an endless litany of questions, interrogating how
museums represent historically marginalized people. Reading his work
through hip-hop aesthetics, I would argue that Wilson’s installations offer
a more ambiguous account of museums and curatorial practices, which
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does not provide a clear thesis or climax. Rather, Wilson ‹nds hope and
possibility within the various fractures and breaks unearthed.
Although he produces ambiguous or ironic renderings of American cul-
tural history, Wilson differentiates his use of racialized imagery from that
of Michael Ray Charles, Kara Walker, and David Levinthal.88 While these
and other artists have attempted to make art out of the most racist imagery
imaginable, Wilson goes beyond copying or mimicking such imagery and
interrogates the very discursive structures that maintain an unconscious,
yet all too real, racial hierarchy. Rather, he questions the popularity among
African Americans of acquiring racist collectibles as an antiracist strategy:
“In my experience ownership [of racist collectibles] gives you less under-
standing. It numbs and anesthetizes you. Living with these objects in my
studio for a period of time has diminished my anger. They’re insidious.”89
For Wilson, mere copying or mimicry cannot transform racist imagery be-
cause neither challenges the viewer’s stereotypes or assumptions enough.
Using or possessing a racist image, as a result, offers a limited form of own-
ership because at its best it only deconstructs without offering an alterna-
tive vision or view.
Going beyond fair/unfair uses, Wilson deploys pronouns, such as I and
me, to directly engage viewers and have them question the very “forms of
ideological interpellation” or ways their own subjectivity is implicated in
racial myths.90 In pieces such as Mine/Yours (1995) and Me & It (1995), Wil-
son speci‹cally contrasts racist collectibles with himself and other real
African Americans through video installations, family photographs, and ce-
ramic ‹gures. Not simply criticizing or deconstructing racist imagery, Wil-
son represents the symbolic and metaphorical impasse between people, as
raced or ethnically marked bodies, and popular stereotypes. Such imagery
offers an ironic representation of black life because it captures the ambigu-
ous position in which many similarly raced people ‹nd themselves, caught
somewhere in between reality and fantasy. Wilson’s museum installations
assert the lived experience of African Americans against commonly held as-
sumptions in order to transform the viewer’s perceptions and attitudes.
Wilson’s commitment to ironic representations is perhaps most fully
realized in the concluding sections of the Mining the Museum show catalog,
which includes interviews with docents and copies of questionnaires com-
pleted by museum visitors.91 These materials democratize Wilson’s art by
allowing the viewer, not just the artist and the critic, to shape the public
meaning of the work. These extra materials undermine any attempt at pro-
viding a central or unifying theme or narrative to the exhibit. Instead, they
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provide substantial evidence about the ambiguity of Wilson’s project be-
cause a considerable number of docents and visitors offered critical com-
mentary about his installations. Precisely because they articulate critical
reviews, these materials demonstrate Wilson’s commitment, and that of
hip-hop aesthetics, to ongoing democratic dialogue. By providing space
for this commentary, Mining the Museum allows the public, not just experts
and artists, to claim ownership over visual culture and the repositories of
public memory. Such gestures potentially undermine the coherence of the
show because critics and artists no longer can assume that a visual image
means the same thing for all viewers. The bene‹t of Wilson’s emphasis on
ambiguity and irony, however, is that it invites conversation about the role
of the visual arts in a democratic culture. Social transformation can occur
precisely to the extent that multiple viewpoints participate and are socially
recognized. The time for racial or cultural monologues is over, and hip-
hop aesthetics has offered one strategy for asserting cultural identities and
engaging in public conversations about controversial topics.
Unlike Alice Randall, Fred Wilson has not needed to defend himself or
his art in trademark or copyright litigation. Because he speci‹cally receives
the permission of museums before reworking their collections, his use and
critique of racist or racialized imagery have not proven as legally problem-
atic or controversial. This, however, does not suggest that current intellec-
tual property doctrines operate in a racially neutral way or that his work
has not been hindered by legal discourse. Less savvy artists or writers
might have found themselves in legal trouble. Rather, Wilson’s legal ma-
neuvering reinforced the regulative force intellectual property law pos-
sesses. Despite his claims about revealing racialized aspects of American
cultural memory, Wilson himself is limited to criticizing those institutions
that agree to be criticized. His decision to ‹nd museums to serve as willing
antagonists echoes or mirrors some early Civil Rights cases in which the
defendants shared the plaintiffs’ concern with the racial injustice produced
by then-current legal doctrine. This approach relies on what Lawrence
Lessig has termed this “permission culture,” in which the only right a cre-
ator possesses is the right to “call your lawyer.”92 For Lessig, this produces
inef‹cacy and sti›es innovation. For African Americans and hip-hop aes-
thetes, current intellectual property law doctrines speci‹cally limit their
ability to produce texts and reconstruct American culture. Such doctrines
extend ownership interests in whiteness into intellectual property law and
maintain a form of white supremacy within the American cultural imagi-
nation.
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Although both Randall and Wilson undermine speci‹c ownership
claims, neither questions the underlying logic behind property itself. Their
efforts, as hip-hop aesthetes, question the current operation of property
rights but do not lend themselves to being easily transformed into a full-
blown critique of ownership, along the lines of Marxism or socialism.
Rather, they seem to argue for a transformation of the cultural imagination
based on existing principles and theories. In her settlement with the
Mitchell estate, Randall negotiated the derivative rights to The Wind Done
Gone.93 Like many hip-hop aesthetes, she sought marketplace success and
the ability to reap the ‹nancial rewards of that success. Similarly, Wilson’s
provocative juxtaposition of museum pieces ultimately does not transfer
their ownership to him. Rather the museum continues to retain property
rights over the potentially offensive items and could return the collections
to their prior condition before Wilson’s interventions. The only rights
Wilson possesses are those over his photographs of the exhibits.94 Wilson’s
work has brought him considerable fame and fortune, especially as he won
a MacArthur “genius” grant in 1999, primarily for his museum work, and
represented the United States in the 2003 Vienna Biennale. Their efforts
for social change involve the redistribution and reallocation of property
rights, but not a revisioning of the underlying logic of property. Hip-hop
aesthetes such as Wilson and Randall deploy the rhetoric of transformative
use and suggest an alternative trajectory for “property talk” from that of-
fered by legal discourse. Transformative use enables-hip hop-inspired cre-
ators to articulate perspectives not readily available to dominant culture.
The transformation contemplated by hip-hop aesthetics, much like the ap-
proaches offered by CRT, does not offer a revolutionary critique of cul-
tural relations designed to rethink our founding principles. Rather, the
goal of both hip-hop’s materialism and CRT’s manifold criticism of legal
scholarship involves developing strategies to apply foundational legal prin-
ciples more fully and to a wider range of people.
This chapter opens by situating hip-hop aesthetics’ approach to social
transformation within postcolonial theory, feminist theory, and CRT.
Their work explores the possibilities for creating moments and spaces that
enable the subaltern to speak. In a justly famous essay, Gayatri Spivak asks
whether Western discourses allow the historically disenfranchised oppor-
tunities to speak. Spivak offers an ambiguous answer to her own question,
suggesting that the subaltern cannot speak if no one hears her and that
once she begins to be heard, she is no longer subaltern because her words
become part of ongoing cultural dialogues.95 Both Randall and Wilson
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provide literary and artistic spaces for audiences to begin to hear what has
been silenced. Obviously, African Americans have been painting, writing,
and engaging in other creative acts for hundreds of years. However, Wil-
son, Randall, and many others have developed an aesthetic form that not
only allows African Americans to articulate social, political, and cultural
concerns but reveals the absence of those same voices from the dominant
narrative of American cultural history.
Implicit to their ironic narratives, transformation requires a certain
amount of mimicry in order to be perceived and heard as discontent and
critique. Thus, transformative use must operate through copying even as it
seeks to create the space for a new subject in law. For much of American his-
tory, African Americans have been subject to law, as legal discourse fre-
quently determined their fate even though they had few opportunities to
make legal claims as subjects in their own right.96 Legal discourse, whether
slave or segregation law, regulated what African Americans could do with-
out offering the corresponding right to utilize legal discourse for their own
ends. The Civil Rights Movement resulted in numerous legislative acts
that permitted African Americans formal equality and the right to vote, an
education, housing, employment, and other basic rights. While Congress
and the courts provided legal avenues to transform social structures and in-
stitutions, the Civil Rights Movement stopped short of developing mecha-
nisms to confront cultural hierarchy and racialization. Hip-hop aesthetics,
building on jazz and blues paradigms, offers contemporary African Ameri-
can cultural workers a form to foster intercultural dialogue and make own-
ership claims over the American cultural imagination. The transformative
impulse of these claims coheres not in basic assumptions about property
rights, but in their assertion that property rights are thoroughly inter-
twined with racial subjectivity and that ownership over intellectual proper-
ties, especially copyright and trademark, has unconsciously privileged
white perspectives, aesthetics, and cultural forms. Intellectual property law
has historically ignored the subjectivities of historically marginalized
people and relegated their creations to the public domain. By construing
those works as mere folk tales, intellectual property law has allowed domi-
nant culture to plunder the traditions and forms of African Americans and
other minority groups. In response, hip-hop aesthetics offers a strategy to
copy property rights rhetoric so that these artists, writers, and musicians
can be heard even if the desired recognition is rooted more in cultural cap-
ital and cultural worth than anything else.
Transformative use confers not ownership in itself, but a parody of
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ownership. While repeating or mimicking property rights claims, hip-hop
aesthetes generally deploy materialism, commodi‹cation, and private in-
terest as metaphors for ongoing cultural struggles. It is this play between
the presence and absence of ownership rights that produces the ruptures
and ambiguity of hip-hop aesthetics. While both claim ownership over cul-
tural icons and aspects of American cultural history, Randall and Wilson
also undermine these very claims by producing ironic texts that refuse to
provide easy answers. Rather, they offer a series of ruptures that make vis-
ible the silencing and elision of African Americans. Randall’s reader or a
visitor to a Wilson exhibition comes to learn the injustice of past distribu-
tions of property, the challenge facing current ownership patterns, and the
possibility the future holds. Inherited images and disciplinary practices
cannot be transformed by any single attempt to claim ownership. Neither
can a text or an artist complete this work alone. As their work suggests,
claiming ownership over American cultural history requires a complex re-
structuring and redistribution of ownership rights. Acknowledging the re-
ality that intellectual property law regulates the use and ›ow of copy-
righted and trademarked images, texts, and characters and unconsciously
sustains racial hierarchy, Randall and Wilson must negotiate this imperfect
but governing legal terrain as they imagine possible alternatives that will
give voice to African American culture and hip-hop aesthetics. This raced
allocation of property rights cannot be easily resolved as legal discourse,
and hip-hop aesthetics offers overlapping and diverging judgments. Fail-
ure to negotiate their competing demands ultimately means being doomed
to silence, like Spivak’s subaltern. In the post–Civil Rights era context, any
claim to ownership necessarily must be an ironic one because the strategy
to mimic property rhetoric falls back upon itself. The conditions by which
speech is possible, for Randall as “fair-use” parody and with institutional
permission for Wilson, structure and undermine the very ownership claims
their art purportedly makes. But this may be the only avenue to be heard.
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......chapter 7......
From Invisibility to Erasure?
The Consequences of Hip-Hop Aesthetics
In Invisible Man (1952), Ralph Ellison depicted the existential angst of his
nameless protagonist who slowly comes to realize that he is invisible to
whites. Through this novel, Ellison criticized existing social, cultural, po-
litical, legal, and economic discourses for failing to recognize African
American subjectivity. In the novel’s conclusion, the hero contemplates the
actions necessary to cast off this invisibility and demand social recogni-
tion.1 For Ellison, a series of masks have displaced authentic African Amer-
ican experience. Jon-Christian Suggs has argued that Invisible Man “brings
the classical [African American literary] impulse as far as it can go” and
constitutes a harbinger of the burgeoning Civil Rights Movement because
it successfully illuminated the inner struggle faced by African Americans in
a white supremacist culture.2 Despite the novel’s recognition and the many
victories of the Civil Rights Movement, the visibility/invisibility binary has
not steadily disappeared from African American literature, art, music, and
cultural criticism. The quest for authenticity experienced and described by
Ellison’s narrator has become even more desperate in the post–Civil Rights
era, albeit with an ironic twist.
African American cultural workers have increasingly found commercial
and critical success precisely to the extent to which they produce images,
lyrics, and texts that revel in presenting the sordid “reality” of the African
American experience. During the 1990s, gangsta rappers created violent
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(and increasingly ‹ctional or metaphorical) descriptions of urban life.
Other rappers “kept it real” by demonstrating their street credentials
through their clothes, use of slang, and adoption of Black Nationalist
themes. In art and literature, neoslave novels and conceptual art deployed
racist imagery and slave or folk stories to subvert dominant assumptions
even as they experimented with strategies to recuperate and claim owner-
ship over such stereotyped texts. Like Ellison’s invisible man, hip-hop aes-
thetes express considerable doubt that authentic social recognition or cul-
tural ownership can be achieved. They produce an ironic rendering of
African American identity in which authenticity and experience are just an-
other set of masks, concealing as much as they reveal. This dynamic also
revealed itself during the 2008 presidential campaign in which Barack
Obama was accused as being all style but no substance or all rhetoric and
no action.
Due to hip-hop’s reliance on layered samples, rhythmic asymmetries,
and irony, hip-hop aesthetics consistently undermines its promise of liber-
ation and self-ownership because it, too, only offers masks. Despite its
identi‹cation of intellectual property law’s racialized foundations, hip-hop
aesthetics displaces and delegitimizes the very racial subjectivity it pur-
portedly articulates, limiting its ability to redistribute ownership rights.
This critique of copyright and trademark principles encounters its limit in
hip-hop aesthetics’ ambiguous attitude toward property rights rhetoric.
Such skepticism exists because property law seems either too individualis-
tic or too interwoven with white supremacy. Any attempt to reconstruct in-
tellectual property law would likely rely on an essential, authentic, or ro-
mantic subject, which hip-hop aesthetics constantly distrusts and defers.
The net result is a series of artistic, musical, and literary works that strug-
gle against intellectual property law’s complicity with racial hierarchy
without suggesting a clear reform agenda. Exemplifying the conceptual
uncertainty of the post–Civil Rights era, hip-hop aesthetics identi‹es the
ongoing problem of an unjust distribution of resources and income with-
out providing a ready solution. The irony that de‹nes hip-hop aesthetics
offers only a partial solution to racial hierarchy. This impasse presents dis-
tinct challenges to the various disciplines and theories discussed in this
book. Although interdisciplinary inquiry has proved exceptionally useful
for identifying a shared aesthetic and critique of American culture, the
consequences of hip-hop aesthetics’ relation to intellectual property law
reveal the limits of current disciplinary debates. As a result, this book offers
‹ve related yet distinct conclusions.
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African American Literature
Hip-hop aesthetics has challenged romantic and tragic modes of African
American literary representation. It has been wildly successful and produc-
tive. Precisely because it has rarely been the subject of litigation (the no-
table exception here is Alice Randall’s The Wind Done Gone), contemporary
texts that rely on hip-hop aesthetics have been able to sample more ambi-
tiously and make bolder ownership claims over the American cultural
imagination than hip-hop music. By the mid-1990s, litigation and changes
in legal discourse caused producers to limit their use of sampling within
music, and politically conscious or message rap had already peaked in pop-
ularity.3 Ironically, this historical moment coincides with the point when
younger African American writers began experimenting with sampling to
contest the racialization of intellectual properties. Although it has been
commonplace within literary and cultural studies to construct African
American culture across generic boundaries, copyright law’s disparate im-
pact on music, literature, and ‹lm serves as an important reminder that
such disciplinary boundaries matter, especially in terms of how legal dis-
course applies to different artistic forms. In this study, it is clear that con-
temporary African American writers and painters have had signi‹cantly
fewer intellectual property hurdles than musicians.
By the late 1990s, the turn to layered samples and voices, rhythmic and
temporal asymmetry, and irony, however, had begun to seem cliché and
potentially ineffective as an approach to sophisticated renderings of the
contemporary African American experience. While writers continue to
challenge stereotypical depictions of black life and the effect of raced intel-
lectual properties, the multiplicity of voices, images, symbols, and icons in
these texts nonetheless fails to produce a complete or satisfying picture.
Toni Morrison’s multivocal texts with their communal subjects and Colson
Whitehead’s tales of young black professionals struggling for professional
success in the post–Civil Rights era do not provide complete access to their
characters’ interior lives. It is absence, not complete or robust representa-
tion, that de‹nes hip-hop aesthetics. If earlier artists offered masks as pro-
paganda in the struggle for social justice, hip-hop aesthetes stress the par-
tial and constructed nature of those masks. This “new” approach has failed
to capture the rich and potentially contradictory subjectivity of their char-
acters. Beloved, John Henry Days, and The Wind Done Gone rely on hip-hop
aesthetics to make their ownership claims over the American cultural
imagination, but they ultimately fall short of realizing their artistic ambi-
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tions. Morrison and Randall offer potentially romantic conclusions to oth-
erwise ambiguous narratives, while Whitehead’s protagonists simply disap-
pear.
In Erasure (2001), Percival Everett brilliantly comments and signi‹es
upon hip-hop aesthetics. Everett suggests that contemporary literature,
with the aid of American popular culture, erases the complexity of African
American identity and culture. For Everett, the challenge is not the social
and political invisibility described by Ellison but the absence of ordinary
African Americans from the American cultural imagination. Erasure tells
the story of Thelonious Ellison (also known as “Monk”), a middle-aged
African American writer whose books experiment with post-structuralist
theory and rework classic texts from Western culture. When the novel
opens, Monk has returned to Washington, D.C., his boyhood home, for an
academic conference. The trip, however, quickly becomes a more perma-
nent return as a number of family crises necessitate that he remain longer.
Over the course of the novel, Monk must deal with his sister’s murder by
antiabortionists, his mother’s emerging Alzheimer’s, his brother’s disclo-
sure that he is gay, the revelation of his father’s illegitimate daughter, and
the dismissal of the family’s longtime maid. To respond to these crises,
Monk decides to stay in D.C. and take a leave from his academic position
in California.
In the midst of sifting through his deteriorating family life, Monk reads
a popular novel entitled We’s Lives in Da Ghetto by Juanita Mae Jenkins and
is disgusted by its stereotypical depiction of black life. Jenkins’s novel pro-
vides a putatively realistic (and monolithic) account of black life, but it
completely omits Monk, his family, and his favorite pursuits (›y-‹shing,
woodworking, and postmodern writing) in favor of stereotypes about
black, urban poverty. Angered by Jenkins’s book, Monk writes a parody of
it. He writes it under the pen name Stagg R. Leigh4 and initially titles the
book My Pafology, only to demand that it be changed to Fuck once publish-
ers demonstrate an interest in it. His book includes a retelling of Richard
Wright’s Native Son, but in the vein of 1980s-style autobiographies, which
claim to speak the truth about multicultural America. Of course, the great-
est irony is that this parody is mistaken for realism and wins (over his
protestations as he sits on the award jury as Monk) the National Book
Award. The novel concludes with Monk accepting the book award as Stagg
R. Leigh. In the ultimate act of irony, Monk becomes Leigh and erases his
“real” experiences from the publishing industry and the study of literature.
Everett’s Erasure mimics hip-hop aesthetics, deploying layered samples,
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rhythmic asymmetry, and irony. Rather than exemplifying hip-hop aes-
thetics, the novel suggests that such artistic strategies constitute a failed re-
sponse to the post–Civil Rights era because artists cannot control their re-
ception and because audience perspectives increasingly determine
decisions on whether to publish books or mount art exhibitions. For
Monk, commercial success in the post–Civil Rights era means compromis-
ing his identity. Everett sides with the critics of Kara Walker and Michael
Ray Charles against this commercialization of African American cultural
production. For Everett, hip-hop aesthetics becomes a straitjacket, limit-
ing expressive and representational possibilities. It relies on stereotypes, as
either model or foil, and it requires its practitioners to adopt a series of
masks or poses. Although Everett’s narrator has ostensibly lived an African
American life outside of racial stereotypes, the publishing and ‹lm indus-
try forces him to become a parody of himself in order to receive cultural
recognition and material wealth. Even before his foray into mass-market
publishing, Monk’s interest in ›y-‹shing, woodworking, and postmodern
theory, according to the novel, confused both fellow African Americans
and non–African Americans. In the post–Civil Rights era, writers, painters,
and musicians willingly contribute to their cultural invisibility and mis-
recognition because hip-hop aesthetics offers a parody of ownership, not
ownership itself, due to its overreliance on samples, layering, asymmetries,
and irony. As components of an aesthetic system, each provides partial or
ambiguous views, which erase as much African American subjectivity as
they reveal. Ellison’s nameless narrator engages in an existential struggle
against invisibility, created and maintained by educational, social, legal,
and political institutions. Everett’s Monk struggles not against institutional
limitations, but cultural ones. Academic discourse, the cultural industries,
and the unspoken cultural assumptions of legal discourse continue to pro-
mote a rei‹ed version of black life, whether categorized as signifyin’ or
something else. The overreliance on signifyin’ as a central principle for
African American literature places textual revision, a potentially problem-
atic strategy due to the expansion of intellectual property law, at the center
of contemporary African American writing.
Although critics have criticized hip-hop for the limited or partial views
of African American life it offers, Everett’s novel attempts to simultane-
ously criticize and transcend hip-hop aesthetics on its own terms. Like In-
visible Man before it, Erasure seeks to demonstrate Everett’s mastery over
hip-hop aesthetics and transform them from within the tradition. Everett
argues that this form has not resolved African Americans’ struggle with and
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against literary discourse but merely translated it. The transition from
metaphors of invisibility to those of erasure suggests that the post–Civil
Rights era presents a similar yet distinct challenge for African American
writers. Both invisibility and erasure result in the disappearance of African
American humanity from public discourse. The metaphor of erasure, how-
ever, emphasizes the agency of those who elide the complexity of African
American culture. Everett’s main critical target is not simply hip-hop aes-
thetes, such as Toni Morrison, Colson Whitehead, and Alice Randall, who
have relied on these literary strategies, but the market forces that demand
publishers produce books with recognizable ‹gures and tropes and the au-
diences who gravitate to such books precisely because they trade on such
stereotyped imagery. Everett implicitly argues that publishing and literary
discourses have consistently promoted such works, even though the under-
lying aesthetic continues to emphasize a faux racial authenticity. Erasure
thus questions the entire enterprise of African American literature in the
post–Civil Rights era because its growth and expansion as both a market
and an academic discipline appear complicit in the ongoing marginaliza-
tion and alienation of African American identity and culture. Hip-hop aes-
thetics and its effort to claim cultural ownership by engaging in revisionist
histories and voicing the unspoken narratives hidden by extant intellectual
properties has reinforced the history of slavery and American popular cul-
ture as the central forces shaping African American identity and culture.
Erasure’s Monk is rendered invisible precisely because he and other charac-
ters like him are conspicuous in their absence from African American liter-
ature. And if writers attempt to represent them, they are quickly trans-
formed into more easily recognized stereotypes.
Some recent novels, such as Lalita Tademy’s Cane River (2002), Martha
Southgate’s Fall of Rome (2002), and Bernice McFadden’s Sugar (2000),
have retreated from hip-hop culture and hip-hop aesthetics as primary
in›uences. They suggest a movement away from layered samples, rhyth-
mic asymmetries, and irony. To some, this work might re›ect a return to
more romantic or tragic narrative modes, which possess more con‹dence
in literary representation to produce positive imagery. Unlike Everett’s
Erasure, these novels deemphasize fragmentation and the power of popular
culture in shaping African American identity and culture. It could also be
argued that these works seem less explicitly invested in claiming ownership
over the American cultural imagination or redistributing property rights.
Rather, they offer smaller narratives that chart the complexity of African
American life and seek to represent the trauma of history. They do not
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conclude with a reconstructed imaginary domain that leaves the future
open to limitless possibility. In a subtle but effective way, they suggest that
hip-hop aesthetics may constitute merely one moment rather than a tran-
scendental feature in the development of African American literature.
They may also portend a shift from cultural politics to other potentially
more successful venues for reform and transformation. In the late 1980s,
Trey Ellis announced that the New Black Aesthetic (NBA), which Nelson
George and Mark Anthony Neal have named Post-Soul Aesthetics, was in
the process of transforming the aesthetic strategies inherited from the
Black Arts Movement. Recent responses to these hip-hop-based move-
ments and their relative shortcomings invite the conclusion that post–Civil
Rights era literary and artistic movements ‹t more neatly within the ebb
and ›ow of African American cultural history than previously thought.
Perhaps the development of hip-hop aesthetics shares its strengths and
weaknesses with the very movements, the Harlem Renaissance and the
Black Arts Movement, it had apparently transcended.
African American Art
Hip-hop aesthetics has also caused artists to explore new subject matter
and deploy new methods. Adrian Piper, Michael Ray Charles, and Fred
Wilson have each developed conceptual approaches that undermine the
supposed stability and authority of American popular, mass, and public cul-
ture. They deconstruct the effects of newspapers, advertising, and muse-
ums in shaping public knowledge and opinion, especially by illustrating the
racialization of visual culture. Their art has turned away from depicting
African Americans to explore the relationship between dominant culture
and African American culture. Burgeoning during the 1980s and 1990s,
their work echoes the concerns about cultural ownership articulated in
hip-hop music. It also focuses on the cultural life of stereotyped imagery.
Like their literary counterparts, Piper, Charles, Wilson, and others deploy
sampling, layering, asymmetry, and irony in ways that frequently exceed
music’s experimentation. Generally, visual artists have found greater free-
dom to sample copyrighted and trademarked imagery than their musical
counterparts, in part because they have sold fewer copies of their work and
because their critical commentary may seem more explicit.
This work, based on layered samples, asymmetry, and irony, has found
considerable notoriety, winning Guggenheim fellowships for Fred Wilson
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and Kara Walker. Walker and Michael Ray Charles also became the focus
of a generational dispute about the politics of post–Civil Rights era art dur-
ing the mid-1990s. Perhaps even more so than African American writers,
hip-hop generation artists ‹nd themselves writing a new chapter in the
Harlem Renaissance debates among W. E. B. Du Bois, Alain Locke, and
Langston Hughes.5 Should art constitute propaganda; re›ect cultural de-
velopment; or express the beauty, romance, and tragedy of being a human
being with a particular racial/ethnic history? For their critics, the danger
implicit in the art of Walker, Charles, and Wilson is that they have lost
connection or “empathy based on a rootedness within the center of African
American cultural sensibilities and ancestral connections.”6 Their work,
rooted in commodi‹ed identities, asymmetrical ‹ssures, and irony, does
not ‹t neatly within the paradigms articulated by the founding ‹gures of
African American cultural studies. Although hip-hop aesthetics attempts to
reclaim ownership of raced texts, it fails as Du Boisian propaganda because
the form performs the critique rather than the subject matter presenting
one. Hip-hop aesthetics also fails to embody Lockean principles of cultural
development, because of its reliance on dominant imagery. It could be ar-
gued that such work, due to its reliance on popular culture and its attempt
to represent a particularly raced perspective way of viewing the world,
could ‹t within Langston Hughes’s paradigm for creating art that ›ows
from the experiences of ordinary African Americans. However, too often
this work mines the cultural landscape for symbols whose origin and ›ow
extend far beyond the borders of the African American community. Rather,
it was their popularity with non–African American audiences that pro-
duced or initiated the controversy. Contemporary African American art
has challenged tradition precisely because it fails to conform to expecta-
tions about subject matter and its social purpose. For these reasons, Glenn
Ligon and Thelma Golden have coined the term post-black art to capture
this new situation.7
Few art critics or historians, however, have explicitly linked these new
artistic paradigms to the emergence of hip-hop as a dominant musical
force. Only recently, in a 2005 cover article, did the International Review of
African American Art address “ ‘Post-Black,’ “Post-Soul,’ or Hip Hop
Iconography? De‹ning the New Aesthetics.” The cover featured a Ke-
hinde Wiley painting, depicting a young man clad in an Adidas warm-up
suit and holding a ›ower adorned with a baroque arrangement of leaves
and berries. In this issue, the editors and writers explore the work of young
and/or new African American artists. Despite the inclusion of “aesthetics”
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in the subtitle, Soraya Murray and Derek Murray’s cover article empha-
sizes primarily the range of imagery being deployed rather than shared
methodologies or approaches to the production of art.8 While Murray and
Murray are quite correct in observing that Kehinde Wiley, Lisa Beane, Er-
ick Mack, Wangechi Mutu, and Kori Newkirk, their article’s subjects, have
chosen a wide range of subject matter, they ignore or elide the shared de-
ployment of layers, samples, rhythmic ›ows/asymmetries, and irony. The
example of Wiley is particularly revealing on this point. It is not simply his
choice of young, urban African Americans as models that invokes hip-hop,
but the interaction of these models with Renaissance poses, religious im-
agery, and trademarked objects from popular culture. Together, these ele-
ments represent and criticize hip-hop aesthetics’ ambiguous relationship
with racialized commodities and the dominant culture it supports more
generally. Subject matter analysis has dominated African American art crit-
icism—especially for critics following Du Bois’s or Hughes’s approach to
art—for so long that it will prove dif‹cult to focus on the politics of form,
which has become a hallmark of contemporary African American art.
Analogous to Percival Everett’s criticism of contemporary African
American literature, Lorna Simpson has consistently offered a counternar-
rative to the one offered by hip-hop aesthetics even as she relies on many
of the same artistic devices and strategies. Simpson’s photographs blend
text and image. The photographs typically offer only a partial portrait of
their subject, which is then given meaning in relation to the accompanying
text or title. Focusing on particular clothing items or body parts, the im-
ages, especially those from the early 1990s, often dismember her subjects,
who adopt dramatic but enigmatic poses. Alternatively, Simpson simply
photographs the person from the back. Whereas hip-hop aesthetics typi-
cally revels in the ambiguity produced by sampling, layers, and rhythmic
breaks, Simpson’s photographs consistently mourn the loss of the subject
ostensibly represented, frequently because racist and/or sexist narratives
imprison them. Sampling and layers do not offer freedom for Simpson’s
subjects, only stale poses that frustrate the putative object of photographic
representation.
Huey Copeland argues that the black body has slowly “retreated” from
Lorna Simpson’s work. While some critics have lauded this move because
they perceive that this has made her work more universal, Copeland dis-
agrees and argues that Simpson’s work more forcefully than ever “assert[s]
the presence of one black woman . . . even as her ‹gure is ghosted away.”9
Copeland’s brilliant reading of Simpson’s oeuvre implicates hip-hop aes-
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thetics in the erasure or continued cultural invisibility of African Ameri-
cans. Simpson’s work does not seek to destroy hip-hop aesthetics as an il-
lusion, following Everett. Rather, Simpson has remained a steadfast resid-
ual or emergent voice remarking on the limits of hip-hop aesthetics as a
mode of cultural representation. Against the playfulness of hip-hop aes-
thetics, with its carnivalesque upheaval of discourses and symbols, Simp-
son’s work consistently evokes the violence hiding just beneath the surface
of her images. For example, her well-known piece Guarded Collections
(1989) consists of six identical African American women ‹gures with their
hands crossed behind them. Underneath the women, Simpson arranges
twenty-one plaques that alternate between “Skin Attacks” and “Sex At-
tacks.” By blending text and image, Simpson depicts the typically hidden
violence that African American women must endure. Similarly, her instal-
lation Wigs (1994), which includes images of many wigs, invites viewers to
wonder about how the hair was obtained and the effects of white standards
of beauty that continue to damage the self-esteem of African American
women. In this piece and others, the parts’ detachment from actual bodies
is so ef‹cient, complete, and clinical that Simpson suggests the violence of
severing the hair from the body without actually depicting it.
Drawing on and criticizing the logic of the sample, Simpson forces
viewers to grapple with the violence of removing or creating such objects
and texts. Simpson, especially in this early work, implicitly criticizes hip-
hop’s reliance on layers and sampling to produce irony and ambiguity. For
Simpson, this constitutes a failed response to post–Civil Rights America
because African American culture suffers from the effects of such partial
views, due to the in›uence of newspapers, advertising, and other forms of
popular culture. While she shares hip-hop aesthetes’ concern with the ef-
fects of such intellectual properties, Simpson’s work implicitly argues that
these racialized images and texts cannot be reconstructed by simply de-
ploying them as samples. Nor can African American artists gain ownership
over them by clever or ironic layered samples. She suggests that they pro-
mote racism and sexism precisely because they are partial and incomplete.
Further partial views, Simpson implies, cannot lead to complete and com-
plex images and narratives. Simpson’s work provides an exemplary re-
minder that hip-hop aesthetics has only constituted one strategy to claim
cultural ownership over the persistence of racial stereotypes, especially
those frequently associated with intellectual properties and popular cul-
ture. Pieces such as Guarded Collections and Wigs haunt contemporary
African American art precisely because they require us to encounter the
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ongoing dif‹culty of representing black bodies. Layered samples, rhythmic
›ows/asymmetry, and irony may only defer this foundational problem
without resolving it. Clarifying the relationships among art, literature, and
music will allow scholars to better understand the central tensions,
con›icts, challenges, successes, and failures of post–Civil Rights era cul-
tural production.
Intellectual Property Law
Many developments in digital culture, from Google’s project to create a vir-
tual library to the birth of YouTube.com, have eclipsed sampling as a cut-
ting-edge issue within intellectual property law. These issues are important
ones that need to be considered. However, the creation of new technologies
and the resulting challenges for intellectual property lawyers cannot mask
how “settled” case law and legislation never quite resolved the questions of
property and cultural ownership that hip-hop aesthetes have put forward
over the past two decades. For critical race theorists and other students of
African American culture, the construction and allocation of intellectual
property rights remain crucial issues because race has affected and contin-
ues to affect the distribution of wealth, especially as images of blackness re-
main key components of how American-style capitalism operates.
In his essay “A Portrait of the Trademark as a Black Man,” David Dante
Troutt creates an extended hypothetical about an African American named
MarCus (or “Mark Us”), who owns an advertising company and decides to
trademark himself as the symbol of his company. This hypothetical situa-
tion functions as an allegory about the perils of intellectual property law
for contemporary African Americans. In his trademark application, Mar-
Cus imitates the language of legal discourse and describes himself and what
makes him trademark worthy in color-blind terms.10 Despite the potential
dif‹culties with becoming a trademarked property, MarCus reasons that
“being a registered trademark allows me both to name myself and to inter-
pret the meaning of that name.11 Taking seriously the commodi‹cation of
identity, Troutt wants to examine hip-hop’s apparent complicity in the
propertization of African American identity and culture. He wonders how
intellectual property law would understand this situation and explores the
cultural consequences of MarCus’s decision. Ultimately, Troutt concludes
that law continues to perpetuate a de facto racist and racialized distribution
of intellectual property law rights.12
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Both Troutt and I suggest the dif‹culty of simply applying putatively
color-blind doctrines to African Americans and their creative products.
Throughout this book, I have examined how African American intellectu-
als and artists are continuing to struggle to deracialize the concepts of own-
ership, property, and intellectual property. As part of this effort, my ac-
count of hip-hop aesthetics challenges three assumptions that seem to
structure the ongoing dialogue about intellectual property: (1) that copy-
right and trademark law prior to the 1990s balanced appropriately the
rights of copyright owners and the public, without negatively impacting
particular social and cultural groups; (2) that national and cultural bound-
aries pretty much overlap and that a text’s meaning does not depend on 
cultural boundaries;13 and (3) that the distinctions among copyright, trade-
mark, patent, and increasingly publicity rights possess a quasi-transcen-
dental character and that most cultural groups recognize them as valid.
The growing concern about intellectual property law’s expansion has been
premised upon the basic assumption that, until recently, legal discourse ap-
propriately balanced the rights of intellectual property owners and the
public.14 While the founding ‹gures of critical intellectual property stud-
ies, such as Rosemary Coombe, Jane Gaines, Lawrence Lessig, Kembrew
McLeod, and Siva Vaidhyanathan, have gestured to the historical inequal-
ities resulting from intellectual property law, they have frequently opted
for “color-blind” solutions, emphasizing free culture, freedom of speech,
democratic dialogue, and creativity.15 Even though I appreciate their at-
tempts to speak in a language that courts understand, one of the central
lessons to be drawn from CRT and hip-hop aesthetics is that such color-
blind rhetoric has rarely realized African American dreams for freedom
and equality.
The scholarship of Olufunmilayo Arewa, Stephen Best, K. J. Greene,
Norman E. Kelley, and Frank Kofsky documents how property and con-
tract discourses, along with discriminatory business practices, have system-
atically transferred the ownership rights over African American creativity
to whites. The history of blues and jazz music also provides abundant evi-
dence that African American artists, musicians, and storytellers have rarely
received the ownership rights supposedly offered by intellectual property
law. The current battle over the hip-hop aesthetic’s reliance on sampling
does not offer a novel instance of intellectual property law’s racialized op-
eration and effects. Rather, it provides another instance of legal discourse’s
marginalization and delegitimization of African American culture. By fo-
cusing on historic inequalities and their relation to contemporary intellec-
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tual property law issues, I would argue that today’s copyright and trade-
mark activists are participating in a civil rights effort whose origins can be
traced back to when the ‹rst slaves and indentured servants stepped onto
American soil.
On a deeper level, the putative goals behind many criticisms of recent
intellectual property law—of promoting innovation, creativity, and
democracy—distort the very voices such critics seemingly support. Hip-
hop culture is a materialist discourse, and participants do want to get paid.
While it certainly fosters innovation and offers an alternative public sphere
for some disenfranchised African American youth, hip-hop aesthetics is
fundamentally concerned with the fair distribution of ownership rights and
claiming control over the American cultural imagination. To ignore or
downplay these aspects of hip-hop aesthetics engages in epistemological
violence against the very creators to whom these critics offer support. At
stake in hip-hop’s use of sampling is not simply some theoretical point
about abstract principles or the public good. Rather, at stake is a battle over
capital and capital formation in cash-starved urban communities and mid-
dle-class communities that have too often encountered the glass ceilings in
American corporate life. Despite the partial view it offers of African Amer-
ican life, hip-hop aesthetics may constitute one of the few avenues to social,
cultural, and economic capital for some African American cultural work-
ers. While few musicians, artists, or writers will likely earn a big payday
from their work, hip-hop culture and its accompanying aesthetics consti-
tute one of the few “natural” resources possessed by many young African
Americans. A cynical reader, following Derrick Bell, might conclude that
copyright’s and trademark’s critics only discuss hip-hop or African Ameri-
can cultural history when it coincides with white and/or middle-class in-
terests. While this reading may have some merit, this book is more con-
cerned with encouraging legal critics to gain a deeper understanding of
African American culture as a whole and how the marginalization of
African Americans has been affected through seemingly innocuous and
color-blind rules and doctrines.
One instance in which African American studies can help improve legal
scholarship is through its attention to the shifting nature of cultural
boundaries. Because federal law regulates copyright and trademark (al-
though there is some state trademark legislation), courts and commenta-
tors tend to assume that cultural borders follow legal ones. While legal dis-
course distinguishes between genres in applying copyright law, it does not
recognize how African American culture differs from dominant culture. As
178 / parodies of ownership
this book argues, African American culture possesses a distinct perspective
about the de‹nition of a text and the rules that govern ownership over a
text. Through hip-hop aesthetics, African American culture has engaged in
a vigorous discussion about the right to copy (i.e., sampling versus biting)
and creating trademarked identities out of neologisms and commodities.
Because copyright and trademark have adopted the color-blind rhetoric of
most legal discourse, such cultural distinctions have not been judicially
sanctioned even if they structure how audiences understand hip hop texts.
Rather, courts have attempted to ignore cultural formations and racial
identity even as key cases, such Acuff-Rose v. Campbell and SunTrust v.
Houghton Mif›in, appear to hinge on racial and cultural distinctions. Fol-
lowing the cues of courts, many intellectual property law critics invoke de-
raced and degendered “universal” creators, users, and subjects as if people
do not create, use, and understand texts and objects through a particular
cultural lens.
Perhaps most illustrative of hip-hop aesthetics’ challenge to intellectual
property law is its deconstruction of the idea/expression dichotomy. As dis-
cussed throughout this book, copyright and trademark assume that ideas
can be articulated in many ways, but each expression possesses a singular
meaning. Hip-hop aesthetics, rooted in signifyin’, sampling, rhythmic
asymmetry, and irony, challenges this foundational assumption of intellec-
tual property law. Hip-hop aesthetics sees textual complexity where legal
discourse assumes simple or surface meaning. Because many critics elevate
the broad, general legal assumptions over the more nuanced and speci‹c
categories deployed by cultural studies, some analyses of intellectual prop-
erty resolve prematurely the very cultural and economic con›icts between
African Americans and white Americans that have found legal expression
within intellectual property law. Attempting to remedy the inef‹ciencies or
absurdities of intellectual property law without referencing its complicity
in the de facto and probably de jure transfer of wealth from African Amer-
icans to white Americans is unlikely to prove successful. Resolving other
cultural/economic con›icts, whether they involve fan ‹ction or unautho-
rized music trading, probably requires engaging with histories of discrimi-
nation and power inequalities, not simply a slight tweaking of abstract le-
gal formulas.
Last, this cross-genre study of hip-hop aesthetics challenges the estab-
lished distinctions among intellectual property law’s sub‹elds. Although
doctrinal distinctions differentiate copyright, trademark, patent, and in-
creasingly publicity rights, it is increasingly common for individuals and
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corporations, no matter their racial identity, to claim multiple forms of
ownership over identical or similar materials. For this reason, judicial, in-
tellectual, and scholarly attempts to divide discussions about intellectual
property have proven unrealistic and unduly abstracted from the actual
functioning of intellectual property law in everyday life. From the perspec-
tive of a particular cultural formation, in this case hip-hop culture, the doc-
trinal differences appear merely as roadblocks in the quest for freedom and
equality. Nonlawyers, I found, in the course of working on this book, re-
spond with bemusement to learn that trademark law applies to Michael
Ray Charles’s use of Aunt Jemima, but copyright regulates Alice Randall’s
parody of Scarlett O’Hara and Gone With the Wind. It has also proven
dif‹cult to explain to nonlawyers why John Henry is public domain but
Uncle Ben is not, even though both ‹gures originate from, more or less,
the same time period and arguably embody similar racial stereotypes.
These legal distinctions do not immediately affect how African Ameri-
cans deploy and rework such images, texts, and stereotypes. Rather, it ap-
pears as if genre, along with any racial stereotypes associated with it and
the author’s/artist’s racial identity, can shape how courts analyze fair or
transformative use, more than the formal elements contained within the
work. Although much criticism focuses on the universal or cross-cultural
effects of individual doctrines, hip-hop aesthetics suggests that copyright,
trademark, and even publicity rights increasingly are asked to provide the
procedural and substantive rules to negotiate among con›icting cultural
groups. Perhaps efforts to persuade Congress to revise its copyright maxi-
malist approach have failed because proponents have not been sensitive
enough to cultural differences. I think the lessons from the Civil Rights
Movement are illustrative. Although general principles about voting,
housing, and employment discrimination grounded the efforts of activists,
it was the speci‹c instances of race-based discrimination that moved Con-
gress to enact legislation. Today, most people accept race or cultural argu-
ments as necessary elements of employment or voting law. It seems that a
similar revolution is needed for intellectual property law if we aim to cre-
ate a vibrant intercultural discussion about American culture.
Critical Race Theory
Although the two movements responded to the same events and developed
concurrently, few scholars have examined the relationship between hip-
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hop and CRT. This book frequently juxtaposes seminal critical race theo-
rists with hip-hop aesthetes because each provides important contextual
clues to understand the other. I have not claimed or even suggested that
critical race theorists are hip-hop artists or vice versa. Rather, this book
provides some evidence that the aesthetic strategies adopted by both en-
able them to make similar criticisms about how white perspectives domi-
nate American culture and have largely shaped the distribution of property
rights. A more thorough study might reveal that hip-hop aesthetics—sam-
pling, layering, rhythmic asymmetry, and irony—provided the form
through which CRT articulated its alternative vision for legal discourse.
Similarly, further study might conclude that hip-hop and CRT constitute
complementary social justice strategies.
In late 2003 and early 2004, Richard Delgado and Kevin Johnson en-
gaged in a spirited debate about CRT’s future. In a review essay that con-
trasted a collection of recent CRT writings16 and Derrick Bell’s autobiog-
raphy Ethical Ambitions (2002), Delgado expressed concern that CRT lost
its focus during the 1990s and has become splintered into various factions,
especially as Latino/a Critical scholarship (Lat Crit) and its annual confer-
ence have become more active.17 He argued that the conceptual framework
underlying this new scholarship has shifted from a materialist outlook to a
more idealistic one, favoring textual analysis over interrogations of the
speci‹c interrelationships among race, racism, and American law.18 Foun-
dational CRT themes and arguments, such as the interest convergence
thesis, voice scholarship, intersectionality, law school hiring and promo-
tion policies, and racialized scholarly networks, have disappeared, accord-
ing to Delgado, and abstract analyses that seem far removed from the lived
experiences of African Americans and other racial minorities have become
the norm in CRT and Lat Crit scholarship. Supporting his claim, Devon
Carbado and Mitu Gulati have noted that CRT has increasingly viewed
race as macrolevel phenomena rather than as the result of concrete actions
and decisions.19 They, like Delgado, suggest that CRT needs to adopt a
more pragmatic and materialist outlook and examine how speci‹c policies
and doctrines contribute to the persistence of racial inequality.
Within a few months of the review, Kevin Johnson defended recent
trends in CRT against Delgado’s attack. Johnson made an effort to show
how Lat Crit had developed, in part, because CRT, de facto, had ceased to
exist, no longer holding regular meetings, and because CRT needs to tran-
scend the black-white binary, which it may have strengthened inadver-
tently.20 In addition, he attempted to show that “Delgado overstates the
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distinction between ideal and material forms of discourse.”21 For Johnson,
the recent focus on discourse analysis helps explain how social, political,
and economic forces have impeded legal efforts to address the ongoing ef-
fects of race, racialization, and racism in American culture. He argues that
Delgado’s claim that contemporary iterations of CRT do not offer strate-
gies to reduce poverty, housing discrimination, and economic underdevel-
opment in minority communities neglects the relationship between mate-
rial and discursive realms. Using the example of immigration, Johnson
attempts to show how Lat Crit has tackled a practical issue facing minority
communities. The cultural politics around immigration also offers an ex-
emplary instance of how the racialization of American culture gets trans-
lated into both international and domestic policies.22 Through their en-
gagement with immigration, Lat Crits have mapped out the forces that
have been used to divide communities of color, splitting the Latino/a com-
munity and pitting African American and Latino/a leaders against one an-
other. Johnson concludes his response to Delgado by suggesting that Lat
Crit has staked out new territory that complements the arguments offered
by CRT’s founding ‹gures.
Hip-hop aesthetics, in many ways, provides a ready analogy for the dis-
pute between Delgado and Johnson about recent developments in CRT
and Lat Crit. Like CRT, hip-hop has exceeded its original boundaries and
come to dominate contemporary African American art, music, and litera-
ture. As it has grown and developed, hip-hop is no longer the exclusive
property of urban youth of color, adopting multiple forms and being
adapted to many audiences. The original innovators have generally re-
ceded from the scene, and a new generation, for whom hip-hop has always
existed, now dominates contemporary African American music, art, and
literature. By identifying 1991 as the baseline year, this book recognizes
the shifting nature of cultural movements and thus maps hip-hop’s effects
on multiple genres and traditions.
Like hip-hop culture, CRT has also changed since its inception. The
debate between Delgado and Johnson, however, need not harden into two
competing camps: materialism and idealism. As both Delgado and Johnson
suggest, CRT need not choose one over the other, because the ideological
and the material are linked domains. Hip-hop offers a ready example of
one strategy for crossing this apparent divide. Hip-hop aesthetes question
the de‹nition and distribution of property rights even as they create texts
that make ownership claims. This seemingly contradictory attitude re›ects
both law’s historic complicity in racial hierarchy and its unrealized poten-
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tial for creating racial justice. More surprising than its turn to ideological
criticism has been hip-hop’s absence in the writing of CRT and Lat Crit.
Although hip-hop began in the mid-1970s, only recently has CRT or Lat
Crit seriously engaged with law’s regulation of the hip-hop generation and
hip-hop culture. As the dominant aesthetic structure in the post–Civil
Rights era, hip-hop has increasingly served as the voice for and representa-
tion of urban youth of color, even if many judges, legislators, and legal
scholars may lack the skills or cultural competence to decode its meaning.
CRT and now Lat Crit articulate the need for outsider voices in policy
making and legal analysis. Most frequently, they have turned to autobiog-
raphy, dialogue, and other realistic modes of representation as their prin-
ciple means. Questions of genre, aesthetic structure, and narrative mode
have rarely been engaged, resulting in a fairly uncritical reliance on ro-
mantic notions underlying authorship—assumptions these theorists share
with intellectual property law.23 CRT’s literary turn during the 1980s and
early 1990s coincided with growing suspicion about the stability of textual
meaning, especially as texts move across cultural and historical boundaries.
Lat Crits’ more recent focus on discourse analysis re›ects contemporary
intellectual debates. Lat Crit has attempted to explain the relative margin-
alization of CRT doctrines within legal discourse even as CRT has been
moderately successful in publishing books and creating a network of schol-
ars across the country. Bill Clinton’s failed nomination of Lani Guinier
re›ects the relative failure of CRT’s in›uence on legal doctrine. Guinier’s
critics easily distorted her ideas about reforming elections law by charac-
terizing her as a “quota queen,” out of touch with mainstream values.
Guinier’s example suggests that knowledge of material inequality does not
necessarily provide a corresponding politically viable solution to that prob-
lem. Part of this challenge results from the malleability of language, image,
and sound. Content alone does not determine a text’s meaning. As a reter-
ritorializing method for creating art, music, and literature, hip-hop aes-
thetics challenges CRT’s trust in alternative narratives and reconstructed
doctrines for remedying inequality because hip-hop struggles to “keep it
real” in the endless cycle of textual and symbolic appropriation and reap-
propriation.
Hip-hop and intellectual property law have become signi‹cant prisms
through which politicians, cultural critics, activists, and artists of all races,
ethnicities, and classes discuss the nature of creativity and the optimal way
to distribute the ownership rights of creative properties. By and large,
CRT and Lat Crit have not participated in this conversation, nor have crit-
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ics and lawyers engaged in an exhaustive analysis of how the doctrines of
intellectual property law further the racialization of American cultural life
and distribute the ownership rights of those racialized properties. This
book has attempted to bridge the materialist-idealist divide within CRT
and Lat Crit by exploring how hip-hop aesthetics constitutes a literary-
artistic-musical style where material and ideological concerns exist to-
gether. To participate in this debate most productively, CRT and Lat Crit
will need to ‹nd ways to blend methods and theories with the approaches
of those trained in ‹elds of law that have typically be absent from their
conversations. While Delgado is quite correct that poverty, housing, edu-
cation, immigration, and the prison-industrial complex continue to affect
the lives of people of color disproportionately, CRT and Lat Crit cannot
ignore how current intellectual property doctrines commodify cultural
products in a manner that tends to distribute ownership rights over African
American creativity to predominately white corporate interests. Activism
efforts should not only ameliorate poverty and social inequality but pro-
mote the structural conditions whereby African American communities
can capitalize on existing cultural wealth. Perhaps even more importantly,
CRT and Lat Crit need to maintain open dialogues with the communities
they purport to represent. Hip-hop’s materialism, its development of an
aesthetic form as the basis of its ownership claim over American culture,
and its attempt to distinguish itself from previous generations all require
careful attention as CRT and Lat Crit develop the next generation of legal-
cultural criticism. The relative absence of hip-hop and the hip-hop gener-
ation as speci‹c CRT and Lat Crit themes constitutes a major oversight,
but one that can be remedied fairly easily, especially given the large num-
ber of hip-hop texts.
Hip-Hop Studies
Mark Anthony Neal, one of the founders of hip-hop studies, recently ob-
served that hip-hop culture has consistently de‹ned itself not only as a
racial or ethnic movement but as the product of working- or lower-class
norms, values, and experiences. According to Neal, “the concept of ‘ghetto
fabulous’ . . . celebrates certain notions of a normative ‘ghetto’ experience”
as central to hip-hop culture.24 Even though many of hip-hop’s stars, in-
cluding Chuck D, Run DMC, Russell Simmons, and Sean “Diddy”
Combs, possess middle-class roots, hip-hop culture has largely identi‹ed
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itself in opposition to middle-class values and behaviors. Hip-hop studies
has reinforced this distinction by, all too frequently, isolating hip hop-mu-
sic and street culture from contemporary art, literature, and cultural criti-
cism. The unsurprising result is that much, but not all, hip-hop scholarship
has severed hip-hop from its relationship to African American culture, writ
large. Hip-hop culture thus appears to transcend the traditional debates of
African American cultural studies as articulated by Du Bois, Locke,
Hughes, Hurston, and Gates and articulate the pure perspective or experi-
ence of disenfranchised and marginalized African Americans.
Although generally separated by academic scholarship and the public,
the forces that shape hip-hop culture also in›uence contemporary African
American art and literature. Increasingly, African American artists and
writers make explicit references to hip-hop culture within their work and,
like Kehinde Wiley, use hip-hop music to create the context for showing
their work. Hip-hop music does not speak simply to the urban working
class, but to a broad range of African Americans who are still waiting for le-
gal discourse to deliver on its promises of freedom and equality. Like blues
and jazz before it, hip-hop has become a central artistic paradigm for cul-
tural production that cuts across disciplinary boundaries. Contemporary
artists and writers rely on sampling, layering, rhythmic asymmetry, and
irony in their work. These writers and artists have also become the focus of
public controversies and lawsuits regarding their use of racist imagery. In
order for scholars to capture the full impact of hip-hop aesthetics, we will
need to get beyond the romantic view of working-class culture that under-
writes much hip-hop scholarship.25 The debate inaugurated by hip-hop
aesthetics involves a broader range of African Americans than typically
considered, and it may demand a profound reworking of our understand-
ing of African American culture. Hip-hop’s criticism of property law can-
not be characterized as a “pure” or “authentic” working-class perspective.
Isolating hip-hop as the music of poor urban youth in effect marginalizes
its critique and encourages class and generational con›ict. It also decon-
textualizes the many African American writers and artists who have en-
gaged with similar questions, albeit from different cultural and profes-
sional locations. By linking generations and art forms, scholars and
intellectuals can foster community building around shared political, eco-
nomic, and cultural concerns.
Although Chuck D described rap as “Black America’s CNN,” hip-hop
studies should not mistake the music, art, and literature of the post–Civil
Rights era for unmediated realism.26 Grandmaster Flash and the Furious
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Five, Kurtis Blow, and countless others have insisted on “keepin’ it real.”
This rhetorical realism, however, does not mean that these artists simply
describe everything they see or experience. Such an understanding would
neglect the many stylistic and aesthetic choices they make. From Run
DMC’s “Peter Piper” to Jay Z’s “Hard Knock Life” and Kanye West’s
“Gold Digger,” rappers and deejays display conscious efforts to transform
familiar imagery and sounds. These songs display aesthetic traits similar to
those found in texts and images produced by post–Civil Rights era African
American artists and writers. Rather than separating their work, this book
suggests that scholars must engage in greater efforts to examine how hip-
hop aesthetics shapes multiple genres. Perhaps we will learn that KRS
One, of Boogie Down Productions, and CRT share an understanding
about how best to transform American culture. We might also learn to hear
the feminism of Lauryn Hill in the writing of Alice Walker, and vice versa.
The wordplay and humor of De La Soul might have analogs in the writing
of Paul Beatty and the art of Ellen Gallagher. This book challenges the as-
sumption that music is the best or most authentic source for learning about
African American criticism of cultural, social, political, economic, and le-
gal structures. Rather, it argues that African American music, literature,
art, theater, and ‹lm frequently work together to develop such criticisms of
American culture.
Most analyses of hip-hop, especially those that consider lyrics, eventu-
ally grapple with their putative violence and misogyny. Such examinations
rarely connect rappers with visual or literary artists. While Dr. Dre, Snoop
Dogg, and many others have been roundly criticized for writing lyrics that
degrade women and/or rely on invidious stereotypes, scholars rarely exam-
ine how their imagery compares to that of Kara Walker, Robert Colsecott,
Ishmael Reed, Darius James, Dave Chappelle, or Spike Lee. Perhaps the
existence of similar imagery in other genres can help provide a fuller ac-
count of this cultural dynamic. Similarly, the tales of violence found in the
music of N.W.A., Ice T, and Jay-Z may have a greater relation to the vio-
lence depicted and referenced by Alice Walker, Toni Morrison, Fred Wil-
son, and Allison Saar than previously thought, even if the nature of the vi-
olence is quite different. Of course, scholars should try to understand
hip-hop music on its own terms, but that effort should not cause them to
forgo examining the overlap with other artistic forms. Why is it that
African American musicians, artists, and writers—no matter their connec-
tion to hip-hop—continued to offer such violent narratives even after the
victories of the Civil Rights Movement? The answer to this question, I be-
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lieve, is more linked to ongoing race relations than to the nature or essence
of hip-hop music. I hope that this study convinces many hip-hop studies
scholars to look beyond music, graf‹ti, and dance to engage with a fuller
range of post–Civil Rights era cultural productions in answering questions
like these. Hip-hop exempli‹es contemporary tensions, but it is not the
sole repository of those tensions within the post–Civil Rights era.
The con›ict between hip-hop aesthetics and intellectual property law
re›ects the broader and continuing gap between law’s promise and the re-
ality many African Americans face. Hip-hop aesthetics has offered many
African American artists, writers, and musicians a form to articulate this
social frustration and offer cultural criticism. Because of its increasing im-
portance in de‹ning and distributing property, intellectual property law
has regulated how these cultural workers create texts and has become the
subject of considerable discussion within contemporary African American
culture. By viewing each through the lens offered by the other, it is clear
that the turn to intellectual property does not provide a ready solution to
the maldistribution of property rights African Americans have inherited,
nor has legal discourse developed a coherent strategy for applying legal
principles to contemporary African American cultural production that re-
spects its creativity and originality. Like cultural studies scholars who view
hip-hop as realism, legal discourse tends to view hip-hop aesthetics in sim-
ple terms and underestimates and misinterprets the resulting texts. While
African American writers, artists, and musicians clearly rely on property
rhetoric and demand ownership over their work and African American cul-
ture, they also see property law’s limitations and express doubt that such
property claims will produce the results they seek. At this time, intellectual
property law has apparently settled on its method for resolving sampling
cases without fully addressing the cultural con›ict that underlies the ten-
sion between hip-hop aesthetics and legal discourse. It is my hope that one
day lawyers, judges, and scholars can create an intellectual property law
regime that recognizes the creativity of hip-hop and other African Ameri-
can cultural forms and allocates the ownership rights over these songs, im-
ages, and stories to their African American producers.
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